Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued – Week of August 09, 2010

NOTE: Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.

Links to full text of opinions (PDF version) can be accessed by clicking the cause number.

Richardson v. State,   No. 02-09-00195-CR    (Aug. 12, 2010)   (Per Curiam).

Held:   The body of law developed in controlled substance cases pertaining to the linking rule applies to the offense of fraudulent use or possession of identifying information. Therefore, based on: (1) Appellant's control of the vehicle in which the identifying information was found, (2) the amount of evidence relating to identity theft in plain view in the vehicle, (3) the proximity of Appellant to the identifying information, (4) the contents in Appellant's wallet linking him to the identifying information, and (5) the accomplice witnesses' testimony that Appellant knew about the identifying information, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support Appellant's conviction for the offense of fraudulent use or possession of identifying information.

Pena v. Smith,   No. 02-09-00356-CV    (Aug. 12, 2010)   (Meier, J., joined by Walker and McCoy, JJ.).

Held:   Assuming that the allegations and arguments contained in Appellee's pleadings were sufficient to give Appellant fair notice of Appellee's contract claim for breach of the mediated settlement agreement, the trial court nonetheless erred by rendering a judgment enforcing the disputed settlement agreement because Appellee failed to support his action with legally sufficient evidence.

Ex parte Castellano,   No. 02-10-00011-CR    (Aug. 12, 2010)   (Meier, J., joined by Livingston, C.J., and McCoy, J.).

Held: The trial court abused its discretion by not reinstating the personal bond that had been granted Appellant on October 24, 2008, pursuant to code of criminal procedure article 17.151 because, having been released on personal bond, nothing in article 17.151 permitted the State to rearrest Appellant and to begin anew the ninety-day period in that article as a result of only the post-release return of the indictment and because the stipulated evidence foreclosed the possibility that the trial court had required Appellant to give another bond pursuant to article 17.09, section three.

In re S.A.D.S.,   No. 02-09-00302-CV    (Aug. 12, 2010)   (Meier, J., joined by Livingston, C.J., and Gardner, J.).

Held:   The trial court erred by entering an order adding a finding predicated on Texas Family Code section 153.131 because the term varied from the terms of the mediated settlement agreement between Appellant and Appellee. While section 153.131 deals generally with conservatorship, section 153.0071(d) deals specifically with mediated settlement agreements and dictates that a trial court must enter an order complying with the parties' agreement. A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that a more specific statute controls over a more general one. That principle applies in this case. Thus, the trial court was required to comply with the specific edicts of section 153.0071(d) and not the more general section 153.131.

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