Appellant pleaded guilty to a jury to the offense of aggravated robbery. The jury assessed his punishment at eighteen years confinement . On January 5, 2001, the trial court entered its judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict. On January 12, 2002, appellant and his attorney signed and filed with the trial court a written waiver of appellant's right to appeal and requested that he be allowed to commence serving his sentence immediately. ⁽¹⁾ On January 23, 2001, appellant's attorney filed a general notice of appeal with the court of appeals. On January 29, 2001, appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. Neither appellant nor his attorney sought permission from the trial court to file a notice of appeal and neither notice asserted that the written waiver was coerced or involuntary. The state moved to have the appeals dismissed. The court of appeals agreed that the written waiver was binding and dismissed appellant's appeals. Monreal v. State, No. 02-01-00057-CR (Tex.App. - Fort Worth, delivered October 25, 2001).

We granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to decide whether the court of appeals erred in holding that he had waived his right to appeal. Specifically, appellant claims that, in a case where a defendant waives his right to appeal without the benefit of any consideration or promise from the state, he should be allowed to unilaterally withdraw that waiver by the timely filing of a notice of appeal, with or without the permission of the trial court.

Appellant further argues that he should not be required to get permission from the trial court because this would place a defendant who wishes to appeal at the mercy of the trial court; if the trial court wanted to prevent the defendant's appeal, the court could simply refuse consent. Appellant asserts that there is no good reason why a defendant should be subjected to such "whim" of the trial court unless the defendant has waived his appeal as a part of some agreement with the state.

Finally, appellant analogizes the waiver of the right to appeal to the waiver of the right to counsel or to remain silent. He asserts that because a defendant can unilaterally withdraw a waiver of the right to counsel or the right to remain silent, he should also be able to unilaterally withdraw the waiver of the right to appeal.

Appellant's first argument characterizes the waiver of the right to appeal as being similar to a contract with the state. This characterization is incorrect. Our law provides that "[t]he defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may waive any rights secured to him by law except that a defendant in a capital felony case may waive the right of trial by jury only in the manner permitted by Article 1.13(b) of this code." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 1.14(a) (2002). There is no requirement that the state reap a benefit to make a waiver binding upon an appellant or that the state be involved in the waiver at all. The waiver is to the trial court, not to the state.

This Court has long held that a non-plea-bargaining defendant can make a valid waiver of the right to appeal so long as it is done after the trial court has completed sentencing. See e.g. Rankin v. State, 46 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Ex parte Tabor, 565 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Ex parte Hogan, 556 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Johnson v. State, 556 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Neither the Code of Criminal Procedure nor the precedent of this Court require that the state receive some benefit before the waiver of the right to appeal is binding on a defendant.

This Court has also long held that where a valid waiver exists, regardless of whether there was a plea agreement with the state, a defendant who wishes to appeal must either receive the permission of the trial court or prove to the court of appeals that the waiver was coerced or involuntary. See e.g. Ex parte Tabor, 565 S.W.2d at 946; Ex parte Hogan, 556 S.W.2d at 353; Johnson v. State, 556 S.W.2d at 818; Hurd v. State, 548 S.W.2d 388, 389-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Bouchillon v. State, 540 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).

Appellant relies upon Blanco v. State, 18 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) in asserting that the existence of a plea agreement impacts the character of a waiver. This reliance is unfounded. In Blanco, appellant entered into a plea agreement with the state that included the waiver of his right to appeal. After the trial court accepted the plea bargain, appellant filed a notice of appeal. He claimed that his waiver was not valid because it was made prior to sentencing. Blanco, 18 S.W.3d at 219. This Court held that because appellant knew the details of the plea bargain and whether any potential errors had occurred prior to entering the waiver, he could not later claim that the waiver was involuntary. Id. Because appellant was fully aware of the likely consequences of the waiver, the state was entitled to insist on the benefits of its bargain even though the waiver had been made prior to the trial court sentencing appellant. Id. at 220.

Blanco did not hold that there must be a plea agreement or that one of the parties must receive some benefit before a written waiver of the right to appeal is binding on a defendant. In Blanco, the plea agreement was important because it was essential to determining whether appellant had made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal. Blanco did not hold that only when a plea agreement exists must appellant seek the permission of the trial court to appeal following a valid waiver. This has never been the law in this jurisdiction.

Appellant has not claimed that his waiver was coerced or involuntary, and his assertion that requiring permission would subject him to the whim of the trial court is without merit. His novel theory, that where the state does not receive any benefit from a waiver a defendant can unilaterally withdraw the waiver, is unsupported by law. This Court has not held that a defendant can simply ignore a waiver of the right to appeal and go straight to a court of appeals without seeking the permission of the trial court, and today we continue to decline to do so. Holding that a defendant can unilaterally waive a written waiver of the right to appeal by the timely filing a notice of appeal would render an otherwise valid and binding waiver meaningless. This could not have been the intent of the legislature when it enacted Art. 1.14(a). ⁽²⁾

Appellant also asserts that the withdrawal of a waiver of the right to appeal should be treated like the withdrawal of the right to counsel or the right to remain silent. Appellant has neither provided this Court with sufficient briefing nor cited any authority in support of his claim. It is not sufficient that appellant raise a general constitutional doctrine in support of his request for relief. Rhoades v. State, 943 S.W.2d 113, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). It is incumbent upon appellant to cite specific legal authority and to provide legal arguments based upon that authority. Rhoades, 943 S.W.2d at 119. Appellant has not provided any legal analysis to support his assertion that a waiver of the right to appeal should be treated in a manner similar to the waiver of counsel or the right to remain silent.

I concur in the judgment of the Court.

Johnson, J.

Delivered: March 12, 2003

En banc

Publish

1. There is no other indication in the record as to why appellant chose to waive his right to appeal.

2. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 1.14(a): "The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may waive any right secured to him by law except that a defendant in a capital felony case may waive the right of trial by jury only in the manner permitted by Article 1.13(b)."