HEARING OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
NOVEMBER 23, 1996

(SATURDAY SESSION)

Taken before William F. Wolfe, Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public in Travis County for the State of Texas, on the 23rd day of November, A.D. 1996, between the hours 8:00 o'clock a.m. and 12:00 o'clock noon, at the Texas Law Center, 1414 Colorado, Rooms 101 and 102, Austin, Texas 78701.



NOVEMBER 23, 1996

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Prof. Alexandra W. Albright Pamela Stanton Baron Honorable Scott A. Brister Prof. Elaine A. Carlson Sarah B. Duncan Michael T. Gallagher Honorable Clarence A. Guittard Tommy Jacks Joseph Latting Gilbert I. Low Russell H. McMains Anne McNamara Robert E. Meadows Richard R. Orsinger Honorable David Peeples Luther H. Soules III Paula Sweeney Stephen Yelenosky

EX OFFICIO MEMBERS:

Justice Nathan L. Hecht Doris Lange Bonnie Wolbrueck

MEMBERS ABSENT:

Alejandro Acosta Jr. Charles L. Babcock David J. Beck Hon. Ann T. Cochran Prof. William Dorsaneo III Anne L. Gardner Michael A. Hatchell Charles F. Herring, Jr. Donald M. Hunt Franklin Jones Jr. David E. Keltner Thomas S. Leatherbury John H. Marks, Jr. Hon. F. Scott McCown David L. Perry Anthony J. Sadberry Steven D. Susman

Hon Sam Houston Clinton
Hon William Cornelius
Paul N. Gold
O.C. Hamilton
David B. Jackson
W. Kenneth Law
Mark Sales
Hon. Paul Heath Till

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ANNA RENKEN & ASSOCIATES CERTIFIED COURT REPORTING

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Good morning,
2	I appreciate everybody being here punctually
3	this morning. It's indeed an imposition on
4	everyone to be here on these Saturday
5	mornings. We will adjourn at noon wherever we
6	may be in the process so that everybody can
7	get back home to their families and so forth.
8	MR. LATTING: My children were
9	crying as I drove off.
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'm sure they
11	were, and you as well.
12	Okay. We have the summary judgment rule
13	that was overnight drafted by Judge Peeples
14	and committee, and I really appreciate their
15	work. I have read it. I'm sure all of you
16	need an opportunity to look at it. Let's just
17	stand still here for a second and everybody
18	will get a chance to look at it.
19	Okay. Is everybody ready to go? Who
20	want to speak first? David, do you want to
21	lead off here?
22	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Me lead
23	off?
24	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir.
25	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Well,

Tommy Jacks drafted something, and then three or four of us looked at it and made minor changes, and I typed it up last night, and that's what you have before you. I did add a little bit to the comment that Tommy had proposed, but the text is verbatim or close to it. And this was our best effort to put into words what we had voted on of the several motions yesterday.

HON. C. A. GUITTARD:

Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge Guittard.

matter that I'm concerned about has to do with the certificate. It seems to me that if the attorney who makes the certificate has made a thorough investigation himself and he has, for instance, a statement in his file by one of the witnesses that would support a fact issue, then he can make this affidavit and say, "Well, the discovery reveals no evidence," when he knows there is evidence available that would prove the respondent's case.

It seems like to me he ought to be

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required to make a certificate that would negate that sort of situation, so I don't know exactly how would you do that, but I suggest, and I move this as a friendly amendment, that in the attorney's professional opinion neither the discovery nor the attorney's investigation of the facts reveals evidence to support the specified elements.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Judge,
I think we voted this rule down along those
lines yesterday and only voted for it after
Judge Peeples made an amendment to eliminate
that, but I may be wrong.

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: That's exactly right.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does anybody want to revote on that issue other than Judge Guittard?

think any of us want that to happen, but when you draft it the way you suggested and it was voted down yesterday, then I think there was a feeling that you'd put a burden on a lawyer that's more onerous than we want to do.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Joe Latting.

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MR. LATTING: I have a

question. Do we need any statement about against whom attorneys' fees might be assessed; that is, under the rules would the judge have the authority to assess them against the party or only against the lawyer, or do we need to address that?

HON. SCOTT A. BRISTER: Well, that's the problem with putting sanctions rules in various places around the rules and why the Sanctions Committee tried to pull them out of all the rules and put them in one place, because you have due process concerns, and what you've got now is the hearing, you've got when is the notice, what's the record, what's the standard. And I mean, I understand wanting to emphasize that in this particular portion, but understand there is a down side every time you put just sanctions in another Does this mean this is a different kind rule: of sanction subject to different procedures than other sanctions or the same?

MR. LATTING: I'm not suggesting one way or the other. I'm just asking a question.

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Do you have a
2	motion?
3	MR. LATTING: No.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Then make a
5	motion.
6	MR. LATTING: No, I'm asking
7	the committee to discuss the issue. If
8	attorneys' fees are granted under this rule,
9	for example, because of a nonmeritorious
10	motion for summary judgment, is the judge
11	empowered to require the payment of those
12	attorneys' fees before the case proceeds?
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Under this
14	rule.
15	MR. LATTING: Or under the
16	rules as we in this rule in conjunction
17	with the other rules we've suggested. What's
18	the law?
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, the
20	answer is it doesn't say so. Now, if anybody
21	wants to move to amend this in some way or
22	another
23	MR. LATTING: Should we clarify
24	that, then, is my question?
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Buddy Low.

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MR. LOW: My question is just that judges aren't going to be given much guideline on when they should award attorneys' fees, and maybe this is the best way to do it, but does it mean just that it's overruled and they automatically may do it? Some of them just do it if it's overruled, even though it's a close question. Or does it have to be something that the judge found was filed in bad faith or something like that? It doesn't give them a guideline. It just says it may award it if it's overruled, and I wonder if that's the way we want it. I raise the I'm not advocating what to put in question. it, but I just raise that question.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Steve Yelenosky.

MR. YELENOSKY: I guess I want to know from Judge Brister what the proposed Sanctions Rules would do and whether it provides variable standards, because even if you have a sanctions rule, is the standard the same in all instances? So you still may need to state, as Buddy is suggesting, some kind of standard here, and then just refer to the

sanctions rule.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, the only problem here is there is only one sanction, attorneys' fees for the defense of the motion, not --

MR. YELENOSKY: But the standard upon which it would be granted, is it a "knew or should have known," or does your rule take care of that?

the discovery rule doesn't because this wouldn't be discovery. This would be
Chapter 10, motions, so if Chapter 10 applied,
you would have to show groundless bad faith,
groundless purposes of harassment. I would
think, just presented with this, I would
construe none of that is necessary. You
presented the motion and you lost. I would
still sometimes award it; sometimes not. I
can assure you some of my colleagues would
consider it to be mandatory and automatic that
if you lose this motion, you pay.

MR. LATTING: Well, then I'm going to have a motion. If it's to that point, then I would like to make a motion.

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Well, let's keep talking about it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does anyone else want to speak to this? Richard.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, let's not forget that we will not have Rule 13 under our vote, that we have Chapter 10, and that this appears to offer an attorneys' fee award that's independent from the sanction rule, but that if the court felt like that the sanction statute had been violated, I would think that the standards of the sanctions statute would still be available. So to me this is a self-contained cost shifting or fee shifting proviso that doesn't have any of the criteria of either our old Rule 13 or the new Chapter 10.

And I also think, based on discussions yesterday, that some people wouldn't vote for this whole rule if we didn't have some really serious impediment to misusing this procedure in my view more serious than Chapter 10.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, focusing on this again, and the language here does not limit the application of this

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procedure to what we talked about yesterday, and I propose language for that, but we're talking about a motion for summary judgment where the trigger is simply filing. plaintiff has no evidence of Element A(2) or whatever, 1, 2, 3 of their claim, or defendant of the defense, period, no evidence is shown. That's why we put the baggage here. the only place where this is to apply. doesn't say that, but I will provide language that I think limits it to that. There are probably better words you can put in place, and we'll get there. I think we're going to get to where the words in this rule (i) or paragraph (i) clearly make it limited to that circumstance, so that's what we're talking about when we're talking about sanctions. Now, that's why it passed yesterday.

But we're not talking about these attorneys' fees as being spread over paragraphs (a) through (h) as summary judgment practice is conducted today. It's only under paragraph (i).

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Well, the last sentence itself says, "If a motion under

this paragraph is denied, attorneys' fees," so that would limit attorneys' fees to this.

Go up one sentence to right in the middle, "The motion shall identify the discovery." We could say, "The motion made under this paragraph shall identify" and so forth, have a certificate, and that would limit the certificate and so forth to this kind of motion. I mean, I think we all want to do that.

Now, as far as attorneys' fees, you know, what I would like to see, I want to penalize the lawyer who files an objectively unreasonable motion. I don't want inquiry into his state of mind, but if a reasonable person objectively can say, "You know, this motion isn't even close," I have no problem with that person paying the attorneys' fees it cost to defend it.

But on the other hand, I don't want to chill and scare people into not bringing good faith, you know, in-the-ballpark motions under this rule. And so I think I would like to say something about, you know, attorneys' fees if it was objectively unreasonable. And I'm not

sure that's the wording, but that's what I would want.

And frankly, I think the attorney ought to be the one to pay it and he shouldn't have to pay it until judgment and it ought to be reviewable on appeal.

MR. LATTING: I would like to enthusiastically agree with almost all of that. I'm not sure that I would only want the attorney to be the one to pay it.

Think about this: In a big serious case where there's a huge record, do we want -- I don't think it's a good idea for this committee to recommend to the Supreme Court to do anything which is going to chill the filing of a motion for summary judgment that is reasonable, because as I understand it, our mission here is to try to hold down defense costs, and we want these motions to be filed if they are bona fide. And so I don't want to have to be looking at a 50,000-page record on discovery and then make my decision, well, I'm going to file a motion for summary judgment in Goldthwaite, but if I'm wrong, my law firm may be looking at a \$10,000 attorneys' fee.

I think we do need to have some objective 1 standard to tell a judge when he can award 2 3 attorneys' fees. And I would say that the appeal -- when it's paid on appeal and so on 4 5 is okay, but I wouldn't want to limit it only to the attorneys, because why not make Exxon 6 7 pay it, if I'm representing them, or American Airlines? 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, who is 10 driving the motion? I mean, if duPont makes 11

the decision to go with it and takes the risk, that's what ought to happen. The lawyer ought to say, "A little shaky here, but it's" --

MR. LATTING: And we file a lot of motions where we do say exactly that.

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: Buddy.

And Luke, remember we MR. LOW: had the discussion about how it would create a conflict between the client and the lawyer. "Well, you didn't tell me to do that."

"Yeah, I did."

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And we've had discussions before that, then, if you tax it against that party and it was the lawyer's fault, nowadays the client, I can tell you, doesn't mind coming back and

telling the lawyer, "You owe me because that was your mess-up." There's no real embarrassment to do that these days, and so I think that would iron itself out.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Steve Yelenosky.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, I guess, as you discussed earlier, if we separated out and excised any reference to evidence which was not already in the record, in other words, the attorney is not attesting that there's no evidence out there, he's just saying, "I've reviewed the record," I'm just wondering sort of out loud when you say, well -- I mean, he's attesting, according to this, according to his professional judgment, he's looked at the discovery and it ain't there. Well, if he's wrong, he either missed something in discovery or his professional judgment as to what is no evidence is wrong. That seems to me to have been his fault.

But on the other hand, I can see, you know, the countervailing issue here. But we have separated out the situation where Exxon just hasn't told the lawyer, because if it's

not in the discovery, you know, he hasn't done anything wrong.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge Brister.

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HON. SCOTT A. BRISTER: I think the concern is bad faith. The concern is an attorney who knows there's something out there and just files the blunderbuss motion, "I don't have any evidence of anything," and that is groundless and it's in bad faith.

Just as another situation that's going to come up, the defendant in medical malpractice says, "You've got nobody to prove causation."

And up to that point they didn't. So the plaintiff more than 30 days before trial goes and hires a new expert. Now, that motion gets denied. But at the time it was filed it was correct. Surely we don't want anybody to award attorney's fees to that guy. But if a motion under this paragraph gets denied, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees for the defense of the motion.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

HON. SCOTT A. BRISTER: Well, I can tell you my colleagues who would. I could

Rusty.

give you their names.

CHAIRMAN SOULES:

MR. McMAINS: Well, my concern is, and there obviously are some people missing today, but in the relatively close votes we had yesterday, the vote was to take out any of those standards in the attorneys' fees. I mean, that was the vote we took, was to just leave it up to the judge's discretion, if it was denied, to assess attorneys' fees, and that's exactly what we proposed to do. Anything else, I think, alters the vote we've already taken on this issue, and you know, it's basically just a complete rehash.

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: I don't remember that being --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yeah. As I review the bidding on yesterday, I'm not sure that ever really got to the focus of a vote. I mean, we did vote that attorneys' fees only would be the consequence.

MR. McMAINS: We voted to take the costs out, but we also voted to take the standards, to just leave it to the discretion of the judge. That was part of Tommy's

1 motion. 2 MR. YELENOSKY: I think that's 3 right. 4 MR. JACKS: Sarah's language 5 was essentially the "knew or should have known" language, and that vote failed. 6 7 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, Judge Brister, are you making a motion that would 8 9 put a groundless and brought in bad faith 10 standard into paragraph (i)? 11 HON. SCOTT A. BRISTER: Well, I 12 mean, I agree to some extent, but we did 13 discuss this yesterday. I mean, definitely I'll move for whatever it's worth. 14 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, anybody 16 that's not here today was invited, and if they 17 want to protect their interest and their 18 position, they can be here. HON. SCOTT A. BRISTER: 19 Then I 20 move for the --21 MS. SWEENEY: Well, for the 22 record, it's incredibly foggy, and at least 23 one person, Paul Gold, is trapped in an 24 airport in Houston. He has been trying to get

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here.

His flight has been canceled.

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are planes not landing here and not taking off from Houston. And so despite the generosity of the invitation, he is trying his darnedest to get here and is avidly interested in this issue. Excuse me, I just wanted to get that on 6 the record. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, he was 8 here yesterday, so let's go forward. HON. SCOTT A. BRISTER: 10 Yeah, I

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would propose that it be the way that David had it yesterday, which is the motion is subject to sanctions under Chapter 10.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that was plainly voted down, because that's the whole array of whatever the judge wants to award.

HON. SCOTT A. BRISTER: How about attorneys' fees pursuant to the standards set in Chapter 10?

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: Tommy Jacks.

MR. JACKS: I'd like to propose some language that Sarah crafted that I think is pretty good. After the phrase "If a motion under this paragraph is denied," insert "and

1	the court finds that the motion was
2	objectively unreasonable at the time it was
3	filed."
4	MS. SWEENEY: Say it again.
5	MR. JACKS: And the court finds
6	that the motion was objectively unreasonable
7	at the time it was filed.
8	MR. LOW: I'll second that.
9	MR. LATTING: I have a
10	question.
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Moved and
12	seconded. Discussion. Joe.
13	MR. LATTING: What's the
14	difference between "unreasonable" and
15	"objectively unreasonable"? And I'm not
16	trying to be funny, I just
17	MR. JACKS: As I understand it,
18	Joe, the difference is you're not trying to
19	say
20	MR. LATTING: Does that mean
21	clearly unreasonable?
22	MR. JACKS: No. It means if
23	viewed as a reasonable person standard, as
24	opposed to what was in the mind of the drafter
25	of the motion.

1 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Excuse me, 2 Judge Peeples just articulated it a minute 3 You're not going to probe the subjective beliefs or strategies of the lawyer making the 4 5 motion, you're going to look at it facially 6 and objectively --7 MR. LATTING: Okay. I just didn't understand what that meant or if 8 9 everybody knows what that means. Okay. 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: the determination. 11 12 Okav. Moved and seconded. Any further discussion? 13 Are we talking MS. McNAMARA: 14 15 about the lawyer paying the fee or the client? 16 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 17 No, we're not talking about that right now. We're talking 18 about adding a phrase, a parenthetical phrase 19 20 that Tommy just stated. 21 MR. YELENOSKY: Before we vote, 22 can I ask what the next vote is going to be, 23 because I'd like to just leave it like it is. So if this doesn't pass as it is, then I'd 24

vote for that. I mean the whole thing.

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Any further discussion? seconded. favor show by hands. voting for the change? MR. YELENOSKY: change. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Four. opposed. qo in.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Moved and Those in

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Are we

Yeah, the

Those 12. 12 to four, that phrase will

Now, I would like to offer -- or Judge, you can read it, but I don't know if anybody should read all that -- but I have proposed language to make this clearly applicable only in the circumstances where a plaintiff or a movant pulls the trigger without any supporting evidence to show that they're conclusively correct and puts the respondent to the defense of a motion as we talked about yesterday. I can read it, or Judge, maybe you can read it if you can read my handwriting.

