Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued – Week of April 10, 2006

NOTE: Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.

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Decker v. Decker, No. 02-0005-108 (Apr. 13, 2006) (Livingston, J., joined by Gardner and Walker, JJ.).

Held: The evidence was legally and factually sufficient to establish that Appellee lacked capacity when he executed the deeds to the real property and that the transfers of real property were the product of undue influence. Also, when third party failed to establish his bona fide purchaser status regarding motor home conveyed to him by Appellant, trial court erred in not quieting title and awarding motor home to Appellee.

In re M.R.J.M., No. 02-0005-392, consolidated with In re T.C., No. 02-0005-074 (Apr. 13, 2006) (en banc) (Cayce, C.J., joined by Livingston, Dauphinot, Holman, Gardner, Walker, and McCoy, JJ.).

Held: Family code section 263.405(g) is not unconstitutional under the separation of powers clause of the Texas Constitution, because the statute does not interfere with the power courts of appeals are assigned under article V, section 6(a) of the constitution to make the final, conclusive determinations on all fact issues raised on appeal. Section 263.405(g) requires a court of appeals to issue “appropriate orders,” which presumably include orders for a sufficiently complete record of the evidence from a parental-rights termination trial to allow the appellate court to decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that an appeal raising a factual sufficiency complaint would be frivolous. Therefore, without cost to the indigent Appellants, the court reporters in these cases are ordered to prepare and file reporter’s records containing all of the evidence admitted at each of the trials on termination.

In re C.R.P., No. 02-0005-137 (Apr. 13, 2006) (Holman, J., joined by Livingston and Dauphinot, JJ.).

Held: The trial court did not err in dismissing a petition to vacate the adoption of C.R.P., and in the alternative, an original petition for suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Because the mother filed a voluntary affidavit of relinquishment of her parental rights, neither the order terminating her parental rights nor the validity of the adoption order can be challenged more than six months following the date of the termination order. Here, the petition was filed nearly five years following the termination of the mother’s parental rights. Because the parent-child relationship between the child and every living parent of the child has been terminated, the mother’s husband did not have standing to file an original suit affecting the parent-child relationship.

Hogue v. Propeth Lab., Inc. & Propath Services, L.L.P., No. 02-0004-376 (Apr. 13, 2006) (Gardner, J., joined by Livingston and Holman, JJ.).

Held: The trial court did not err by granting a partial summary judgment and directing a verdict in favor of Appellees. Appellants' negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and deceptive trade practice claims were barred by the Medical Liability and Insurance Improve Act's absolute two-year statute of limitations. Appellees were entitled to a directed verdict on Appellants' breach of implied warranty claims because Texas does not recognize implied warranties in the context of professional services.

Hernandez v. Lautensack, No. 02-0005-585 (Apr. 13, 2006) (Gardner, J., joined by Cayce, C.J., and Holman, J.).

Held: The applicable version of the Residential Construction Liability Act provided for abatement of a claim, not dismissal, when a claimant failed to tender timely presuit notice; Appellee presented sufficient evidence of the reasonableness and necessity of the cost of replacing his roof; the evidence was legally insufficient to support jury's finding that Appellee made an excessive presuit demand; Appellee conclusively established attorney's fees in an amount double that awarded by the jury, and the trial court erred by rendering judgment for only the amount awarded by the jury; and the trial court did not err by refusing to reopen testimony so that Appellee could present evidence of his anticipated appellate attorney's fees.

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Updated: 14-Sep-2006