Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued – Week of September 13, 2010

NOTE: Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.

Links to full text of opinions (PDF version) can be accessed by clicking the cause number.

Taylor v. Taylor,   No. 02-09-00255-CV   (Sept. 16, 2010)    (Gardner, J., joined by Walker, J.; Livingston, C.J., dissents with opinion). [Note: This opinion was withdrawn February 24, 2011.]
Held:   The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow Appellant to introduce evidence concerning retroactive child support. Appellant pleaded for child support and a temporary order for child support during the pendency of the case, Appellee had specific notice of Appellant's request for retroactive child support, and Appellee did not file special exceptions seeking clarification of any ambiguity in Appellant's pleading. The trial court's erroneous legal conclusion that special exceptions were not required was an abuse of discretion.
Dissent:   None of appellant's pleadings provided fair notice that she was seeking retroactive child support, nor did appellant seek or obtain a trial amendment to include such a request. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow appellant to introduce evidence regarding retroactive child support.
Valdez aka Martinez v. State,    No. 02-09-00292-CR    (Sept. 16, 2010)    (Gabriel, J., joined by Dauphinot and Gardner, JJ.).
Held:    The trial court's failure to properly admonish Appellant as required by code of criminal procedure article 26.13 did not affect Appellant's substantial rights and, thus, was harmless because the record shows that both attorneys and the trial court thoroughly went over the punishment range during voir dire in Appellant's presence and, therefore, that Appellant had notice of the punishment range before he entered his plea in front of the jury, that Appellant was well aware of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea before he entered it because he had discussed the immigration consequences of the plea "at length" with his attorney and had also worked with his immigration attorney in handling the immigration issues related to his case, and that Appellant expressly acknowledged to the trial court that his counsel had admonished him prior to entering his guilty plea.

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