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: The purpose of it is to make clear that you've got the old kind of summary judgment motion under the old rules, and then in addition, you've

got this one, which is a separate creature.

What Luke has is as follows: In addition to the other procedures available under paragraphs (a) and (b), by further compliance with this paragraph (i), a movant may seek a summary judgment on the ground that the respondent has no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense without presenting any summary judgment evidence to support the motion on such ground.

MR. JACKS: And that goes at the beginning?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right at the beginning.

MR. JACKS: Could you read it one more time?

addition to the other procedures available under paragraphs (a) and (b), by further compliance with this paragraph (i), a movant may seek a summary judgment on the ground that the respondent has no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense without presenting any summary judgment evidence to support the motion on such ground.

MR. LATTING: And what's the purpose of that, Luke?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: To make this apply to that circumstance only, which is what we talked about yesterday.

MR. JACKS: Luke wants to make sure this doesn't apply to his car being at Red McCombs and him being in Idaho.

you an example. I get sued for professional malpractice. Buddy is my lawyer. Buddy files a motion for summary judgment. He's got my affidavit saying I didn't do anything wrong. Joe Latting has 20 vicious affidavits, and they don't come with an affidavit. Now, right now the way this is written, this rule can apply in that situation, even though that's already available and this rule is not in place.

Now, if what we talked about yesterday is a circumstance, where instead of bringing forth affidavits in my defense, Buddy just says, "We've done discovery. They haven't proved anything, and I want a judgment." And he doesn't offer anything. That's what this

7 language is to give a line of demarcation so it doesn't apply to the first. 8 applies where a motion is filed without 9 10 supporting evidence. HON. DAVID PEEPLES: 11 I think everybody would agree to that, Luke. 12 And this 13 is enough of a change, and people who don't understand that, I have no problem with saying 14 15 that, even though I think it's clear anyway 16 since we mean to do that. I say go ahead and I think this could be boiled down to 17 18 half its length, though. 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: As long as we 20 say it clearly, I don't care what words we 21 use. HON. C. A. GUITTARD: 22 I think 23 "other" is unnecessary, just "in addition to the remedies under (a) and (b)." 24 25 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I don't

motion is designed to do.

apply to that situation?

apply to the second situation.

written, it also applies to the first.

MR. LATTING: And this will

This will

The way it's

CHAIRMAN SOULES:

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1 care how it's written. I just want to be sure 2 that that language is in this paragraph so that we know this is new and different and it 3 doesn't affect anything else. 4 MR. LOW: But to me it's more 5 6 than "in addition." We want to know that this 7 one doesn't relate back to the other, don't 8 So your language will do that, not just say this is additional, but this is a separate 9 10 animal right here and it doesn't apply 11 anyplace else. It's not just additional, though, so I think we need to do more than 12 13 that. 14 MR. LATTING: Would it be better to do that in a comment? 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 16 No. MR. LATTING: No? All right. 17 18 MR. JACKS: So moved. 19 MR. LOW: Second. 20 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Seconded. 21 Discussion. 22 All in favor show by hands. 23 Opposed. There's no opposition, so that's unanimous. 24 25 MR. ORSINGER: Luke, can I

comment?

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. Richard Orsinger.

MR. ORSINGER: I can foresee situations where after the discovery window is closed there might be a combined motion where some aspects of the motion are based on specific summary judgment proof and some aspects are based on an allegation that the respondent has no proof. And in the situation like that, it seems to me that the certificate of the lawyer would apply only to the portion of the motion that is relying on a mere allegation of no proof, and that the award of fees based under this rule would not apply to the portion of the motion that is based on a conventional summary judgment proof. understood by everybody?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's the reason I used "ground" in the language I proposed. And I see that "ground" is in the language that Judge Peeples -- let's see, bear with me.

MR. JACKS: The last sentence limits the judge's authority to motions filed

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under this paragraph.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, I know.

But if I have a motion that's partially under this paragraph and partially not under this paragraph, I would want to know whether or not the court is going to single out whether I was right or wrong on my Celotex approach rather than right or wrong on my conventional approach.

MR. JACKS: If the court did not deny the part of your motion that was under this paragraph, the court cannot award attorneys' fees against you.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Good.

MR. JACKS: Now, I think that's clear from the language. I don't think it needs further explanation.

MR. ORSINGER: Maybe you should say if a motion -- the last sentence ought to say, "If a motion or a part of a motion" -- well, see, the motion may be denied, Tommy, but it may be a legitimate dispute, a summary judgment traditional denial as to part and it may be a Celotex analysis.

MR. JACKS: But unless he

denied the part that -- I mean, you've had to identify a part of your motion as a paragraph (i) motion because you've had to make a special certificate for that part of your motion. And unless the court denies that part of your motion, the court can't award attorneys' fees against you. I think that's pretty clear. MR. ORSINGER: Okav. 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I quess it is. 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Rusty. MR. McMAINS: Just for the 13

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record, would this rule, do you think, authorize in the event that the court were to grant the Celotex motion and it go up to be reversed on appeal? Would the appellate court have the authority to award attorneys' fees based on the fact that it should have been denied?

MR. ORSINGER: I don't see how the fees could be proven in the appellate court.

Well, you could MR. McMAINS: make your proof at the time that the order was

1 entered, if you were confident that you were going to reverse it. 2 3 HON. DAVID PEEPLES: If a trial judge granted it, how can you say it wasn't 4 5 objectively reasonable? 6 MR. McMAINS: It depends on the 7 the judge. 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: It depends on 9 the objectivity of the trial judge. MR. JACKS: If it's one of 10 11 Judge Brister's colleagues that he talked about. 12 MR. McMAINS: Especially if 13 they don't have to go through anything. 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Tommy Jacks. 15 16 MR. JACKS: I woke up early this morning realizing that I left out a 17 18 Odd the things you think about. 19 had intended that the -- we have a (1) and a 20 (2) for time periods. My intention was that if there is a discovery period, whether it's 21 22 by court rule or by a scheduling order in the 23 particular case, that this motion couldn't be filed until after the expiration of the 24

discovery period.

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Clause (2) was meant to apply if there was no discovery period, either because our Supreme Court doesn't pass those rules and there is no scheduling order or for some other reason. But a party who wants to file a paragraph (i) motion, they then go to the judge and say, "Judge, tell us what the date is after which we can file one," and the court sets such a date, and that's what (2) is supposed to be.

To make that clear, I propose inserting after the (2) in parentheses and before the words "a date set," the following: "If no definite discovery period has been prescribed, a date set by the court which allows adequate time for discovery."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. If no discovery period has been what?

MR. JACKS: If no definite discovery period has been prescribed. And I use "definite" because, I mean, there is a discovery period in every case under the rules. I mean, it may run up to and through the trial, but there is a discovery period.

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Can I ask

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1 a clarifying question? 2 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, do you want to use "definite" in the first one, "the 3 4 expiration of any definite discovery period"? 5 That word is odd to me. Luke, I don't have 6 MR. JACKS: any strong feelings. I mean, definite is the 7 8 opposite of indefinite. And if you're operating under the rules, you have a 9 discovery period, but it's an indefinite one 10 because it has no date at which it ends. 11 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I quess I'm 12 not following what you're saying. 13 14 "After (1) the expiration of any applicable discovery period," and you say there is an 15 applicable discovery period in every case. 16 so, we don't need number (2). 17 MR. YELENOSKY: Well, there's 18 19 no applicable definite discovery period. MR. JACKS: Then you need 20 "definite" in both cases, but that's 21 22 confusing. 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That makes it

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more confusing to me, but that's okay.

easily confused.

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MR. JACKS: I mean, here is the situation: Right now we're writing on a slate in which our rules do not prescribe a discovery period, true?

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right.

MR. JACKS: We know that in some cases courts order a discovery cutoff date. That to me is an applicable discovery period. We know in other cases the court cannot do that and you're operating under the rules, and your discovery can go right up to the time of trial or beyond.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Or beyond. I don't think there is an applicable discovery period in every case. That's what I'm getting at. I don't think there is one. There's a duty to supplement at some place, but that doesn't stop discovery.

MR. JACKS: Well, then perhaps we need to repair (1) as well. But right now I'd like to focus on (2), and then we can come back and fix (1).

CHAIRMAN SOULES: How about just if there is no applicable discovery period?

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
2	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Can I ask
3	a question, Luke?
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Tommy,
5	you've made a motion. Is there a second?
6	MS. SWEENEY: Second.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
8	Discussion. Judge Peeples.
9	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Okay.
10	Situation one, it seems to me, is if the
11	Supreme Court adopts the Discovery Rules and
12	we've got that kind of discovery rules.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Or a 166
14	order.
15	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Situation
16	number two is when there is a pretrial order,
17	a docketing order or whatever you want to call
18	it.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: No.
20	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Well, I'm
21	saying out in the world, if we're classifying
22	situations, one is when we've got the rules
23	that the Supreme Court may do; and whether

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have pretrial orders, but a lot of them

they do that or not, some cases are going to

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don't.

My question is, in a case in which there has been a lot of discovery and the trial is pretty close but there's no order and the Supreme Court didn't adopt the Discovery Rules, what does the movant have to do? Does the movant have to first go and get an order from the court saying --

MR. JACKS: It would be incumbent upon the movant to have the court set a date after which this motion could be filed.

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: So one of these motions can't be filed unless the court has expressly ruled that there's been enough discovery?

MR. JACKS: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yeah. And that's another curious thing here that we haven't focused our attention on between moving and hearing. What this rule says, paragraph (i), which is fine with me, you can't even file a motion until you're beyond the period.

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Well, I

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quess the next question is, can you file a both heard on the same day? MR. JACKS: this rule that would preclude you doing that. do I do that later? HON. DAVID PEEPLES:

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motion at the same time, a motion to rule that there's been enough discovery and have them

There's nothing in

MR. ORSINGER: Well, as long as you're discussing simultaneity, am I going to now have a court reporter there because I want to prove up my attorneys' fees in the event that the motion gets denied, or am I going to have to do that by affidavit in a response, or

I would have the hearing without a court reporter, and then if I denied the motion and thought it was in the ballpark, let people testify about attorneys' fees.

MR. YELENOSKY: Is this a oneshot deal? Can you do successive motions on different elements?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Before we go on with this, let me get one thing out of the way here just simply in terms of housekeeping.

1	Is there any opposition to adding "if
2	there is no applicable discovery period" after
3	number (2) in the second line?
4	There's no opposition. That will be
5	done.
6	Okay. Now, what else on this rule?
7	MR. YELENOSKY: Can you file
8	successive motions? Can you file on one
9	element and say, "There's no evidence for
10	this," lose that, and then file on another
11	element?
12	MR. JACKS: If you're fool
13	enough to do that, yes.
14	MR. YELENOSKY: Okay. So
15	nobody is going to do that?
16	MR. JACKS: Well
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Oh, yeah.
18	MR. JACKS: I mean, we can't
19	accommodate every aspect of foolish behavior.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
21	Anything else on this?
22	MR. ORSINGER: I'd like to find
23	out for sure whether it's contemplated that
24	attorneys can be sanctioned under this rule.
25	Is that clear? Does everyone understand that

1	attorneys can be or the client can be, or is
2	it just the client? That last discussion left
3	me unclear.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: It doesn't
5	say.
6	MR. ORSINGER: So presumably
7	either could be sanctioned?
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right.
9	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Don't our
10	Discovery Rules in some places say "either
11	or"?
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That doesn't
13	apply to this rule.
14	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: I know.
15	But we've done it before, and when we wanted
16	to do that before, we've said so.
17	MR. ORSINGER: See, I mean, I
18	think I could argue
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Does anybody
20	have a motion to make on this?
21	MR. LATTING: I think it should
22	be "either or," and I think we should say
23	that, and I so move. If it's not clear
24	already under the rules, I think the court
25	ought to be able to, in an appropriate

situation where he thinks that there's been an innocent client but a crazy lawyer, it ought to be awarded against the lawyer. And where he thinks it's a client moving situation, he ought to be able to do it against the client or both.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: This is carrying us to a discussion that we had under the sanctions rule, of course, where all the tension that had been put between a lawyer and his client to come before the judge to sort So this is not an easy issue. this out. can be done quickly or it can be done some other way, but it is not -- I don't want us to rush into this issue without recalling the debate we've had before about the tension between the lawyer and client when we get into this situation. It's fine with me, whatever you want to do. Anne McNamara.

MS. McNAMARA: Keeping with that subject, I think the biggest problem with it is that the big clients will always pay their lawyers for something like that. So that kind of rule would have a disproportionate effect on the little guy, the

one whose lawyer, you know, isn't going to be able to extract from the client the additional So you know, for the Exxons, the money. American Airlines, you're going to want your lawyer to move for summary jdgment. And if the judge hits you with a fine, you're going But it's at the smaller end of the to pay it. scale that it would have an effect. So what are you MR. LATTING:

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suggesting?

MS. McNAMARA: I'm just suggesting that you not focus on the lawyer, not necessarily on the lawyer, because I think it's adding a level of complexity and it's not going to accomplish its intended goal.

MR. LATTING: What do you do when you have a situation where you have, let's say, a small case and you have small individual clients and you get a nutty lawyer who is clearly the problem?

MR. JACKS: With a small mind. MR. LATTING: Or with a big mind. I mean, big mind, small integrity, and he does all kinds of crazy things. It seems to me that Judge Peeples ought to be able to

say, "I'm going to award \$10,000 in attorneys' fees, and I want you to pay it, not your client." And if we're not going to do that, I think we ought to say so. I think this ought to be clearer.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Richard Orsinger.

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MR. ORSINGER: I'm so incredibly troubled by the conflict problem, because the rule you just described is going to put me in a situation where I, as an individual lawyer, have to defend myself from an effort to make me write a check out of my earnings when in reality it's my client that wanted the motion filed and I had advised the client that it was risky and x, y and z, and all of that is a confidential communication, and now I'm in a position where I might have And I'm not in a position to write a check. where I can say it was my client who was the one that wanted to do that and that I gave them fair warning that the sanction might be levied against them. And now it's levied against me?

MR. YELENOSKY: You shouldn't

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1	have filed it.
2	MR. ORSINGER: What?
3	MR. YELENOSKY: You shouldn't
4	have filed it. It's your certificate.
5	MR. ORSINGER: I've got a
6	conflict of interest with my client. If I
7	advise my client that it's a risky motion to
8	file, and the client says, "You're my lawyer.
9	I want you to file it," then I've got to
10	either withdraw from the case or I've got to
11	go into court with the trial judge saying, "I
12	want you, Richard Orsinger, to pay these
13	sanctions," and I can't even tell him that I
14	told the client that he probably wouldn't win.
15	MR. YELENOSKY: Yeah, but the
16	conflict is intrinsic to the whole certificate
17	idea, which is why I spoke against it, just
18	from that perspective. But we've gone with
19	it, and if you go with it, this sort of goes
20	with that.
21	MR. ORSINGER: I don't agree it
22	goes with that.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Tommy Jacks.
24	MR. JACKS: We've only got
25	three choices. We either empower the judge to

assess fees against the lawyer, against the party, or against either one depending on which seems more appropriate.

I mean, one way to solve your conflict problem is just make it the lawyer in every case. And then if the lawyer were made by Ford Motor Company to file this motion even though he's told them it's a loser, and what's more, we may get sanctioned, he can sort that out with the client. If you make it against the party in every case, then in those cases that Joe described, a client is unfairly being made to pay because of a lawyer's either foolishness or lack of integrity. My own vote would be to give the court the discretion to sort it out.

MR. ORSINGER: How does the lawyer protect himself, since the client controls the attorney-client privilege and the lawyer can't speak to what the dynamic was on the decision to file?

MR. JACKS: He says, "I'll pay it, Your Honor," and then he sorts it out with his client.

MR. ORSINGER: I dislike that.

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1 That's inherently unfair to the lawyer, and 2 it's going to lead to a lot of lawyers having 3 to withdraw from employment. 4 MR. JACKS: What do you do with 5 the client in the case with the nutty lawyer? 6 How do you protect --MR. ORSINGER: You let the 7 client --8 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: We can't make 10 I'm not interrupting you, a record on this. 11 I'm letting you talk back and forth, but only talk one at a time. 12 MR. ORSINGER: You let the 13 14 client sue the lawyer if the client gets 15 sanctioned for the lawyer's malpractice. That's the normal remedy for bad legal advice, 16 17 not having the lawyer in there writing checks 18 to the judge and having his hands tied behind 19 his back when he's trying to defend what he 20 did in good faith. That's my view. 21 MS. SWEENEY: But you can't 22 file a malpractice case over \$10,000. 23 just eat it. CHAIRMAN SOULES: 24 You can file 25 a grievance.

