Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued – Week of December 27, 2010

NOTE: Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.

Links to full text of opinions (PDF version) can be accessed by clicking the cause number.

Cooper v. State, No. 02-08-00136-CR (Dec. 30, 2010) (McCoy, J., joined by Livingston, C.J.; Dauphinot, J., dissents with opinion).

Held: The trial court made a determination of Appellant's competence to stand trial before accepting his guilty pleas because the punishment charge and judgments reflect the trial court's finding that Appellant was mentally competent to stand trial and the record reflects that the trial court had the opportunity to consider Appellant's competence before trial, that it thoroughly admonished him before trial, and that it had the opportunity to evaluate his mental competence both before and during trial.

Dissent: Because Appellant had previously been judicially determined incompetent, he was presumed incompetent to stand trial. The record does not reveal that the trial court determined that Appellant had regained competence and provided Appellant with the opportunity to object to that determination before proceeding with trial. This case should be abated and remanded as the law requires.

Nichols v. Nichols, No. 02-09-00319-CV (Dec. 30, 2010) (Livingston, C.J., joined by Meier, J.; Gardner, J., concurs with opinion).

Held: The trial court erred by dismissing this case because the divorce decree was interlocutory in that it did not dispose of all parties and claims; therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the nondivorce-related claims. Alternatively, the oral severance order was effective to sever the nondivorce-related claims; thus, the trial court had jurisdiction over the severed claims.

Concurrence: The concurrence would hold that the final decree of divorce was not an interlocutory order but was instead a judgment rendered after a conventional trial on the merits subject to the presumption that it disposed of all claims and parties and was final. The concurrence would also hold that Appellants timely filed their plenary power extending motions, that the record established that the parties and trial court intended to sever the third party claims, and that the trial court was not precluded from signing a written severance order because it did so within its extended plenary power.

« Return to Case Summaries Home Page «