Second Court of Appeals | Case Summaries

Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued – Week of February 2, 2009

NOTE: Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.

Links to full text of opinions (PDF version) can be accessed by clicking the cause number.

Lawson v. State, No. 02-08-00116-CR (Feb. 5, 2009) (McCoy, J., joined by Livingston, J., and William Brigham, J. (Senior Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment)).: Held: Section 71.021 of the Texas Penal Code does not violate the Nondelegation Doctrine because it is neither practical nor efficient for the Texas Legislature, which meets every other year for a few months, to determine the exact requirements necessary to prevent gang members from engaging in future gang activities. Furthermore, the limitations and guidelines in place for section 71.021 prevent it from being unconstitutional "on its face."

Jones v. State, Nos. 02-07-00324-CR, 02-07-00325-CR (Feb. 5, 2009) (Dauphinot, J., joined by Livingston, J., and Dixon W. Holman, J. (Senior Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment)).: Held: The allowable unit of prosecution for the offense of making a false statement to obtain property or credit is the property or credit sought or obtained via the false or misleading statement or statements, not each individual statement made.

Murphy v. State, Nos. 02-06-420-CR, 02-06-421-CR (Feb. 5, 2009) (Holman, J. (Senior Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment), joined by Gardner, J.; Walker, J., concurs without opinion).: Held: After weighing the Barker factors, the record supports the trial judge's ruling to deny Appellant's motion to dismiss, and there was no violation of Appellant's right to a speedy trial. Even though the State offered no valid reason for the lion's share of the delay in this case—a nearly four-year gap of inactivity pertaining to the charges—Appellant failed to assert her right until more than six years after her indictment, and then, she asserted that right in the form of a motion to dismiss on the eve of trial, indicating that she did not really want a speedy trial but wanted only a dismissal of the charges. Further, there is a lack of any substantial personal or defense prejudice resulting from the delay.