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1	MR. JACKS: I have suggestion,
2	and that is just to kind of take a straw vote
3	on who we would rather it be, A, the lawyer
4	only; B, the party only; or (c), either or
5	both depending on the circumstances.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Or silent?
7	MR. JACKS: Or silent. I guess
8	that's the fourth choice.
9	MR. GALLAGHER: What was the
10	fourth choice again, Luke?
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Silent.
12	MR. JACKS: Say nothing. Just
13	leave it as it is right now.
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. I
15	don't know, this is probably going to get to a
16	plurality.
17	MR. JACKS: Well, let's just
18	see where the wind is blowing.
19	HON. SARAH DUNCAN: Can I
20	suggest that we do silence versus something,
21	that that be the first vote?
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
23	Silence versus something. Those who think we
24	leave the rule silent on whether the sanction
25	is imposed against the lawyer or the party or

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both, show by hands. 13.

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Those who feel we should address that issue with express words in the rule show by hands. Two.

13 to two. The rule will not have a mention or a reference to against whom the sanction may be imposed.

Joe.

MR. JACKS: Sarah, that was a very good idea.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I'm trying make a record of the vote and you're talking and the court reporter can't hear what I'm saying, so we've got to keep this better organized.

So by a vote of 13 to two the rule will not express against whom the sanction may be imposed, whether the lawyer, the party or otherwise. Okay. Next. Tommy Jacks.

MR. JACKS: I have two editing changes which I regard as housekeeping. the sentence that begins "The motion shall identify the discovery that has been completed," et cetera, and I think Judge Peeples suggested this but I'm not sure it got

1 done, if we can change that to say, "A motion 2 filed under this paragraph shall identify," 3 just to make clear again that this is a feature only of a paragraph (i) motion. 4 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: The language 6 that I proposed says, "By compliance with this 7 paragraph (i)" and goes forward, so that's another piece of making this only attach to 8 those circumstances. 9 10 MR. JACKS: I suppose when 11 those who are going to edit and make this finally right look at it, if it looks okay 12 13 without this, then that's fine. And I'm content to leave it to the discretion of the 14 15 draftsperson. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anytime that 16 17 there is vagueness about whether anything in this rule might apply to something else, we 18 19 ought to fix it so that it's clear. 20 MR. JACKS: Well, that's the intent of this. 21 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right. 23 HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Is there 24 any reason not to do what Tommy said?

CHAIRMAN SOULES:

No.

1	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: I second
2	the motion.
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Moved and
4	seconded. Those in favor show by hands. 13.
5	Those opposed. None opposed. That's
6	done. It passes.
7	MR. JACKS: The other
8	suggestion I have, and this is a pet peeve of
9	Judge Guittard's and mine, and that is to
10	change the word "nonmovant" to "respondent" in
11	the third from the last line. I know that we
12	use "nonmovant" in other places in the summary
13	judgment rule, but there are nonmovants in the
14	case who have nothing to do with the motion.
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any
16	opposition to that? That passes.
17	MR. JACKS: I'm also reminded
18	by Buddy Low that it's in the caption of the
19	paragraph, and I would change it there too.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any
21	opposition to that? That passes.
22	HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Thank
23	you, Tommy.
24	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anything else
25	on paragraph (i)? Alex Albright.

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: This is
not on paragraph (i). This is on something
else.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Paula
Sweeney.

MS. SWEENEY: Paul Gold called a moment ago and said he could not be here and asked me to express on his behalf this suggestion, with which I concur, that we add at the end of the paragraph, or somewhere in the paragraph, language to provide that the standard of appellate review for overturning or for reviewing one of these summary judgments shall be the scintilla of evidence rule, specifically using the word "scintilla" and not the phrase "no evidence," which seems to be in considerable flux.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Let me see if I can articulate that without saying my position on it.

I guess it would say, "The court shall grant the motion unless respondent produces more than a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact," in the next to the last sentence.

1	Now, that's a way to get there. You're
2	moving that that be done, Paula?
3	MS. SWEENEY: Yes.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Is there a
5	second?
6	MR. McMAINS: Second.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Moved and
8	seconded. Any discussion? Richard Orsinger.
9	MR. ORSINGER: I think I
10	understand what Paul is doing, because he
11	feels like the concept of no evidence is a
12	moving target. But I'll tell you that if a
13	scintilla needs to be a moving target, it will
14	also move, so I don't think we accomplish a
15	damn thing.
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any other
17	discussion? Joe Latting.
18	MR. LATTING: I would be
19	opposed to that. I think it's needlessly
20	cluttering our rules with clutter.
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any other
22	discussion? Those in favor show by hands.
23	One those in favor show by hands. I think
24	you seconded it. Are you for it? One, two,
25	three, four. Four.

Those opposed. 13 are opposed, so the 1 2 motion fails. Anything else on paragraph (i)? 3 Jacks. 4 I'm sorry, Elaine, you had your hand up. 5 We haven't heard from you. Please go on, and 6 then I'll get back to Tommy 7 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Just two 8 points of clarification, Judge Peeples. 9 the second to --10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Silence, 11 We've got to make a record. 12 please. PROFESSOR CARLSON: In the 13 second to the last sentence when we're talking 14 about the nonmovant producing evidence, are we 15 talking about competent summary judgment proof 16 as provided under paragraph (c) of this rule? 17 Did I understand that yesterday? 18 cross-referencing back? We're not talking 19 about necessarily evidence admissible at 20 21 trial? MR. JACKS: That's what the 22 comment says in its last paragraph, "The 23 existing rules continue to govern what 24

constitutes appropriate summary judgment

evidence." 1 2 HON. DAVID PEEPLES: We certainly intend that. 3 At least I do. 4 CHAIRMAN SOULES: And that was 5 part of our vote yesterday when we were up 6 there talking about would it be admissible at 7 trial and so forth. Okay. Tommy. 8 MR. JACKS: In that regard, I think the comment should --9 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. stand adjourned for five minutes. Everybody 11 get done talking, because the court reporter 12 cannot take the person that has the floor's 13 comments when there is a clutter of noise in 14 15 the background. 16 MR. JACKS: Can we please not take a break, because I'm already on borrowed 17 18 time with my wife. I mean, I was supposed to leave --19 20 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we'll try it without a break, but I don't know 21 whether it will work. Okay. 22 23 MR. JACKS: My suggestion is that the last sentence of the comment be 24

broadened somewhat by saying the existing

1 rules continue to govern the general 2 requirements of motions for summary judgment, 3 including what constitutes appropriate summary judgment evidence. My point is you've got 4 5 other things like time limits for filing the 6 motions and how many days before the hearing 7 and responses to court orders, and those, too, 8 apply to a paragraph (i) motion. 9 language may not be the most artful way of 10 saying it, but it gets the idea across, and 11 again, the draftspersons can refine it. MR. LOW: I'll second that 12 motion. 13 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 14 Okay. Any 15 dissent? Okay. That will be approved. 16 Anything else on paragraph (i)? Elaine 17 Carlson. 18 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Just one other last point of clarification. 19 20 movant's attorney does not have to be the 21 movant's attorney in charge, is that correct? 22 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Correct. 23 MR. JACKS: It just has to be

CHAIRMAN SOULES:

It will be

an attorney on his behalf.

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1	someone who becomes counsel of record by
2	filing a motion for summary judgment for the
3	first time.
4	MR. McMAINS: Someone
5	expendable.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anything else
7	on paragraph (i)? Justice Duncan.
8	HON. SARAH DUNCAN: As long as
9	Elaine has brought up the point, I guess there
10	is no sentiment, is what we're hearing, that
11	it has to be the attorney in charge?
12	MR. ORSINGER: I would vote for
13	that. No? All right.
14	MR. GALLAGHER: We couldn't
15	hear you.
16	HON. SARAH DUNCAN: I guess
17	there's no sentiment that the person signing
18	this no-evidence summary judgment motion
19	should have to be the attorney in charge for
20	that party and not someone who is brought in
21	just to sign this motion?
22	MR. JACKS: On behalf of the
23	attorneys in charge, I think.
24	MR. GALLAGHER: I think anybody
25	ought to be able to sign it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: One at the time, please. Would anybody like to speak to Justice Duncan's suggestion? Tommy Jacks.

MR. JACKS: Not necessarily endorsing the system, but acknowledging the system, that in the real world it is frequently not the attorney in charge who would be able to say honestly that he or she has reviewed all the discovery in the case in the certificate. I think we ought to leave it as it is.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Buddy Low.

MR. LOW: Oftentimes there are three or four of us on the pleadings that have different roles. Like I have cases with Ernest Kennedy, and he's the lead counsel, but I sign most of it because I know more.

I mean, I just think we took it out of Rule 8. We redid Rule 8. It used to be "attorney of record" and we've gone through all of that. I wouldn't go for "attorney in charge." I think it should be attorney of record, but we don't find it anymore.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anyone else?

Does anyone want to make a motion? No motion

is on the floor. We'll move on. Anything else on paragraph (i)? Richard Orsinger.

MR. ORSINGER: I'd like to find out who is going to do the final draft and when.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anything else on paragraph (i) before we go to logistics?

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: I have something on a different paragraph in the summary judgment rule.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Did
you have something else, Paula, on
paragraph (i) before we go to logistics?

MS. SWEENEY: Only,

Mr. Chairman, to note that all of the votes that have been taken -- and I'm just doing this because I don't want to waive objection, because some of the votes I have felt have been analyzed retrospectively differently than they were made prospectively. All of the votes at least that I have made on this rule are subject to protest or to objection that I think this is a terrible rule that we shouldn't have, and the fact that we've worked to draft something that has as few warts on it

1 as possible shouldn't be construed as 2 endorsing the rule. Thank you. 3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Justice Duncan. 4 5 HON. SARAH DUNCAN: comment, fourth line, can we add "an element 6 of" between "for" and "a"? "The motion must 7 be specific in challenging the evidentiary 8 support for an element of a claim or defense." 9 MR. JACKS: For an element of a 10 claim or defense? 11 HON. SARAH DUNCAN: 12 Yes CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 13 MR. JACKS: I'll second that. 14 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any objection to that? There's none. That will be passed. 16 It will be approved. 17 Anything else on paragraph (i)? 18 Okay. Who -- Judge Peeples, you've had 19 20 control of the draft. That's certainly fine with me, unless you want to cede it to someone 21 22 else. 23 HON. DAVID PEEPLES: 24 glad to do it. If I can get the names of 25 anybody that wants it, I can do all this and

1	fax it by noon Monday to the people, and they
2	can look at it. I'm doing nonjury this week,
3	Thanksgiving week, and it would be great to
4	MR. ORSINGER: Aren't you going
5	to need the transcript of the hearing, or do
6	you have all of these edits down?
7	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Well, I've
8	been writing down what we're doing.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.
10	Who wants to get the earliest draft in order
11	to give comments back to Judge Peeples?
12	Richard, Alex, Joe, Tommy, Sarah, and Scott
13	Brister. Anybody else? Okay. If you can run
14	the traps, then, with them on your draft to
15	get that back, and then if you will send it to
16	me, I will send it to the entire committee.
17	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: You just
18	want the final product?
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, I want
20	your
21	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Whatever
22	we end up with?
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right.
24	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: I'll pass
25	around a sheet in a minute and you all put

your fax numbers on it and I'll put mine.

Whatever you send to me has got to have my
name it because I share a fax with a bunch of
people. And what I have in mind is you
getting back to me and I'll just keep hitting
you with drafts, and then by Thanksgiving
we'll have something, if you all are as fast
as I'm going to be.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So by Wednesday you're going to have something probably over my fax machine. Okay.

MR. ORSINGER: Now, Luke, would you contemplate, then, that that would come back up for committee vote at the January meeting and then get forwarded to the Supreme Court?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. But because of the timeline that we seem to be confronted with, I think when you get this rule from me, everybody please look at it. If you've got anything to say about it, write me back. Let's try to get it done ahead of the meeting and then spend as little time as we can, because we've got a lot of work to do on other issues and everybody is going to have

anxieties about getting this out in a correct way, so let's get as much of it done in advance of the meeting as we possibly can.

Alex, now, you had something else elsewhere in the summary judgment rule?

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Right. As I understand it, you all decided to leave the rest of the summary judgment rule the same. And the only thing I want to point out is if you look at (e) of Rule 166a, you can see it on the red-lined draft, I gave it to you all yesterday, "Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion." What this does is it allows the judge to ascertain what material issues exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted.

Oh, I'm sorry, it's on Page 3 of the red-lined draft. It is old (e), new (h), the way I have redrafted this. It says "Order," and then crossed out, "Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion."

So it allows the judge, if you look down to the bottom part of that paragraph where it's crossed out, it allows the judge to

determine what issues exist without substantial controversy and which ones are in good faith controverted. And it allows the judge to make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy and to direct at the trial that those cases are not at issue.

Well, under our procedure, the judge cannot take a fact issue out of the case because it does not have substantial controversy. It's got to have no evidence or conclusive evidence, so this is wrong. I imagine this came out of the federal rule many, many years ago and no one ever did anything to it.

So I would propose that we change this paragraph as it appears on my red-lined draft which makes it clear that the judge can -- that in effect the judge can determine what facts actually are established as a matter of law and can direct the trial accordingly, but the standard is the legal sufficiency of the evidence and not without substantial controversy.

MS. GARDNER: I'll second that.

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1	HON. SARAH DUNCAN: I've always
2	wondered about that paragraph.
3	HON. SCOTT A. BRISTER: So just
4	drop "substantial."
5	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Well, if
6	you look at the red-lined draft, this is
7	pretty much you and I had pretty much the
8	same language on this.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Can we get
10	past the first sentence then?
11	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Yeah, take
12	out that first sentence. But the redraft of
13	the existing paragraph
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: This really
15	just conforms to old paragraph or existing
16	paragraph (e) to what the real-world
17	practice is.
18	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: To what
19	the law is.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yeah. Okay.
21	It's been moved and seconded that the language
22	that has been proposed as paragraph (h) on
23	Page 3 of the red-lined Draft 1 be substituted
24	for the old paragraph (e); that is, that
25	paragraph (e) be modified as shown here except

for the first sentence of the proposed (h). Moved and seconded. Any discussion?

Any opposition? No opposition. That passes. Rusty.

MR. McMAINS: Luke, I was only concerned about one thing in this (i), other than the whole thing, and that is the paragraph towards the bottom that says, "The court shall grant the motion unless." That appears to be mandatory, and I'm not sure that -- I mean, there will be people, especially nowadays, that will take the position the third time on mandamus on the denial of such a motion --

MS. GARDNER: Rusty, the original --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let Rusty finish. Go ahead, Rusty.

MR. McMAINS: Well, I don't believe that this is -- I don't have a problem with it saying that the motion should be granted, may be granted, the court has authority to grant such a motion unless, but any directive of "shall," which incidentally we're taking out of most of our rules anyway

due to Mr. Garner and his crowd, but that is 1 2 going to be used as a basis for a mandamus on 3 a denial of a summary judgment, especially after Tilton, and I think this is a serious 4 5 mistake to use that word in this context. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 6 7 that in paragraph 166a(c) the language is there "The judgment sought shall be rendered 8 forthwith," even, it says, but whether we --9 So Rusty, what's your proposal? 10 okay. MR. McMAINS: That the court 11 12 may grant the motion or should grant the motion unless. I think "should." 13 like the word "shall." 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: So the court 15 should grant the motion. "Should" instead of 16 17 "shall." You're moving to substitute "should" instead of "shall." 18 Is there a 19 second? 20 MS. SWEENEY: Second. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Moved and 21 22 seconded. Discussion. Judge Peeples. 23 HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Our whole history is of courts being reluctant to grant 24

summary judgments. It's already in the rule.

And if the Tilton case is moving toward mandamus, that's for the Supreme Court, but why in the world would we take out -- I think judges need to be told, "You're supposed to do this if this is the state of the evidence." If a judge doesn't want to grant a summary judgment, as I understand the law, that's not appealable or mandamusable anyway, and so I just think you need to tell people that if that's the way the evidence comes out and 10 everything is done right, you're supposed to 12 grant it. CHAIRMAN SOULES: 13 MS. GARDNER: Well, I just 14

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Anne Gardner.

agree with Judge Peeples that our rule has always said the judgment shall be rendered forthwith if it's established. And if we change it in (i), then we ought to change it in the whole summary judgment rule. Otherwise, if we change it to "may" or "should" in paragraph (i), we might as well omit paragraph (i) altogether.

