Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued – Week of December 14, 2009

NOTE: Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.

Links to full text of opinions (PDF version) can be accessed by clicking the cause number.

Swaim v. State,   No. 02-07-00165-CR    (Dec. 17, 2009)   (op. on PDR) (Holman, J. (Senior Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment); Walker, J., concurs without opinion; Dauphinot, J., dissents with opinion).  [Note: Both opinions are at the same link in one document.]

Held:   No authority relied on by Appellant supports his argument that the trial court reversibly erred by failing to sua sponte include a sudden passion instruction in its charge to the jury at punishment, and trial counsel was not ineffective.

Dissent:    The evidence raised the issue of sudden passion, Appellant could not and did not forfeit the right to a sudden passion instruction by his inaction, and the trial court therefore reversibly erred by failing to give the instruction sua sponte.

Ex parte Chamberlain,   No. 02-09-00079-CR    (Dec. 17, 2009)   (Walker, J., joined by Gardner and McCoy, JJ.).

Held:    As an issue of first impression in Texas, the Texas Sex Offender Registration Program does not violate the substantive due process rights guaranteed to Appellant under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Moreover, the trial court was not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to article 11.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

Speegle v. Harris Methodist Health Sys.,   No. 02-08-00228-CV    (Dec. 17, 2009)   (op. on reh’g) (per curiam).

Held:    Under federal law, hospital is not required to seek payment for medical services from Medicare when the Medicare beneficiary’s hospital bill is covered by liability insurance. In such a case, Medicare benefits are secondary to benefits payable by a third party and hospital is entitled to lien on Medicare beneficiary’s claim against the third party under chapter 55 of the Texas Property Code. To the extent section 146.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code requires hospitals to bill Medicare when it is a secondary payor, it is preempted by federal law.

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