Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Remanded In Part and Plurality and Concurring and Dissenting Opinions filed September 13, 2001.



## In The

## **Fourteenth Court of Appeals**

NO. 14-00-00427-CV

MARIE HOOVER, Appellant

V.

## LEE M. LARKIN and FOUTS & MOORE, L.L.P., Appellees

On Appeal from the 269<sup>th</sup> District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 98-53068

## CONCURRING OPINION

Hoover presented evidence, among other things, that Larkin asked her if she was willing to settle the case for \$20,000, she agreed, and he subsequently told her that the case was settled for \$20,000, but without clarifying that the \$20,000 included approximately \$6,000 which Hoover already owned. If Hoover's evidence is taken as true, as it must be for summary judgment purposes, a reasonable trier of fact *could* (but might not necessarily) conclude from it that: (1) Larkin breached a duty owed to Hoover by materially misstating the terms of the settlement to her; (2) Hoover was entitled to rely on

Larkin to recite the agreement accurately in open court (just as he had been obligated to do when the agreement was being initially reached); and (3) if Larkin failed to recite the agreement accurately in open court, Hoover's failure to catch the discrepancy and correct it, despite subjecting her to a binding Rule 11 agreement, did not absolve Larkin of responsibility for getting her into the jam in the first place. Because a reasonable factfinder could thus reach differing conclusions as to what happened and whether Larkin and Hoover each exercised reasonable care under the circumstances, I concur with the majority opinion that fact issues exist and, accordingly, the summary judgment cannot properly be affirmed.

/s/ Richard H. Edelman Justice

Judgment rendered and Opinion filed September 13, 2001.

Panel consists of Justices Edelman, Frost, and Murphy.<sup>1</sup>

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.3(b).

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Senior Chief Justice Paul C. Murphy sitting by assignment.