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: Paula.

MS. SWEENEY: If we leave "shall" in, we're opening the door to another cottage industry, which is going to be the mandamus on denial of summary judgments, whether they have any merit or not. You build in delay. You build in expense for the other side. It's another way to abuse the process. I don't see any reason to encourage that. There's enough vice in the system as it is.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Richard Orsinger -- Anne Gardner.

MS. GARDNER: Excuse me, it's already worded that way in paragraph (c) as you've pointed out.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Richard Orsinger.

MR. ORSINGER: As much as I would like to see that mandamus practice open up, maybe the better way to do this is to just drop one at the end saying that except where otherwise provided by law, the refusal or the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not subject to mandamus review. Now, we know that it is under the Civil Practice and Remedies Code when it's a first amendment defendant, media defendant, I believe. But in other circumstances, why don't we call a spade a

1	spade instead of fooling around with words
2	that have one meaning at the trial level and a
3	different meaning at the Supreme Court level?
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any other
5	discussion?
6	MR. ORSINGER: I would move
7	that as an alternative to your motion. I don't
8	know if that's proper procedure.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, let's
10	see where the vote goes.
11	MR. McMAINS: I don't think we
12	have the power to tell the Supreme Court what
13	they need to do.
14	MR. ORSINGER: The Supreme
15	Court is telling everyone else that if they
16	adopt this rule. It's not us telling them.
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Elaine
18	Carlson, did you have a comment?
19	PROFESSOR CARLSON: I just
20	wanted to say everything that I've read about
21	Celotex emphasizes in the federal system that
22	the court still has a measure of option and
23	discretion whether to grant the motion, and I
24	think it's a very different kind of motion
25	than the traditional motion, and I would be in

1	favor of Rusty's proposal.
2	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anything
3	else? Those in favor show by hands. Five.
4	Those opposed. Eight. The motion fails
5	eight to five. Richard Orsinger.
6	MR. ORSINGER: I'd like to move
7	that we add a separate proviso after the
8	appeal proviso saying that except for
9	otherwise provided by law the denial of a
10	motion for summary judgment is not subject to
11	mandamus review.
12	HON. C. A. GUITTARD: That will
13	help the courts of appeals.
14	MR. LOW: I would second
15	anything that discourages mandamus, so I'll
16	second.
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I guess this
18	is kind of a snide comment, but isn't <u>Tilton</u>
19	the law?
20	MR. ORSINGER: <u>Tilton</u> may not
21	be valid if the Supreme Court accepts this
22	suggestion.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Except as
24	otherwise provided by <u>Tilton</u> ?
25	MR. ORSINGER: I don't know how

1	to draft around that. But I would think that
2	if the Supreme Court adopts this rule it will
3	be a signal to everyone that nobody is going
4	to be getting mandamused except for what the
5	Civil Practice and Remedies Code says.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So
7	Richard moved. Buddy, do you second?
8	MR. LOW: After yeah, I'll
9	second it.
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Any
11	more discussion? Those in favor show by
12	hands. Seven.
13	Those opposed. Four.
14	So it passes by seven to four.
15	MS. SWEENEY: Could you read it
16	one more time, please, Richard?
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Richard.
18	MR. ORSINGER: Except as
19	otherwise provided by law, the denial of a
20	motion for summary judgment is not subject to
21	mandamus review.
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: And is that a
23	new paragraph?
24	MR. ORSINGER: I'd drop it on
25	as a separate paragraph after "Appeal."

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It's a new

Yeah.

Anything

HON. C. A. GUITTARD: There is one sentence in the old (b), now (c), I quess, that has always struck me as odd, and I think it needs to be clarified. It says, "A ground for summary judgment not expressly presented in a motion or response shall not be considered." And I think my concern has been taken care of if this language is inserted: "or for denial of the summary judgment."

I want to make sure that that point has been passed on and recommended by the committee, "a ground for summary or for denial of a summary judgment not expressly presented in a motion or response shall not be considered," because it doesn't make any sense to say, "A ground for summary judgment not presented in a response," when the respondent is not going to present any ground for summary judgment.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Doesn't that

go against the vote we took yesterday -
HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Does that

change it?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: -- that we

would not change -- didn't we vote yesterday

not to change the right to legally contest a

motion for summary judgment on any ground, anything you want to raise on appeal that attacks the legal sufficiency? That really

goes to that issue, I think, Judge.

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HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Well, if that's the case, we should strike out "or response," if you don't want it. If that's the view that the committee takes, then that means you strike out the words "or response," because you can't raise -- you don't raise a ground for summary judgment in a response.

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Can I ask where this is in the existing rule? I've been trying to find it.

HON. C. A. GUITTARD: It's in

(c), I believe. Let's see, well, what it says
is a little bit different language in the

present rule, "Issues not expressly presented
to the trial court by written motion, answer

1 or other response shall not be considered." 2 Now, does that --3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: That language is there and it's been interpreted. 4 5 HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Is there any problem about that? 6 7 MR. LOW: No. CHAIRMAN SOULES: It may be 8 that the language is not consistent with the 9 1.0 appellate decisions or the appellate decisions are not consistent with the language, but 11 everybody knows what they are, I think. 12 Does anyone need to change? Does anyone 13 feel it needs to be changed? Okay. No change 14 1.5 there. Anything else on summary judgments? 16 Judge Peeples, it's in your able 17 Okay. hands then, you and your group, and we'll see 18 that midweek next week. 19 Let's see, Richard, I think you're on 20 21 deck. Okay. 22 MR. ORSINGER: We were in the middle of Section 3 yesterday, but I 23 think it would be better to have Bill continue 24 25 with that since he's the actual draftsman of

1 2 and he's not here right now. 3 So I would propose that we move to the 4 5 6 7 8 Bonnie Wolbrueck, dated 11-22-96. 9 10 11 the changes that we made. 12 The end of which MS. SWEENEY: 13 table where? 14 15 limited number of copies, so look and see if 16 17 18 through 165.

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the changes, and I think Austin is fogged in

Clerks Rules which Bonnie has drafted, which we discussed last time, and we have come back with changes, and it's a packet that's entitled Clerks Committee Report to Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules 15-165, It's at the end of the table here, and I'm going to ask Bonnie to take us through and talk to us about

MR. ORSINGER: We've got a

you've got it in your packet. It's Rules 15

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let me pass something out that Judge Evans sent so you can Bring it with you next time. have it.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. everybody situated? Then I quess we can go on, Bonnie.

> MS. WOLBRUECK: Okay. I would

just note the corrections made since the last Advisory Committee meeting.

Beginning on Page 4, number (h), Transfer of Venue Change, there were just a couple of words that were changed to take out the words "a transcript of" all original papers on the third line. And there was also some concern during the last Advisory Committee meeting of an interlocutory appeal and any reference to that in regards to the clerk's duties on the transfer of the record, and that information was found to not be necessary to be included.

MR. ORSINGER: Let me comment on that. David Keltner said he was going to look into it and then later on sent a letter to Bonnie withdrawing his concern. And I think in our discussions we recognized that there is not an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a venue transfer. It's from the denial of the opportunity of a party to intervene.

Alex, are you listening? Did I say that right?

You don't have an interlocutory appeal from the granting of a venue transfer. You

have an interlocutory appeal from the refusal to permit a party to intervene.

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PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: To either intervene or an additional plaintiff to join. So venue is proper in this case, in this county, over one plaintiff, so one plaintiff can establish venue as proper in this county. So we can try this case with this plaintiff and these defendants in this county. question is whether we are going to allow other plaintiffs who cannot independently establish venue to join in this lawsuit. the issue is not whether this case is going to be transferred someplace else, the issue is whether we're going to let these plaintiffs in or make them go file their lawsuits someplace else.

MR. ORSINGER: So under that analysis, we're never going to have a situation where there's an interlocutory appeal after the papers have been transferred to another court. It's going to be out of the same court that denied the intervention.

 $\label{eq:professor} {\tt PROFESSOR} \ {\tt ALBRIGHT:} \quad {\tt Or \ granted}$ the intervention.

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MR. ORSINGER: Or granted the intervention, so that's a non-issue. We've decided not to worry about that. We're not ever going to be shipping papers out to another court when interlocutory appeal is available under the current statute.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

MS. WOLBRUECK: Going on then
to Page 5, we had some discussion on the
disposition of exhibits and depositions and
discovery by the clerk. And the discussion
was around the factor that the party that
offered an exhibit should be allowed to obtain
that exhibit first, so in the first paragraph
on Page 5 we have made reference to that.

The underlined portion says, "If a party requests any exhibit, deposition or other discovery, the clerk of the court may, without court order, release such to the party that offered the exhibit or filed the deposition or other discovery after the required time period stated in this rule. If the party that offered the exhibit or filed the deposition or other discovery does not want such, the clerk of the court may release it to any party upon

request."

Okay. I think that takes care of the matter that we discussed at the last meeting.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

MS. WOLBRUECK: Going on to
Page 6, the Appealable Order, No. 2, we made
reference to that according to the view of
Rule 304, I think it is, and made clear that
the notice shall go to each party or the
party's attorney. That was the only change in
that.

Going on to No. 3, Disposition Notice, we have rewritten this to clarify it: "The clerk of the court may include in the default judgment notice of the appealable order notice, a disposition notice that all exhibits and discovery will be disposed of by the clerk of the court according to the procedures and time periods in this rule."

I think that there was some concern over the previous wording, and we just have clarified that the clerk may include the disposition notice in with the other notice.

Going on to Page 7, we had quite a bit of discussion on the fax filing rule, and we have

changed this in regards to the direction of the last committee meeting. The changes are, basically there was some discussion over the fee and payment, and now under number (3) the only thing that is stated there is that "Court costs and fees shall be paid by a payment method authorized by the clerk of the court."

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And the other discussion stemmed around And we have changed number (8), which now reads, "Each page of any document received by the clerk of the court will be automatically imprinted with the date and time of the receipt. The date and time imprinted on the first page" -- and there was a great deal of discussion about that, about transmissions prior to 5:00 o'clock that ended after 5:00 o'clock. "The date and time imprinted on the first page of the document will determine the time of filing, if received during a normal business day before 5:00 p.m. Transmissions received after 5:00 p.m., on weekends or holidays shall be deemed filed on the first day the clerk of the court's office is open for business following receipt of transmission."

1	So basically fax filing would be treated
2	as mail or hand delivery filing.
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: No, the
4	mailbox rule is
5	MS. WOLBRUECK: Well, mailbox
6	is different, that's correct.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Fax filing
8	will be like actual come-to-the-counter
9	MS. WOLBRUECK: Actual over-
10	the-counter filing, right.
11	HON. SARAH DUNCAN: Can I just
12	suggest a comma. Subsection (8), line 4,
13	where you say "after 5:00 p.m., on weekends or
14	holidays," it seems to me that would be
15	clearer if you put the comma in after "on
16	weekends," as in a series, so that nobody
17	interprets that to mean only after 5:00 p.m.
18	on a weekend or only after 5:00 p.m. on a
19	holiday.
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: How about "or
21	on weekends or on holidays"?
22	MS. SWEENEY: Yeah, that's
23	best.
24	CHAIRMAN SOULES: With the
25	comma?

1	MR. ORSINGER: Shouldn't there
2	be a comma after holidays?
3	HON. C. A. GUITTARD: If you
4	have a comma before, you ought to have it
5	after.
6	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Not in a
7	series, Judge.
8	MR. ORSINGER: It's not right
9	to put a comma after "holidays"?
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's okay.
11	MR. YELENOSKY: It's
12	permissible.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's not a
14	parenthetical, it's a series.
15	HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Take out
16	the first comma.
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.
18	Anything else, Bonnie?
19	MS. WOLBRUECK: Okay. The next
20	change is on Page 11, just a minor correction
21	on this is in regards to Rule 99 on the
22	issuance and form of citation. Number (11),
23	to clarify on the very last sentence of number
24	(11), was "The notice should contain," and it
25	now says in the very last sentence after

"default judgment," it says, "for the relief 1 demanded in the petition." And we had failed 2 to include that in the last draft, and so 3 4 that's just a minor correction that was made 5 there. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Somebody is 6 going to have to get on a word processor after 7 our votes of yesterday, because I think this 8 is now called a complaint --9 MR. ORSINGER: It is. 10

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: -- and not a petition, so we'll need to scrub through that.

MS. WOLBRUECK: I'll make those

corrections in here wherever "petition" is stated.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Next.

MS. WOLBRUECK: Okay. We did

the same thing on Page 18, just corrected it

in the citation by publication rule, added

that. And we'll have to go through those also

and pick up the "complaint" instead of the

"petition."

We did the same thing on Page 19, the form of the citation for out of state. We added that verbage in there also.

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Then on Page 21, Rule 142, Security for 1 Costs, we had tried to change this rule 2 according to the last direction of the 3 committee. "All statutory filing fees that 4 are required to be collected by the clerk of 5 the court are due at the time of filing or 6 The clerk of the court request for services. 7 shall require from a party fees before 8 performing any other services or issuing any 9 10 process." And hopefully that takes care of all the 11 issues that we discussed at the last meeting. 12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: It seems to 13 Do you agree, Richard? me it does. 14 MR. ORSINGER: Yes, I do. 15

CHAIRMAN SOULES:

Yelenosky.

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There were just MR. YELENOSKY: a couple of stylistic things I noted in here and I don't know whether that's in order or not, but I can point to them specifically.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Go ahead.

MR. YELENOSKY: But generally I noted a number of places where the term "such" was used, which at least in my writing I try

to disfavor. I don't know if other people 1 2 feel that way or not, but I think it could be 3 replaced wherever it's used with another word. 4 5 On the first page, the part (b), Assignment of Case Numbers, the second line, 6 7 "which shall be known as the case number," I think is self-evident. That can be taken 8 9 out. On Page 5 -- oh, that was just the "such" 10 appeared, and I noted it again on 15 and I 11 think a couple of other places, but those are 12 just stylistic comments. 13 MS. WOLBRUECK: I think that 14 probably Bill Dorsaneo will go back through 15 these and rework the words. 16 HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Or Bryan 17 18 Garner. MS. WOLBRUECK: Yeah, or Bryan 19 20 Garner. MR. ORSINGER: Steve, do you 21 22 have your edits on paper? 23 MR. YELENOSKY: Those, yeah. But it was just random where I saw "such." 24

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didn't do a word processor search for it, but

that's what I would do. 1 2 HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Bryan Garner will take out all those "suches." 3 MR. ORSINGER: Is Bryan Garner 4 going to look at these? 5 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't know. 6 MS. WOLBRUECK: Those were all 7 the corrections that I had from the last 8 committee meeting. 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 10 have before us, then, the Clerks Committee 11 Report to Supreme Court Advisory Committee on 12 Rules 15-165, with the parenthetical that it 13 includes corrections. It's by Bonnie 14 Wolbrueck, dated 11-22-96. We've been through 15 the work which is Pages 1 through 22. 16 Does it stand approved? Does anyone 17 Okay. This stands approved in its 18 disagree? entirety. 19 20 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. another issue that's important to us is the 21 22 recusal disqualification. However, the proposed language we were going to discuss is 23

Brister is not here. I'm not sure exactly

language prepared by Judge Brister.

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what wordings he made in the justification for it, and I'm going to suggest that we put that off until Judge Brister is here.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Put

165a on the January agenda specifically for

Judge Brister -- I'm sorry. 18a and 18b.

MR. ORSINGER: And since Bill Dorsaneo has not yet arrived, I would suggest we take up our agenda where we left off before and continue with that. And if we get that exhausted, we either decide that I'll give Bill's presentation or we'll move on to what's next on your list.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

MR. ORSINGER: I'm prepared to do Bill's agenda, but I didn't make the changes and so I may not articulate them and explain them as well as Bill can.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So we're on our disposition chart?

MR. ORSINGER: We're moving to our disposition chart that's dated as of September 20, 1996, for this Rule 15-16a subcommittee. And just so you'll know, when I say "as of September 20th," that means as of

the votes we took on September 20th. 1 We want to go to Page 12 of this 2 disposition chart, and the very last item at 3 the bottom of it is the next item for us to 4 consider, Rule 156 on Page 274 of the original 5 I think you call this the agenda? 6 Volume 1. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right. 7 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. So we're 8 all together on this, we're on Page 12, we're 9 on the bottom entry, which is Rule 156, and 10 we're on Page 274 of Volume 1 of our agenda. 11 Now, this is a proposal from Kim Spain 12 that in some places in our rules we use the 13 term "nonjury" without a hyphen and in some 14 places we use the word "non-jury" with a 15 hyphen, and he wants us to be consistent. And 16 the subcommittee recommends that we go with 17 "non-jury" throughout the rules. 18 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 19 Any It stands approved. 20 objection? 21 MS. SWEENEY: Boy, I'm glad we 22 got that done. HON. SARAH DUNCAN: Feels good, 23

CHAIRMAN SOULES:

Next.

doesn't it?

