Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued - Week of August 19, 2013

NOTE: Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.

Links to full text of opinions (PDF version) can be accessed by clicking the cause number.

Waterway Ranch, LLC v. City of Annetta, Tex., No. 02-12-00309-CV (Aug. 22, 2013) (Livingston, C.J., joined by Walker and Meier, JJ.).
Held:  The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for Appellee City of Annetta, Texas because Appellant Waterway Ranch, LLC, which owned the property at issue on the date that Appellee annexed it, did not present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Appellant's property was incapable of being annexed under section 43.024 of the local government code. Also, Appellant's complaint about procedural compliance with section 43.024 by the petitioners for annexation was required to be raised by the state through a quo warranto proceeding. Finally, Appellant's claims for inverse condemnation and for a declaratory judgment to establish a nonconforming use of its property were not ripe because governmental proceedings that could have impacted and validated Appellant's rights to develop its property as a manufactured home community were available to Appellant but had not been instigated at the time Appellant brought this suit.
Ex parte Evans, No. 02-13-00037-CR (Aug. 22, 2013) (Livingston, C.J., joined by Dauphinot and Gabriel, JJ.).
Held:  Appellant's argument, which hinged on his contention that the explicit, specific holdings in two United States Supreme Court cases precluded any constitutional punishment that could be applied to him and that his restraint for capital murder was therefore illegal, cannot succeed because the legislature has amended Texas's capital murder sentencing statutes and because the amendments expressly apply to appellant's pending criminal action.
Lundgren v. State, No. 02-12-00085-CR -Opinion, 02-12-00085-CR -Dissenting, (Aug. 22, 2013) (Gabriel, J., joined by Walker, J.; Dauphinot, J., dissents with opinion).
Held:  Appellant, who committed a community-supervision violation seven days after he pleaded guilty to DWI, waived his right to appeal, and was placed on community supervision, could be revoked based on the subsequent violation even though Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and a motion for new trial after the violation occurred but before the revocation. The procedural posture of the case at the time the violation occurred-community-supervision terms were in effect and Appellant had waived his right to appeal-allowed the trial court to punish the community-supervision violation even in the absence of appellate mandate. The motion to suppress evidence of Appellant's intoxication was properly denied because the totality of the circumstances showed that the arrest followed a consensual police-citizen encounter.
Dissent:  Appellant did not waive his right to file a motion for new trial and timely filed a motion for new trial. Because the judgment placing Appellant on community supervision was not final when he committed the new offense, the new offense could not be used as the basis for revocation of his community supervision.
Houston v. State, No. 02-12-00514-CR (Aug. 22, 2013) (Walker, J., joined by Livingston, C.J., and Dauphinot, J.)
Held:  Because this court can consider the bill of costs that was filed in a supplemental record and that sets forth the statutorily-mandated court costs owed by Houston, the trial court judgment's provision that requires Houston to pay $570 in court costs is supported by the bill of costs; because the trial court found Houston indigent prior to trial and did not make a later determination that he was able to pay all or a portion of his appointed attorney's fees, the trial court judgment's provision that requires Houston to reimburse compensation paid by the county to any appointed counsel who represented him is deleted.

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