Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued - Week of September 9, 2013

NOTE: Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.

Links to full text of opinions (PDF version) can be accessed by clicking the cause number.

In re C.H., No. 02-11-00335-CV (Sept. 12, 2013) (Dauphinot, J., joined by Walker and Meier, JJ.).

Held:  Appellant's long delay in requesting that the jury questionnaires be made part of the appellate record would forfeit any possible right under the appellate rules that he might have had to a new trial based on the questionnaires' apparent destruction, and he did not establish that the apparent destruction of the questionnaires violated his statutory right to a jury trial or due process or First Amendment protections. Additionally, Appellant did not satisfy his burden in the Batson hearing to show that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations for striking two black veniremembers were a pretext for discrimination. Further, Appellant did not raise his Brady issue at trial. Also, given the law of parties and the state of the evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the police officer's testimony about what a prison informant told her a co-defendant said. Finally, we hold that Almanza applies to charge error in juvenile cases, that the trial court erred by not including the law of self-defense in the application paragraph of the charge after sua sponte including it in the abstract portion of the charge, and that the error is harmless.

In re J.G., D.G., and C.G., No. 02-12-00085-CV -Opinion, 02-12-00085-CV -Dissenting (Sept. 12, 2013) (Gardner, J., joined by Livingston, C.J.; Dauphinot, J., dissents with opinion).

Held:  The trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition to adopt J.G., D.G., and C.G. filed by C.C. and her husband because the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the adoption was not in the children's best interest is against the great weight and preponderance of the credible evidence contrary to that finding.

Dissent:  The visiting judge, who is the exclusive arbiter of credibility in this case, based his best interest determination on sufficient evidence—the order of termination providing endangerment and abandonment as two of the grounds for termination of C.C.'s parental rights to the children, his observations of her, the testimony she gave at trial, and her refusal to provide the affidavit supporting the children's removal from her despite his express wishes to review the affidavit and her lawyer's assurances that it would be provided. He therefore did not abuse his discretion in denying the petition to adopt filed by C.C. and her husband.

« Return to Case Summaries Home Page «