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MR. ORSINGER: Page 13,

Rule 162, Page 275 of the agenda is a submission without explanation of a photocopy of a news announcement of an amendment to the federal rules regarding directed verdicts.

And this has nothing to do with nonsuits, which Rule 162 would relate to nonsuiting, dismissal or nonsuit, so we would reject the suggestion as to the dismissal of nonsuit issues and don't think that the federal provisions are pertinent to our motion for directed verdict or motion for judgment practice, so we recommend no change.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any objection? No change is approved.

MR. ORSINGER: Next pertains to Rule 165, Page 276 of the agenda. These are proposals that the notice of dismissal of a suit for want of prosecution should be pushed out far enough in advance to permit someone to request a trial setting which in a non-jury matter requires 45 days' notice for your initial trial setting. And the proposal was that we ought to mandate that more than 45 days' notice is given of docketing the case

for dismissal so that someone can secure a
non-jury trial setting before that time or
even a jury trial setting, I suppose, but at a
minimum 45 days' notice of trial.

And our subcommittee felt like this was a

And our subcommittee felt like this was a reasonable recommendation and that we ought to require 60 days' notice of docketing a case on the dismissal docket which then would permit someone to set it for trial before then.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: How would it work?

MR. ORSINGER: Well, what we're proposing is that there would be some kind of language in Rule 165a for dismissals for want of prosecution saying that there would be a minimum of 60 days notice before dismissal.

It says here in subpart (1) of the rule, the first sentence says, "A case may be dismissed for want of prosecution. Notice of the court's intention to dismiss and time and place shall be sent by the clerk to each attorney of record." And we could say "at least 60 days in advance of the hearing."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Well, we've got a party with a presumably inactive

case, although sometimes other cases get caught up in the process of dismissal, which has not made a jury demand or may have, and who gets given a DWOP notice, which is in effect a trial setting.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, I don't know. It depends on what court you're in. In Bexar County a DWOP setting is a special docket and you can't show up and try your case on that day. You have to show up and beg them not to dismiss your case while you have it pending over on the other docket, the trial docket.

question here is, is this broke? We had a lot of DWOP problems before we went into 165a and had the motion to reinstate, and that notice had to actually be mailed to the parties and things like that. And also we had pretty much a pervasive statewide problem of undisposed of cases, I mean, huge dockets of old stale cases that really have gotten pretty much cleaned up, as I understand it. So do we want to add some additional feature to this? You have to have 45 days. I believe you have to have

1	45 days' notice.
2	MR. ORSINGER: You're saying
3	that the trial setting rule would require
4	45 days' notice of the DWOP?
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think so.
6	MR. ORSINGER: Well, that's
7	interesting.
8	MS. SWEENEY: I know we get
9	notice on less than that that you've been set
10	on the dismissal docket.
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Well,
12	I guess I'm coming from a misconception. I've
13	always thought you had to have 45 days' notice
14	of a disposition as with your trial, and I
15	thought that 45 was fine, but maybe that's
16	if there's no time period, then if we want to
17	set one, let's set it.
18	So you're proposing that we put a 60-day
19	period of notice into paragraph (1) of 165a,
20	right? That's your committee's
21	recommendation?
22	MR. ORSINGER: That's right.
23	And you need to understand that in the context
24	of this, it is also our recommendation that if
25	you have a regularly scheduled docket call and

standing order that if you fail to appear your case may be called for trial or dismissed and you don't appear for that, then independent notice is not required. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that's That's the first sentence of right. paragraph (1) of 165a. MR. ORSINGER: We don't mean to 8

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If these rural counties have change that. docket calls once a month and they drop the case if the lawyer doesn't show, we don't mean to affect that. We're talking about where a case is specifically targeted for dismissal that the notice that's sent out saying "You're targeted for dismissal" should go out 60 days before the dismissal date.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right. Do we have a consensus to do this? anyone disagree?

Write it up in red-line, if you will, and bring it back so we can take a look at what you've come up with.

> MR. ORSINGER: Will do.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: To accomplish what you said, we don't change the first

ANNA RENKEN & ASSOCIATES CERTIFIED COURT REPORTING 925B CAPITAL OF TEXAS HIGHWAY #110 · AUSTIN, TEXAS 78746 · 512/306-1003 sentence but we put a 60-day fuse into a dismissal docket.

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MR. ORSINGER: Okay. The next item is submitted by Professor Hadley Edgar, which is the word "judgment" should be replaced by the words "order of dismissal" in the first sentence of the last paragraph. And the first sentence of the last paragraph says, "In the event for any reason the motion to reinstate is not decided by signed written order within 75 days after the judgment is signed," and he is saying it ought to say "order of dismissal."

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any objection to that? No objection. The change is approved.

MR. ORSINGER: The next item moves to the supplemental agenda, Page 28.

That is actually a letter from me, and that's already been acted on. That has to do with revisions to the pleadings rules, which is something we've discussed, and we now have stated that clear and concise and we have examples like plaintiff sues defendant for negligent operation of a vehicle. This has

already been taken care of.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

Page 14 then.

MR. ORSINGER: Paula.

MS. SWEENEY: I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "this has already been taken care of." What exactly would this change here require? That summary is a little brief for me.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, my proposal, which has been subsumed now in something that's been accepted by the entire committee, was that we go a little bit further in requiring pleaders to state the legal basis for their claim so that you understand conceptually whether they're suing on a contract or negligence or negligence per se under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act or whatever.

And that led to discussions about what the pleading requirements ought to be, which led into discussions about special exceptions.

And what has resulted in that is that we now have tightened up the language in the

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rules as to what you must plead, although the procedure professors felt like we were doing no more than stating current case law requirements. However, we voted to put a comment on there to show by way of example how the requirement could be met.

And we discussed that yesterday when Bill was talking, for example, of an allegation on damages, was that we're seeking damages for \$100,000. You may remember the conversation. This suggestion here led to that implementation which has already been approved by committee. Did I answer your question?

MS. SWEENEY: How is your suggestion -- no. Well, sort of. How is your suggestion here different from existing law?

That's what I'm not grasping.

MR. ORSINGER: In my view my suggestion is more exacting than the existing language in the rules of procedure but is not more exacting than the requirements articulated by appellate courts as to what those rules mean. So as a practical matter, the idea was that at some point in your pleading you have to identify the legal

concept you're relying on.

Yesterday a rule that articulates the standard to be applied to pleadings. This is a standard that is similar to what we passed yesterday, but we passed yesterday what the standard is going to be.

MR. ORSINGER: It was in
Section 3 on Page 1 and 2. And the functional
part of it was the comment saying, for
example, plaintiff sues defendant for
negligent operation of a motor vehicle or
plaintiff seeks recovery of attorneys' fees
under Civil Practice and Remedies Code
Chapter 38, et cetera.

So as a proponent of this change, I'm satisfied with the product that the Advisory Committee has approved.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 14.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Page 14.

MR. ORSINGER: All right.

Page 14 of the disposition chart moves us to

Page 32 of the agenda, and this was a proposal

from Wendell Loomis who wanted to amend

Rule 87(2), which is on motions to transfer 1 2 His proposal was, there appears to be a conflict as to who has what burden of proof 3 when one party appears to have the burden to 4 5 show venue is proper in another county while the other party has the burden to show that venue is maintainable -- pardon me. One has 7 8 to show that venue is proper in the current county and one has to show that venue is 9 proper in the target county, and he asks is 10 11 that a conflict, and we're saying possibly, but the language is going to have to be 12 rewritten anyway. It's in the process of 13 being rewritten, and so we're just going to 14 carry it out. 15 MR. GALLAGHER: Richard, 16 Is the burden placed at all in 17 question. Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies 18 Code? 19 20 MR. ORSINGER: I'm going to ask Alex to comment on that. 21 The burden 22 PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: 23 in venue cases? MR. GALLAGHER: Yes. Does 24

Chapter 15 address the burden of proof?

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I think

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: that's in the rules. The burden of proof is in the rules. It's Rule 86. MR. GALLAGHER: Okay. MR. ORSINGER: I want everyone to understand that we're in the process of rewriting the venue rules, but we've gotten slowed down by writing the summary judgment rules and a bunch of other things.

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My subcommittee is reconstituted of members of other committees whose other commitments have slowed down our ability to do this committee's job, so we haven't got to them before. But perhaps by January, I think by January we will have a venue rule that we can put here for evaluation.

So our suggestion is to table that, Luke, until we bring up our venue proposal.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Let's do that.

MR. ORSINGER: The next item is Rule 162 on the supplemental agenda, Page 35, and this has to do with a letter that Justice Hecht submitted after the Moriel case and bifurcation as a result of -- well,

bifurcation related to the punitive damages component of a case being tried on motion of a party after the liability issues were tried and the actual damages have been determined. And the issue that Justice Hecht raised was how does our nonsuit rule apply if someone tries to nonsuit after they get a verdict in on the first phase of the trial, because if you read the nonsuit rule, it says that you can nonsuit up until you rest on your case in chief.

And from one standpoint you could say you haven't rested in your case in chief until after you've rested on the second phase of the trial. And we recognize that as a problem and have proposed language that the plaintiff can only nonsuit having tried the first part of the trial to verdict or actually past the nonsuit point of the first phase, that any nonsuit after that point could only apply as to the second phase, so that if a party tried to nonsuit after the nonsuit point in the first phase, that nonsuit could only apply as to the second phase of the trial, and that would also apply to separate trials.

And we have language which is in our 1 proposed materials which Bill Dorsaneo is in 2 3 the middle of explaining that would implement this concept that if you're trying separate 4 5 trials and you get past the nonsuit point in one phase of the trial, you can't use the 6 pendency of other phases of the trial to go 7 back and nonsuit the first phase. 8 9 CHAIRMAN SOULES: May I suggest, if this works for you, where Bill has 10 already drafted something to address these 11 particular issues, and we're not going to talk 12 about Bill, just tell us that it's being 13 carried until Bill reports? 14 15 MR. ORSINGER: Okay. CHAIRMAN SOULES: And then 16 we'll have the specific language in front of 17 18 us to deal with it. Okay? MR. ORSINGER: Will do. We'll 19 20 move on then.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So this is being carried. Rule 162, Supplemental Page 35 is being carried until Dorsaneo's later report?

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MR. ORSINGER: Right.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Second Supplemental Page 47 through 49 would be next.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. This is a letter from Jim Parker at formerly Johnson & Wortley, and this has to do with recusal.

We've been through quite a bit of recusal stuff, we did at this last meeting, and the upshot of it was that Judge Brister agreed to rewrite the recusal rules. And as we just announced earlier, since Judge Brister is not here to defend them, we're going to take them up in January. So we would propose this as the core of the issue that we've been talking about constantly about where the grounds for recusal occurs after your cutoff, 10 days before hearing or trial. And there's no point in debating it now because we have a specific rule to look at that we've agreed we'll look at it in January when Judge Brister is here to defend it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Can we have a red-lined version of 18(a) and (b) to look at so we don't inadvertently miss something?

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. I will

1 take Judge Brister's proposal and prepare a red-lined version of it. 2 HON. DAVID PEEPLES: 3 Question. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Judge 4 Peeples. 5 6 HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Is he doing that on his own? Is anyone helping him 7 8 on that, Richard? MR. ORSINGER: I'm not aware of 9 what input he had. He just made that 10 proposal, and I got it a few days before this 11 hearing, so it has not passed through our 12 subcommittee. 13 14 HON. DAVID PEEPLES: I looked through his proposal, and I have this 15 concern: I just hate to see repeated changes 16 almost sentence by sentence in a rule unless 17 there's a really good reason for making the 18 And I would rather see us look at 19 changes. 20 identified problems in the recusal rule and 21 deal with those instead of trying to make it 22 perfect. I mean, that's very important. Does that sound 23 MR. ORSINGER: like an offer to do another David Peeples like 24

you did for the --

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1 CHAIRMAN SOULES:

I wish you

would.

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Here is what happened: When 18a was written, it was a pretty good flow of words that came together and it was worked on extensively by this committee. Then the Supreme Court didn't want the Code of Judicial Conduct be have the grounds for recusal over there because of whatever its reasons, so they got folded in to what was just a procedural rule and then it became to some extent substantive because the grounds got folded And additional grounds got folded in which include disqualification. Well, the concept of disqualification doesn't fit recusal, because a judge can't be acting within 10 days or any other time if he's disqualified. So the folding in of the grounds out of the CJC and the folding of -first of all, that made it substantive, and I don't think that was a particular problem.

From what I see of that, it seems to be okay, although it got divided. It was 18a.

Now it's 18a and 18b. I think maybe that's okay, too, or make it one rule. That doesn't

make too much difference.

But what the problem got to be was that the recusal procedure doesn't really fit the concept of disqualification. It could, I think, with very slight modification, but it really doesn't, and it wasn't looked at for that purpose when disqualification got folded in. So that's really the only problem with the recusal rule.

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Well, if that's the only problem, then we ought to limit it and focus our efforts on that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: It's a tough rule. Everybody knows how hard it is to get that done, and everybody knows it really needs to be done sometimes. And if the tool we've got is getting the tough cases done enough times to help the parties, I would hate to see it changed, too.

But anyway, I would like to see an alternative that does very little to the existing language except fix that problem and any other real problem that we have.

Could you take a shot at that, Judge Peeples?

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: I'd be glad to talk to Judge Brister about it. And if the committee would allow it, I would like to talk to presiding judges and just see if they know of some procedural problems that the people who make all these assignments and deal with recusals, who assign the judges to hear them and so forth, if there are some things that are not working. I think we ought to find out from them and try to fix them.

If, on the other hand, they say, "Hey, it's working pretty well," that says something to me. I want to hear what lawyers and everybody else says about it too, but if the people that deal with this across the state don't have a problem with the procedures, I'm just reluctant to tamper with it.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, David, the whole reason that we even brought up this rule was because of the problem about the event that occurs after the 10th day before the hearing or trial. And we fought, fought, fought, fought, fought, and finally ended up with this compromise that you should be able to raise those matters, but that it's going to

be a parallel proceeding that will not stop
the trial. And that's to take away the
incentive from specious motions being filed at
the last minute just to secure a continuance.

Now, the committee can change its mind at any time, but we have fought that and decided that the best compromise is to permit you to raise something late but not to stop the trial by raising it late, and that takes the incentive away from specious motions.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: And that's all we really addressed, and then we got into a complete rewrite.

MR. ORSINGER: Yeah. Then we realized that we mixed recusal and disqualification grounds, and the truth is we can't put time deadlines on disqualification grounds because it's a constitutional issue and the judgment is void, so why do we pretend like we are? So then one thing leads to another and it's like the tar baby in the Uncle Remus story.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So we'll postpone Rule 18a to the next meeting.

MR. ORSINGER:

And David, if

Scott revises his rule, have him fax it to me. I don't want to be red-lining a rule that he's not even proposing.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Try to get that done by the end of the year to you, and then if you'll get it to us, we'll mail it out before the meeting.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. The next item is on the second supplemental agenda, Pages 50 through 53. And this is a letter from Justice Guittard, and you'll see there are a number of them right here in a row, in which Justice Guittard is suggesting that we have a unified rule that would apply to both trial and appellate rules when they're on the same grounds, rather than having parallel rules.

Our subcommittee feels like that's a worthy endeavor; however, the Appellate Rules have already been shipped off and are close to being finalized, and so as a practical matter, probably just by the sequence of events we're stuck with stand-alone Appellate Rules; and therefore, we have to continue our separate and parallel Trial Rules and really all we can

do is just be sure that they're consistent, rather than unify them at this point.

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HON. C. A. GUITTARD: We have to make an allowance for the shortness of life.

MR. ORSINGER: So this will come up several times. That would be Proposed General Rule 9, Proposed General Rule 5. So we're recommending against that just because of that practicality.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Any opposition? No change will be made then there.

Now then, that MR. ORSINGER: takes us to the top of Page 15, a comment by Kim Spain on the supplemental agenda that we give notice to the AG anytime that -- or the city attorney or other appropriate person when the constitutionality of a statute, rule or ordinance is called into question. I realize now that the subcommittee hasn't voted on I've read this I don't know why, Luke. that. disposition table a hundred times and I'll just have to apologize. I don't know why it slipped through the cracks.

1	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Postponed.
2	MR. ORSINGER: We'll endeavor
3	to have that resolved before the next meeting.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Isn't that a
5	matter of statute anyway?
6	MR. ORSINGER: Well, I think
7	that the law does require that the AG be given
8	notice. I don't know about city attorneys and
9	all of that.
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yeah, you're
11	right.
12	MS. SWEENEY: I'm sorry, I may
13	have missed something, like a whole year of
14	law school. Are you saying if somebody wants
15	to challenge the statute of limitations as
16	being unconstitutional or punitive damages as
17	being unconstitutional, they have to write a
18	letter to the AG telling them that's in their
19	pleadings?
20	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right.
21	MS. SWEENEY: That's the law?
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think so.
23	MR. GALLAGHER: We think so?
24	Mike Gallagher. We currently are involved in

challenging the constitutionality of some

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legislative enactments last session, and there 1 2 are three lawyers on the pleadings, and none of us have even given a thought to notifying 3 the AG's office. If that is the law, I sure 4 would like some clarification. 5 MS. SWEENEY: Where is that 6 I mean, I'm sorry if --7 law? CHAIRMAN SOULES: 8 I don't want to do the research on it, but I know that I've 9 been in a number of cases where constitutional 10 11 challenges to statutes have been raised and the AG has always gotten notice. 12 MR. LOW: I know a lawyer that 13 has gotten caught on that. 14 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Anyway, this 15 16 has been postponed. We'll be back to it next time. 17 MR. ORSINGER: 18 Okay. Well, 19

we'll all learn a little bit out of it.

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The next item is supplemental agenda This is a letter from Jim Parker Page 64. suggesting that telefax transmissions should be effective when the last page is sent. have supplanted all of this with the debated rule, and we've come back with revisions and they were just approved about 10 minutes ago, so this has been overtaken by events. And we did not in fact do this. We're now going by -- well, wait a minute, that's not right.

What we talked about was filing with the clerk, which is entirely different than with another lawyer. We could be inconsistent. We could say that service on a lawyer is effective with the last page, even though filing with the clerk is effective at the time of the first page. I would think we ought to be consistent about that, and so therefore I don't know.

The subcommittee voted on this before we made our changes to the effective filing time of a fax filing with the district clerk. I would propose without the authority of my subcommittee that we be consistent and go with the first page.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any objection to that? That will be done.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay.

Supplemental Page 66 is another letter from

Justice Guittard about a unified rule, and the

same problem exists, the Appellate Rules are

1	out, so let's make them consistent but not
2	combine them.
3	HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Well, do
4	we need to make any effort to look at them and
5	see whether they are inconsistent?
6	MR. ORSINGER: I think we
7	should.
8	HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Well,
9	then does that mean that since the Appellate
10	Rules are already out we should look at them
11	and make the Civil Rules conform?
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think so.
13	MR. ORSINGER: Okay.
14	CHAIRMAN SOULES: I mean, we at
15	least
16	HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Who is
17	going to do that?
18	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, Judge,
19	in response to the question do we make the
20	Civil Rules conform, I don't think we're going
21	to give a general position on that, but we
22	certainly need to take up all inconsistencies
23	and determine whether they should be made to
24	conform.
25	HON. C. A. GUITTARD: That was

1	one reasons for the proposed General Rules,
2	was to make sure.
3	MR. ORSINGER: Let me say that
4	our subcommittee will undertake in each of
5	these events where Justice Guittard has
6	suggested a unified rule that we'll compare
7	the appellate rule to the trial rule and then
8	come back with recommendations on conformity.
9	HON. C. A. GUITTARD:
10	Excellent.
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Great. So
12	assigned.
13	MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Agenda
14	Page 68 is another such letter from Justice
15	Guittard, so same ruling on that, I guess.
16	Same vote on that?
17	HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Yeah.
18	MR. ORSINGER: Luke?
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right. No
20	change, but review for consistency.
21	MR. ORSINGER: Okay. Then that
22	moves us to Second Supplemental Page 70, which
23	is an issue about whether the deadline for
24	amending pleadings ought to count back from
25	trial and whether it ought to be 30 days. And

the Rules Committee wants trial related deadlines that are longer in advance of trial than they currently are, but the Discovery Subcommittee has suggested cutoffs that relate to the discovery window.

Our subcommittee believes that we ought to go with the subcommittee's recommendation of leveraging off of the closure of the discovery window, since amending pleadings can require the reopening of discovery and what have you. But until we know the status of the discovery window, we don't feel like we want to lock ourselves into a deadline for amending pleadings, so we want to carry that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Action postponed. Okay.

MR. ORSINGER: That jumps us up to Page 80 of the agenda, and that's going to be a letter from Justice Guittard on a proposed combined rule, and the same would apply to that, as well as to Justice Guittard's letter on Page 82. So the subcommittee will evaluate and conform.

Luke, is that agreeable?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, correct.

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MR. ORSINGER: Move on to

Page 84 of the second supplement, and this is an issue of uniform statewide rules on audio-video cameras in the courtroom. And we have brought that up for discussion and vote on a Saturday morning when, I believe, there were six or seven people here. And at that time, the vote was not to implement statewide rules.

And as I recall, Joe, you were a great proponent of that; that we would actually change the existing Rules of Procedure to prohibit media in the courtroom unless you had the consent of both parties.

Now, that was a skeletal crew at that time, and I plan to take that issue up, if permitted, for reconsideration. But at the present time, uniform standards based on an amalgamation of all of the existing rules have been implemented, and there are many of us who feel very strongly that if this Advisory Committee recommends to the Supreme Court to change existing rules which give the court the power to do this and take that power away from the trial court, we are going to ask that the Court not to follow through on that.

morning.

We feel like we shouldn't change the existing rules that have been in place that are working. All we want to do is provide uniform rules. But the actual vote that was taken on that Saturday morning was to forget the uniform rules and put another rule in that you can't have media unless everyone agrees, which basically is going to ban media in most cases.

MR. YELENOSKY: Cameras. TV media is what I remember. We weren't planning to ban the paper.

MR. ORSINGER: No, you can't ban someone who is taking notes. But I think you can ban a camera, a television camera, and you can ban a microphone. That's the way I understood it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Where is the rule that requires both parties and the witness to agree before being televised live?

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: We just talked about that in a meeting one Saturday

MR. YELENOSKY: We voted on it.
CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yeah, there

1	is a rule someplace about that.
2	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: There's no
3	rule in the rules.
4	MR. YELENOSKY: There were some
5	proposed rules that we considered at the
6	time. And I don't remember it being that
7	skeletal. There were more than a few people
8	here, because there was discussion about the
9	intrusiveness of the cameras, and I know Chip,
10	of course, spoke against it, and so
11	MR. LATTING: He spoke for the
12	admissibility of
13	PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: We were
14	talking about a draft that Chip had of 18c.
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: We presently
16	have 18c, the trial court may permit
17	broadcasting, televising, recording or
18	photographing of proceeding in the courtroom
19	only in the following circumstances. It's
20	there. 18c.
21	MR. ORSINGER: But it doesn't
22	require
23	MR. YELENOSKY: consent of
24	both parties.
25	MR. ORSINGER: Let's see, I

thought it was broader than that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: According to the guidelines of the Supreme Court; "and the parties have consented, and consent to being depicted is obtained from each witness whose testimony will be broadcast, televised or photographed." If everybody says it's fine, what's wrong it?

MR. LATTING: What if not everybody says it's fine?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, that's what 18c requires at this time.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, the problem with 18c is that all of the independent large media communities have their own rules, and they've had problems that are created by local competition, and they've had the -- our proposed rules, which are different from the issue that Joe raised, had to do with having a pool and giving the court the authority to decide who will maintain the pool camera and permitting all media to have access to the pool camera, which is an amalgamation of the rules in Fort Worth, Houston, Dallas and whatnot, and those were salutory

regardless of whether you have to have the consent of everybody.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, whether or not we're going to revisit this, I mean, we weren't any more skeletal then than we are now, and I wouldn't want to discuss this without at least going back and looking at the transcript of that discussion, because it was a fairly extensive discussion.

MR. ORSINGER: I know that.

I'm not proposing that we redebate this now.

We've reached this point on our agenda. We have a subcommittee recommendation that we took up out of order of the agenda, out of order of this disposition chart, and we had that vote. We can look back and see what the vote was and how many people were here and whether we want to reconsider it, I guess.

But at this point I don't know for sure where we are on all of our mechanism.

Regardless of whether it requires the consent of everybody, people may still feel like the mechanism that we proposed based on an amalgamation is a good thing to do regardless of the consent issue.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 1 So 2 we'll postpone it. MR. LATTING: Until when? 3 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't know 4 5 until when. Do you have those rules ready? Have they already been looked at? 6 remember the status of it. 7 Luke, I'm going MR. ORSINGER: 8 to have to go back and look and see. We have 9 10 a set of rules that Chip drafted that I would like him to explain, because he's the one that 11 drafted them and he's the one that represents 12 these media defendants in both Dallas and 13 And I think the only controversy 14 Houston. 15 that we really had that was important was this issue of can the court permit the taping when 16 somebody objects. 17 MR. LATTING: May I make a 18 request, please, Luke? 19 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Sure. 20 MR. LATTING: If there's going 21 to be any effort, direct or sideways, to take 22 up that issue again, I would like to be 23 notified before it comes up. 24

MR. ORSINGER:

Well, Joe, we're

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getting to the end. My subcommittee is getting to the end of its work. We've got Bonnie's work behind us now. We're almost through Bill's work, so if we're on the agenda for the January meeting, we'll probably put everything we have on the table at the January meeting.

MR. LATTING: Okay.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, is there a consensus that 18c stays as is but it's okay to have some sort of a direction to

there a consensus that 18c stays as is but it's okay to have some sort of a direction to the trial judge that he can pool? Just because you get the agreement of the parties and each of the witnesses, that doesn't mean that five TV cameras can rush the courtroom.

MR. LATTING: I'm fine with that. I have no problem with that.

MR. ORSINGER: Okay.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Alex

Albright.

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: I don't really think this is the time to discuss that, because as I recall, Chip had a very involved, detailed rule that we were talking about, and I don't think any of us really remember what

the resolution was at that meeting when it was discussed. I kind of vaguely recall he was going to go back and redraft his rule based on our discussion. I don't think he liked the result of our discussion, and so it may be just that he decided, I think, he was happier with 18c as it exists now than what we were talking about maybe. But I don't think we should start over now without the information in front of us.

It seems like what we should do is ask Chip to review that transcript and come up with something.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: What we're going to say on 76a is that the record is vague, and if the record was dispositive, it has been disposed of unless it's reoffered.

MR. ORSINGER: Well, I don't think the record will have disposed of the mechanisms. It will only have disposed of the issue of consent.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. And if it does dispose of that, we can go to that. So that's all on 76a.

Let's go to 86.

MR. ORSINGER: Let's move on to second supplement Page 124, and this was a letter from Lee enclosing an article out of the "Texas Lawyer" -- Lee Parsley, I'm sorry -- about how we have to rewrite the venue rules. "Waiver of venue change of one defendant shouldn't waive it for all defendants." That's the article by Susan Fortney. And our subcommittee says that we have to rewrite all of these, and we're presently under construction.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Postponed.

MR. GALLAGHER: What did the

Chair say with regard to that?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Postponed, because we do have to get the rules lined up with the new amendments, and they're working to do that and they will get it done. Okay.

MR. ORSINGER: Supplemental Agenda Page 128, a letter from Doyle Curry, 1994, wanting special exceptions to be heard not less than 30 days before trial. And you will recall from yesterday that we left a blank in there for special exceptions. I believe that blank is still in there.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, it still 1 2 is. MR. ORSINGER: And I think 3 that's pending also some determination on 4 5 discovery, is it not? CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right. So we 6 might as well just put that postponed, because 7 that will remind us to fill in the blank at 8 some point. 9 10 MR. ORSINGER: Supplemental 11 Agenda 137 had to do with an instance where Larry Gollaher from Dallas became aware that a 12 private process server served the defendant 13 and then interviewed the defendant about the 14 circumstances of the lawsuit and then 15 testified against the defendant before he had 16 a chance to talk to a lawyer or anything, and 17 he thought it was despicable and should be 18 eliminated and all that. 19 We think that it is an abhorrent 20 21 practice, but that we can't effectively 22 prohibit that by rule. CHAIRMAN SOULES: 23 It stands with no change. 24 objection? 25 MR. ORSINGER: Second

Supplement Agenda Page 187 was a letter from

Earl Bullock, Dallas County clerk, in which he

was saying that county clerks should be

permitted to contest affidavits. And our new

Rule 145 permits county clerks to do that.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: So that's already approved. Okay.

MR. ORSINGER: Second

Supplement Agenda Page 193 is also relating to affidavits of inability, and we have a well crafted Rule 145 that supersedes all of these suggestions. These were proposed, by the way, by Justice Guittard. We now have the final product that months ago we approved and everybody seems to be happy with.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we've assimilated what the committee wanted to use, and Justice Guittard's suggestions, I guess, got into the rule?

MR. ORSINGER: Yes. I don't know that Justice Guittard has compared his letter to the rule, but I know that Justice Guittard has been here when we had the discussions under Rule 145 contesting paupers oaths.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

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no change?

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MR. ORSINGER: And then the last item on the disposition chart is Second Supplement Page 196, which is a letter from Carl Hamilton enclosing a letter from Richard Worsham saying you ought to consider the merits of the case before it's put on the dismissal docket and subsequently dismissed. And our view is that we shouldn't change the current practice but that we should increase the notice to give somebody an opportunity to secure a trial setting before they're dismissed.

> CHAIRMAN SOULES: You recommend

> > MR. ORSINGER: No change.

CHAIRMAN SOULES:

There will be no change. opposition?

MR. ORSINGER: Okay. That's the end of the disposition chart, and that leaves us then with Bill's changes to the pleadings.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Let's take about 10 minutes here and let the court reporter rest, and then we'll get to those.

(Recess.)

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 216 to 299(a). Who wants to do this? Paula.

MS. SWEENEY: Well, let me lead off and report to the remaining two members of the committee that are here.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: We're on the record. We're on the record. Okay.

MS. SWEENEY: I mean, really,
Judge Peeples and Joe Latting and I will
report to each other. We had previously gone
through a vast majority of the items on the
disposition chart in the full committee.
We've reported, and there have been votes.
And we had a few remaining items that needed
other work, needed something else done to them
or whatever.

The first is on Page 2 of the disposition chart, Rule 232. This is, here we go again,

Batson. Every time we've ever had a Batson

discussion in this committee it's been with a less than skeletal crew, and we're doing that again.

But what we decided -- there has been a new Jury Task Force appointed by Justice

Cornyn that is considering a whole host of jury issues such as what was brought up in the Arizona article that was circulated earlier, jurors' rights, don't waste time, let them ask questions, et cetera, et cetera, a whole host of issues involving the jury. I have been told that that group has taken <u>Batson</u> under it's purview and effectively, since we didn't already have a <u>Batson</u> rule, subsumed or taken that out of our purview.

In addition to that, the Supreme Court, and Elaine has been following this course very closely, has a case up right now on Batson, and we didn't think there was much point in us writing law pending what -- we thought maybe we should wait and see what it was.

So I think it would be premature at this point to -- and is that --

JUSTICE HECHT: I think that's right.

MS. SWEENEY: Might we get some insight from --

JUSTICE HECHT: Well, the issue in <u>Goode vs. Shoukfeh</u> was what the procedures ought to be in <u>Batson</u> cases.

So it would seem 1 MS. SWEENEY: 2 really premature of us to be writing that rule 3 with that issue being up for consideration right now maybe. So Batson, our subcommittee 4 5 has decided, needs to simply be tabled until and unless we get some guidance from the Court 6 certainly, and it would also help to get some 7 quidance about whether or not it even should 8 be part of this committee's work, given the 9 other task force that's at work on the jury 10 11 charge. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Will the Jury 12 Task Force submit its report to the Advisory 13 Committee? 14 JUSTICE HECHT: 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: I haven't 16 17

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I don't know. seen an order on that like some of the others.

JUSTICE HECHT: Well, some of it, the early -- I mean, they've just barely And some of their work they think started. may require changes in statutes, and others may be changes in rules. I feel certain that if they want rules changes, they'll submit it through us, through this committee. But if it's statutory or other stuff, they may not.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, the Chair will entertain a recommendation that there be no change in response to this request and that we wait for some other vehicle to come to the committee, some other source of recommendation, so that in effect we dispose of this item while waiting for another item to come at a later time.

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MS. SWEENEY: So moved.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any objection Okay. No change in response to this to that? then.

All right. The MS. SWEENEY: next item that is hanging out there is on It's been discussed before, but Rule 241. it's come to us again. Judge Peeples, are you ready to report on that?

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: 1989 Judge Bill Coker of Dallas wrote a letter saying basically this, saying Rule 47 allows the plaintiff or requires the plaintiff in an unliquidated case, you know, not to name an amount. And then when there was a default judgment, he said, "It's hard for me to" -- "I can't grant it without a hearing, because, you know, the defendant faced a petition that didn't mention a number." So he wants Rule 47 changed and Rule 243 also to make it easier to grant default judgments. It can be done by computer and so forth.

We recommend against that change. I remember hearing Jim Kronzer's letter say that the reason for Rule 47 was that they didn't want in unliquidated damage cases for the plaintiff to name an astronomical figure that gets in the newspaper and everybody says, "Oh, my gosh, look at this."

So the decision was made to require damages to be pleaded generally in excess of the jurisdictional limits of the court and then upon special exception name a specific amount. And our subcommittee does not want to revisit that decision, and we're not convinced that there is a big burden on trial courts in having to at least consider some evidence when granting a default judgment in unliquidated damage cases.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So you recommend no change in response to Judge Coker?

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Yes. Now, we got this morning a letter dated November 21 from Judge David Evans in Dallas, which I think we need to take a look at.

He says that he would like to have

Rule 243 changed so that you can -- once the

answer date has come and gone and there's no

answer filed, the judge can take affidavit

testimony and people don't have to show up

live. I think we should take a look at that.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I don't think this changes the law, but it does clarify it, because unobjected to hearsay can be the basis for a judgment. An affidavit is hearsay. But then apparently there are -- and I've heard this concern other than just from Judge Evans. Some trial judges are still maybe remembering the law before unobjected to hearsay could be probative, because there was a time when if the record had nothing but hearsay in it, you could raise it JNOV.

MR. LATTING: <u>Texaco vs. Lee</u>.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Whatever it is, Joe has got the case. We changed that in the Rules of Evidence. But Judge Evans

suggests that we add to 243, I hope you've got this before you, I'm going to read the words that are already in the rule: "If the cause of action is unliquidated or be not proved by an instrument in writing, the court shall hear evidence as to damages," and he wants to add either "on the record in open court or by affidavit testimony submitted without further record," that ends his insertion, and picking up the rule, "and shall render judgment therefor unless the defendant shall demand and be entitled to a jury trial," and so forth. Why don't we go ahead and announce that in the rule if we believe it is the case and

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eliminate the confusion or the concern?

Well, can we say MR. LATTING: either on the record in open court or by affidavit testimony or both?

MS. SWEENEY: You want it and/or?

MR. LATTING: Yeah, because you might have a situation where you had a rather complex default judgment and you wanted to prove it with some testimony and some affidavits. And if we're going to make it

1	clear, we might as well make it clear.
2	MS. SWEENEY: So you would take
3	out "either" and have it say say "on the
4	record in open court and/or"?
5	MR. LATTING: Yeah.
6	HON. C. A. GUITTARD: I object
7	always to "and/or."
8	MR. LATTING: Overruled. Then
9	if we can say "either"
10	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Why don't we
11	just take out "either"?
12	MS. SWEENEY: There you go.
13	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Evidence as
14	to damages on the record in open court or by
15	affidavit testimony.
16	MS. SWEENEY: Or both, is what
17	Joe's that's the tenor of your suggestion,
18	isn't it?
19	MR. LATTING: Yes. It's not a
20	big deal, but it's clarifying it.
21	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: It's a
22	very thoughtful letter. My inclination is to
23	always think about things at least until the
24	next meeting before doing anything. I can't
25	think of a good reason not to do this right

1	now, though.
2	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So you
3	want to table this?
4	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: I just
5	think what we're doing here is serious
6	business, and as smart as all of us are,
7	sometimes if you've got time to think about
8	something or talk to some people who do this,
9	you know, collection work, you might come up
10	with a reason not to do it.
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Next
12	meeting. Okay. That will be on the table, on
13	the agenda for the next meeting.
14	MS. SWEENEY: And I would point
15	out we've already amended 243 in one
16	particular, which is we've already agreed
17	unanimously to delete the "writ of inquiry"
18	provision since no one knows what that is.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: We'll find
20	out once it's gone.
21	MS. SWEENEY: That's true.
22	Suddenly it will become important.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. 241,
24	no change, right?
25	MS. SWEENEY: Correct. All

right. The next area, flipping through your syllabus, where we have not already had full committee discussion is on the second to the last page. I'm sorry they're not numbered, but it's Rule 221 to Rule 236. I did not have that on the agenda until this morning, and I'm just flagging it for you.

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Bonnie this morning handed me a couple of Now that she's had a pages of comments. chance to go through -- if you'll recall, we discussed these rules in full committee at some considerable length two years ago about jury lists in different counties, jury shuffles, how they're drawn and all of that. And Bonnie has gone through the rules and identified some reference areas where we need to look back at, you know, other rules that may be affected and so on, so I just am just flagging that. We are not final on those rules as of what she handed me this morning, but we don't have anything else to tell you right now because I haven't even fully digested what she gave me, much less have we discussed it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: This is on

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2 MS. SWEENEY: Yes, sir. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Can we get 3 this resolved in January? 4 5 MS. SWEENEY: Yes. We'll discuss it between now and then. I'11 6 circulate what she gave me. And Bonnie, what 7 we'll do is, we meet by conference call, and 8 we'll conference you in so you can explain 9 your notes to us. 10 CHAIRMAN SOULES: 11 Okay. So that is on our January agenda. 12 HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Well, we 13 have what's on Page 869 of Volume 2 of the 14 original materials, and I'm trying to find it 15 on this sheet, but it deals with Rules 290 to 16 295. 17 The rules are in MS. SWEENEY: 18 chronological order. It's on the sixth page. 19 20 HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Yes. 290 21 to 295. John Chapin writes in and says the federal rules were changed to change judgment 22 23 NOV to judgment as a matter of law, and why don't we do that. And in addition, there's 24 25 some language in the federal rule that he

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221 through 236?

quotes that says the judge can just enter judgment as a matter of law at any time during a trial wherever a party has fully been heard and so forth, which just blows my mind.

opposition?

I don't think any of us want to do that, if it means what it seems to means, which is just make a decision in the middle of the plaintiff's case in chief. And so our committee thinks there's no reason to make either that substantive change or to change our terminology to judgment as a matter of law.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Any

HON. C. A. GUITTARD: That change has already been made in Rule, what, 300 and something, when we considered judgments and postjudgment motions. We abolished judgment NOV then, and we adopted a rule that would apply either before or after verdict, judgment as a matter of law, either before or after verdict, so that takes care of that problem.

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: So...

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So no further

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1	change in response to this inquiry?
2	HON. C. A. GUITTARD: But it
3	should be conformed.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, this
5	was in a Don Hunt set of rules that we did
6	that, right?
7	HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Yes.
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: So no further
9	change in response to this particular
10	inquiry. We've done what we're going to do
11	already in the Don Hunt set of rules,
12	correct?
13	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: That's in
14	the Appellate Rules?
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: No, it's in
16	the late 200, low 300 series, Don Hunt's
17	report. Okay.
18	MS. SWEENEY: So other than
19	conforming that, then that is all from our
20	group that has not been previously addressed.
21	So what we have to talk about at the next
22	meeting is the area from Bonnie that I
23	flagged, jury shuffle, et cetera.
24	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Rule 243,
25	the letter from Judge Evans in Dallas.

1	MS. SWEENEY: And Judge Evans'
2	letter.
3	HON. DAVID PEEPLES: About
4	affidavit testimony in a default judgment.
5	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Those two
6	items. Okay. We'll have those specifically
7	on, and I don't know what else will flow in
8	between now and then.
9	MS. SWEENEY: Other than that,
10	our subcommittee is done.
11	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Great. Thank
12	you. Congratulations. Okay. What's next,
13	Holly?
14	MS. DUDERSTADT: All we had
15	left was Sadberry, and he's not here.
16	HON. C. A. GUITTARD: I'd like
17	to ask Lee and Judge Hecht about Shelby
18	Sharpe's proposal, the proposal of his
19	committee concerning frivolous appeals. Is
20	that to be considered before the Appellate
21	Rules are promulgated, or is that to be left
22	for some future revision? What is the
23	situation there?
24	JUSTICE HECHT: Well, Lee and I
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have thought about it and studied it and read

the Baylor article that was associated with it, and I know of at least two other judges that have read the article. I'm not sure they've looked at Shelby's proposal, but I think the Court will look at it before it takes final action on the rules. I don't know how much more they think needs to be done than what we've done already.

MR. LATTING: What is the current status of things, just to remind us?

JUSTICE HECHT: Of the TRAP

Rules?

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MR. LATTING: Yes.

JUSTICE HECHT: A final copy is available here. It has not been finally approved by our Court or the Court of Criminal Appeals or Bryan Garner or this committee.

MR. LATTING: What do they say in substance about frivilous appeals?

JUSTICE HECHT: They say that they relax the standard for imposition of sanctions by the court of appeals and relax or change the damages, I think, from 10 times cost to such as are just or whatever has been the standard for our Court for the last

several years. I think we find that it's a fairly simple rule. It just says if the court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivilous, it may on motion of any party or on its own initiative after notice and a reasonable opportunity for response, award each prevailing party just damages. It incorporates the requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard.

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I think the two things that the Court sees in the lower court opinions is that they rarely award sanctions for fairly frivolous appeals, and when they do it, the first time the party knows about it is when they get the order in the mail. And they probably ought to have a chance to say, "Hang on, let me be heard on this." So those are the proposed changes.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. But we don't have those on our docket at this time?

JUSTICE HECHT: No.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. We're going to go to the disposition chart for 527 to 734, and I'm going to try to give this report. One of our members has not been able

1	to or hasn't attended on a regular basis, and
2	I think we can get this done, famous last
. 3	words, in the time we have remaining here this
4	time.
5	MS. SWEENEY: Could you wave
6	that at us?
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Holly is
8	passing it out now. We may have to share
9	copies.
10	MS. DUDERSTADT: We've got
11	plenty.
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: We've got
13	plenty. Okay. We've got about, it looks
14	like, three items.
15	MS. SWEENEY: Should it have
16	tabs on it or not have tabs?
17	CHAIRMAN SOULES: It has tabs.
18	MS. DUDERSTADT: There are two
19	of them. There's a disposition and then a
20	supplemental disposition.
21	CHAIRMAN SOULES: The one I
22	want to go to first is the one that has the
23	tabs, because these are more specific. At
24	least they appear to me to be.
25	Rule No. 539 would change the justice

court rule to allow reasonable notice and not have any particular time. They're now governed by the 45-day rule. Apparently this is causing some delay in the justice court system which is unnecessary to the work of those courts. And they believe that the 45-day-first-trial-setting fuse is unnecessary and it's burdensome on their case disposition and they want it changed to simply say a reasonable notice.

That seems to me to be reasonable, but if we need to do any debating on it, let's proceed.

Does anyone have an objection to going to a reasonable trial notice in the justice trial courts rather than the 45 days? No objection, so that's approved.

Next is Rule 680. This is not a justice court rule, it's just these rules pick up not only justice courts but some of the extraordinary writ rules. This is a request by James Holmes to add the language right behind Exhibit B, the tab that says Exhibit B, that's underscored, "a certificate of reasonable effort to contact the adverse party

or counsel for party prior to obtaining TRO or temporary injunction without notice." He says this brings it into line with the Lawyer's Creed.

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The subcommittee opposes any requirement for contact with party who is not an attorney or who does not have in-house counsel. I gather, then, that the subcommittee's recommendation is that we not make the change? Anne Gardner.

MS. GARDNER: Tony drafted this proposed language that's underscored in Exhibit B which just requires reasonable effort to the party, adverse party or attorney representing the party, if known. His view and our view was that it created some ethical problems to require an attorney to contact a party who is not represented by counsel, and that we not go so far as to require it, because of a lot of potential ethical problems that a party without counsel might later take the position that the attorney had given them advice or something to that effect.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

Recommend no change. That's the

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subcommittee's recommendation. It doesn't require a second. Discussion. Steve Yelenosky.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, I just want to ask, Luke, just what is on the agenda here? Because the justice court rules obviously are of real importance in certain types of cases, and some Legal Services attorneys have talked to me about some of these issues, and Judge Till had told me, you know, he would be sending me some more stuff. I got some stuff early on. I haven't gotten anything in a while, and then --

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, this is not a justice court rule.

MR. YELENOSKY: I know that one isn't, but in general there are ones here. So what are we purporting to do today? Because this says an introductory report on some -- I mean, some these rules cover justice court rules.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Right. What

I want to do is act on these specific requests

to change the rules or not change the rules

that we presently have so we get them off of

Someday, I understand, we're 1 our docket. going to get a report from a Justice of the 2 Peace Task Force. 3 MR. YELENOSKY: I just wanted 4 5 to know if that was still coming. CHAIRMAN SOULES: And we're 6 going to have to figure out what to do with it 7 8 whenever it gets here. Anne Gardner. Luke, my 9 MS. GARDNER: understanding, again, from Tony, and he 10 couldn't be here today, is that Justice 11 Hill --12 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Till. 13 MS. GARDNER: -- Justice Till, 14 Justice Till has done a final 15 I'm sorry. 16 report from his task force and has given it to 17 Justice Hecht. JUSTICE HECHT: It's on its 18 It's not there yet, but Paul called and 19 20 said it's on its way. 21 MS. GARDNER: And Judge Till feels that his tenure as the head of that task 22 23 force is over and that they have accomplished what he feels they were asked to do, and that 24 25 was to make their report. And they have -- he spent several months, a tremendous amount of work. Their task force undertook to write an entire separate set of justice court rules.

Our subcommittee, which is composed of lawyers who primarily practice in district courts and appellate courts, voted to support and back the task force. We did not feel that we were in a position to contradict them. We voted to back them completely in the direction they were going and support them in their decision to rewrite these justice court rules.

And if the Supreme Court votes and decides to send it back to this committee, then we'll do what we're directed to do. But it's my understanding that those rules are going directly to the Supreme Court.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Now, specifically to Holmes' recommendation.

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Yeah

I've read the explanation in the right-hand box that says we want to require notice to counsel but not to a pro se litigant. But the language underscored seems to require notice to the adverse party or attorney. It doesn't square with what they're telling us in this

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: I agree. Joe Latting.

MR. LATTING: I have a question and a concern, and that is, if the Lawyer's Creed requires this notice, which I think that it does in spirit anyway, if we put this in the rule after it's already in the creed, are we imposing another requirement in order for there to be a valid injunction? And my concern about putting it in the rule is, is that going to be another basis for appeal or some kind of appellate action to overturn injunctive relief if there was a failure to follow this? If it's just predicatory, it's a good idea to do this, and I think we've already got it, so it seems to me we're adding something that doesn't really add anything to the law or the operation of the injunction And if by putting it in there we're confusing the situation, I would be against it, unless somebody could tell me why that's not right.

HON. DAVID PEEPLES: Can I speak to that?

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1 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes, sir, 2 Judge Peeples. 3 HON. DAVID PEEPLES: First of all, this applies to TROs, which would be, you 4 5 know, 14 days. And second of all, I think 6 it's healthy to tell lawyers, "Don't come over here and try to get ex parte relief unless you 7 try to talk to the other side." 8 It's also helpful to tell judges you're 9 not supposed to just sign these things with no 10 11 questions asked. Admittedly, if a lawyer doesn't do this and a judge signs the TRO, 12 that's enforceable. But I think it's kind of 13 salutary to put this in. 14 15 MR. LATTING: I agree it's salutary, but we've already said it in the 16 So how many places do we need to 17 Creed. remind us to have good manners? 18 HON. DAVID PEEPLES: 19 20 unfortunate fact is that the lawyer who is getting the TRO or injunction is going to look 21 22 in the Rules of Procedure and not the Lawyer's Creed. 23 MR. LATTING: And what about a

failure to do it? And you can sometimes

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appeal a TRO in an emergency situation. You can move to stay it. I'm just concerned about a claim on appeal that there wasn't any showing or attempt to make contact and it invalidates a restraining order. It's not a big deal. If you want it in there, I'll vote for it. It just comes to mind, though.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we're talking about something that can arise in literally emergency circumstances and putting some baggage on there that might be a big problem to do, because sometimes, maybe a lot of times, I don't know, there's an abuse of the TRO process. But we've got family violence and a lot of things where you get a call at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and you have got to separate two people and you've got to get an order. And to have this baggage in the rule to me is dangerous, and to tell somebody they should do it as a matter of practice and creed is one thing, but to make it mandatory, there just may not be time. That's my feeling about it, but let's discuss it.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, I think

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the judge can make that determination. We wouldn't go in on a TRO where we knew where somebody was and had an attorney and we could get ahold of him, because the judge is going to or should say, "Have you tried to get ahold of him?"

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HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Some don't.

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, but the judge can then say something.

MR. LATTING: Well, one more thing on this while we're on the subject. It's part of our local rules in Travis County and it's part of good practice, and it doesn't seem to me that unnotified lawyers in TRO situations is a big problem in the jurisprudence of this state. It's not only baggage to a rule, it doesn't have any -we're not going to attach any sanction for its disobedience. And why change a rule when we're really not changing the law? And it seems to me that it confuses, but I could be It's not a big thing one way or the other.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So

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those in -- I'm just going to ask, does anyone favor a change on this? One. Others who say no change. Okay. house to one no change. That takes us to Dick Brown, Okay. Rule 684, who wants to allow cash deposit in lieu of a bond for a TRO. The committee says that we have passed 14c, which I think is consistent with my memory, that cash --MR. LATTING: We have done this. CHAIRMAN SOULES: -- cash can always be used in lieu of a bond. 13 MR. LATTING: That's correct. 14 15 MS. GARDNER: Luke. CHAIRMAN SOULES: 16 Anne Gardner. 17 14c is a generic 18 MS. GARDNER: rule that allows the use of a cash deposit, as 19 20 it's currently written, in lieu of a bond 21 anywhere where a bond is required under the 22 Rules of Civil Procedure. The problem is that 23 this lawyer that wrote in about this, and 24 probably I guess a lot of other lawyers, don't

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And our

realize that 14c is even there.

1 thought was to refer this to --2 MR. YELENOSKY: Send them to 3 · CLE. MS. GARDNER: Send them to 4 5 CLE. No, send it to Bill Dorsaneo's subcommittee for some consideration, maybe 6 7 putting a comment below other rules where bonds are mentioned or something to refer 8 9 lawyers to 14c. Or if there's going to be a 10 general catch-all section of the rules at the beginning for general provisions, that 14c be 11 kept there with some comment, rather than the 12 only other choice which is to add on a 13 provision like 14c to every rule where bond is 14 15 required. There is already Rule 14c. CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So the 16 17 committee recommends no change. If we do put 18 a change in, it's just going to be a repetition of what 14c says? 19 MS. GARDNER: 20 Correct. 21 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Apparently, Dick Brown, who is a pretty knowledgeable guy, 22 23 feels that -- a pretty knowledgeable lawyer, 24 feels this is needed. The subcommittee feels

otherwise. Let's discuss it and dispose of

it. Alex Albright.

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: When the rules are reorganized, I'm hoping that it will be more obvious that there are general rules that apply to all other rules. And so maybe this won't be as much of a problem as it is now.

MR. YELENOSKY: This was in our little subcommittee where we did one to 14, and I can't remember exactly, but Alex remembers us conforming it to the Appellate Rules on the bond issue, so we have touched on this rule already.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. No further change. Is that unanimous? Okay. No further change.

634. I guess this is Exhibit D.

HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Now, there has been a change made in the TRAP rule that would have this same effect, but I think it would be appropriate to put it here too.

PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: Justice Guittard, in the Rule 1 through 15 subcommittee we made this rule identical to what we had put in the TRAP rule.

HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Good.

That takes care of that.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Have we already done this? Did someone say we've already done this?

HON. C. A. GUITTARD: On the Rule 657 and following, we already presented them to this committee. They came from, perhaps inappropriately, but from the Committee on Appellate Rules of the appellate practice section. Sarah Duncan was the one that authored these changes, none of which I think is controversial. And I think that they passed this committee really without any discussion or any opposition, and they were postponed because there was some question of revising certain of the execution rules, and I don't know just what the status of that is.

But I haven't reviewed this to make sure that those things are taken care of, but in other words in, any event, these garnishment judgment rules or garnishment rules have been submitted to this committee and have been approved, as I recall.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. We

have the vote of the full committee on January the 20th approving a change to 634 that says, "The filing and approval of a supersedeas bond immediately suspends commencement or enforcement of any proceedings or official action to enforce the judgment by execution, garnishment, or otherwise."

So do we need to add this language in 634, or has that already been done? I'm not sure. Lee says it's been done, so I guess this has been done, by a general rule as opposed to a specific rule. Is that correct, Lee?

MR. PARSLEY: Yes. But we did it -- this committee approved 634, and it's behind Exhibit D. The first page is No. 1. The next page is No. 85. The next page is No. 86. You'll see at the top that page number, 86. That's exactly what Anthony Sadberry says.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So this has already passed the committee?

MR. PARSLEY: This passed the committee in January of '95, I think. I think him saying January of '96 is wrong. I believe

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1	it was January of '95 when it passed the
2	committee.
3	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So
4	that's done.
5	Now we get to 657 through 677.
6	HON. C. A. GUITTARD: That was
7	approved also, was it not, Lee?
8	MR. PARSLEY: That's right.
9	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So
10	that's done.
11	146. Now, what is this one about? I
12	guess we're going to have to get the this
13	doesn't say what agenda it comes from. 170.
14	Let's get that out. We can't tell from this
15	what the problem is.
16	MR. YELENOSKY: It's about a
17	separate set of justice court rules, if you
18	look at the comment.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: 146 and 148
20	have to do with deposits for cost.
21	MR. YELENOSKY: Oh, I'm sorry,
22	I'm looking at well, no.
23	CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's the
24	rule number, and this is the page number.
25	Well, let's put this on the side while

Holly is looking at it, and let's go to the 1 2 next report. Where should we start on this 3 report, Anne, do you know, the one that does not have tabs? 4 5 MS. GARDNER: The one that does not have tabs was prepared by Tony, so -- no, 6 7 Anthony Sadberry. And it goes through the --8 I quess let's start at the beginning. through the requests that were made in the 9 1.0 agenda. The page numbers are referred to there beside the rule, so that serves a 11 12 purpose too. Almost everything was either referred to 13 Judge Till's task force, or we recommended no 14 15 change. MS. SWEENEY: Could we get a 16 little more elaboration on that? 17 MS. GARDNER: Well, I would 18 love to, but I did not have a chance to go 19 back through here and review the page numbers 20 21 of the agenda before today's meeting. MR. YELENOSKY: Well, this 22 looks duplicative of what we just looked at. 23 CHAIRMAN SOULES: While we're 24 25 trying to find the agenda, let's turn over to

the page where there's a chart back here. And it this looks like to be to some extent duplicative of what we've already looked at but maybe not altogether, because I don't see a 662. We've done Dick Brown's.

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MS. GARDNER: Well, without having the page numbers before us of the agenda and without having an explanation of the agenda set out on the chart, it looks like it would take more time than it's worth to go through it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, we're going to go through it sometime. We've got 45 minutes here to do it. Let's get the agendas out and work on them and try to get this done. Sooner or later we're going to have to do them.

Okay. The last one, the one with tabs, has to do with 146. Herb Finkelstein says, "There is no provision relating to justice courts to prevent a defendant against whom a judgment has been rendered to appeal by making a cash deposit. 46b and 48 provide for the making of a deposit in lieu of a bond, but strangely enough there is no comparable

provision for appeals from judgments in the justice court. I suggest the rules relating to appeals from judgments in the justice courts been amended to provide for a cash deposit in lieu of a bond."

MS. SWEENEY: Mr. Chairman,
this might be out of order, but on all of the
justice court rules, I would propose we bypass
those, since they've all gone to the special
set of rules, and that we talk about the
things that haven't gone there, unless I'm -it's possible I'm completely out of order and
confused, but --

MR. YELENOSKY: Well, one of
the issues that I would like to have a chance
to discuss is whether there should be a
separate set of justice court rules, and now
may not be the time. But wherever there is a
justice court rule here as opposed to a
particular one there, I think, as Anne said,
it defers to the task force and the fact that
there will be a separate set of rules and that
the task force will take care of recommending
those. And we don't have that report before
us, do we?

1	MS. SWEENEY: Didn't we get
2	that report?
3	MS. GARDNER: No.
4	CHAIRMAN SOULES: No.
5	MS. GARDNER: It went to
6	Justice Hecht.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: He's talking
8	about 146, I guess, because 46b and 48 don't
9	seem to have anything to do with bonds. He
10	says that there is no provision for appeals
11	from judgments in the justice courts. You can
12	appeal by making a cash deposit.
13	Where is the provision for appealing a
14	justice court judgment? Somebody on the
15	subcommittee help us with that.
16	PROFESSOR CARLSON: I thought
17	it was like 571.
18	MR. PARSLEY: 573.
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: 573. Well,
20	tell me, if we look at 573, when the bond or
21	the affidavit in lieu thereof has been filed,
22	the appeal shall be held to be perfected. And
23	we have put in 14c, as I understand it, that
24	any time a bond is required, a cash deposit
25	can be used. Well, that's in lieu of a surety

that's in 571. CHAIRMAN SOULES: this problem. PROFESSOR CARLSON: CHAIRMAN SOULES: Refer to 14c. change. the tabbed portion. what this is? 15 16

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bond, and I quess this is an appeal bond. I think HON. C. A. GUITTARD:

Well, it says in double the amount of the judgment, so that is supersedeas. I think 14c takes care of

> I agree. Okay.

That takes care of everything in

Now we need the original agenda. Is that The original agenda, 906 to This is from Judge Tom Lawrence, who at least on December the 10th of '92 was a JP in 523 to -- (reading) "I believe you Houston. can rescind 523 to 591 as separate rules for the justice court and relocate them to the General Rules section. One of the problems of leaving 573 to 591 unchanged is Rule 523 defies precise interpretation."

What does 523 say? I hate to be doing work of the subcommittee here, but we've got to get this done, so --

1	MR. YELENOSKY: 523 says that
2	the rules that apply to district and county
3	courts also govern the justice courts, which
4	also is that whole issue again of a separate
5	set of rules.
6	MR. PARSLEY: He wants to get
7	rid of that.
8	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. So is
9	your recommendation, Lee, that we do nothing
10	on this and see what comes from the task
11	force?
12	MR. PARSLEY: Yeah. I think
13	the task force is dealing with what he wanted
14	to do.
15	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. On 523
16	to 591 this committee will make no change.
17	Any objection to that?
18	Okay. Now we go to 525. Is that another
19	part of this same that's on Page 919.
20	MR. YELENOSKY: That's part of
21	the justice court rules as well.
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Now we
23	go to 919 from Judge Hawkins who wants to
24	determine whether the justice court pleadings
25	should be oral or written. "With minor

exceptions, justice court rules should be the same as county and district court rules. The same is true of statutes on venue,"

These two judges, at least in '92, were of the view that we ought to eliminate the special justice court rules and just have the regular rules. However, it seems that the momentum has gone the other way in Justice Till's task force. Elaine, can you comment?

PROFESSOR CARLSON:

Yeah.

Justice Lawrence contacted me. He's a very fine judge who headed up the state bar section, and I've heard from several other JPs, and I think there is sort of a mixed sense among that bar or judges. And I would hope that when and if that issue is brought up here that we have enough lead time so we can hear from different judges on that perspective or at least receive input to consider.

MR. YELENOSKY: Luke, I mean, there is an important issue there, and I don't feel fully briefed to address it right now, but what we're being asked to do now is look at a disposition chart, which basically

whenever a justice rule comes up it says
there's a task force, but we don't have the
task force report. And I don't think in any
other situation have we gone through a
disposition chart where we haven't seen the
report. So these issues are coming up, and
then there's some recommendation from the task
force report that we don't have before us, so
it's kind of the cart before the horse.

MS. GARDNER: Yeah, I agree.

Being a member of the subcommittee, I defend
our subcommittee. Ours is the only one that
had a task force appointed at the same time
the subcommittee was created and was working.
They were working on their proposal at the
same time we were here, as opposed to all the
others who took the task force reports and
went from there.

We did not feel comfortable or that it was productive to be taking action on the very same issues that were being dealt with by the task force at the same time. So subsequently we referred everything that had to do with the justice court to the task force, and that's where it is. That's where it stands.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: 1 Well, 534 2 requires the justice or his staff to in effect 3 document into a citation the plaintiff's claim. 4 5 PROFESSOR CARLSON: Right. CHAIRMAN SOULES: That's 6 different, but that seems -- why isn't that 7 Why does Judge Hawkins not find sufficient? 8 that sufficient? Pleadings should be oral, 9 10 525, or written, 534. 534 is a citation. It's not a pleading. And the citation, 11 though, says the defendant has to file a 12 written -- I guess he's talking about the 13 defendant's pleadings. The citation requires 14 15 the defendant to file a written pleading, whereas 525 says pleadings shall be oral 16 except where otherwise specifically provided. 17 526 says an answer shall be in writing. 18 Luke, may I --MS. GARDNER: 19 20 MR. YELENOSKY: Luke, can I make a motion that we defer any consideration 21 of the justice court rules until we have the 22 23 task force report? PROFESSOR ALBRIGHT: I second 24

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that.

1	MR. YELENOSKY: Luke?
2	CHAIRMAN SOULES: All right.
3	Well, then, let's go to 662 and see if we can
4	figure out what this is.
5	We will okay. On 525 we will
6	postpone I guess we can do one of two
7	things. We can do what you say, Steve, or we
8	can do no change. We're going to have to see
9	these okay. We'll just postpone them.
10	MR. YELENOSKY: Right. I would
11	like to use
12	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Postpone 525.
13	MR. YELENOSKY: I would like to
14	use the time, too, but I just don't see how we
15	can use it productively for this.
16	CHAIRMAN SOULES: 528. Okay.
17	534, 536, 542, postpone 544 and 574a, postpone
18	without reference to the merits.
19	And now that gets us to 662 at Page 940.
20	MR. YELENOSKY: And that's
21	ancillary proceedings.
22	CHAIRMAN SOULES: This is
23	delivery of writ of garnishment. It says the
24	writ of garnishment shall be dated and tested

as other writs, and may be delivered to the

sheriff, constable, or authorized person by the officer who issued it, 662, or he may deliver it to the plaintiff.

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The sheriff and constable are already there. All they're adding is "or authorized person" by the officer who issued it. So what they're adding is "or authorized person" to this.

A writ of garnishment is just a It's not an attachment. It's not pleading. an execution. It's just handing over a piece of paper like handing over a citation. And we have somewhat drawn the line as to what process servers could serve or should serve or shouldn't serve. Is there any activity connected with the service other than the delivery of the paper? And I don't see any problem with process servers serving a writ of garnishment. All it does is require it doesn't take over any property. It doesn't sieze a person. It doesn't do anything like that.

Is there any opposition to this? Okay. That stands approved, 662.

663. This is execution and return of

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1	writ. Same issue.
2	Any objection to that? Approved.
3	684. We already looked at that a moment
4	ago. No change. See 14c.
5	688. Page 943. Clerk to issue writ.
6	This is, what, a writ? 688. This is a writ
7	of what? This is an injunction, a writ of
8	injunction. "Deliver same to the sheriff or
9	any constable of the county of the residence
10	of the person enjoined, or shall deliver such
11	writ to an authorized person." It's the same
12	issue.
13	Any objection? It stands approved.
14	689 on Page 944. This is also
15	injunction. Same issue.
16	Any objection? That's approved.
17	MR. YELENOSKY: To no change?
18	MS. SWEENEY: To no change?
19	CHAIRMAN SOULES: No. To allow
20	a process server to serve it.
21	MR. YELENOSKY: Oh.
22	MS. SWEENEY: So we're going
23	against the subcommittee's recommendation?
24	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Yes. Yes,
25	because I don't think they focused on what the

issue is. The issue here is, can an 1 2 authorized person, can a process server serve a writ so long as there's not any other 3 activity collateral to it. 4 MS. SWEENEY: Like interviewing 5 the defendants? 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Like 7 interviewing the defendants or picking up 8 property or anything that might otherwise be a 9 breach of the peace where a state officer 10 should be doing that probably. 11 So we're back to 571, which I guess goes 12 back to the justice court rules again. 13 What about 696, MS. SWEENEY: 14 698, the back of the page? 15 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Did I skip 16 something? Oh, thank you. 945. 17 Doris Lange. Clarify the sequestration. 18 MS. LANGE: The only comment I 19 would like to make, Mr. Chairman, is by 20 21 letting another person serve these, the clerk will not be able to answer any questions the 22 attorney or defendant may ask in regards to 23 Right now we know who we gave the the writs. 24

writ to or the service to and can follow up on

it for you. If it's whoever wants to take it, we will not be able to do that. And I just wanted to point that out, that by making these changes what could happen.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, the clerk is supposed to deliver it to the authorized person, so they would have to show authority. It's just like if you gave it to the sheriff or constable. The giving is not changed. The transfer from the clerk to the server is still in the rule. It's just adding another class of people to whom you may transfer the item to be served.

MS. LANGE: I understand. But if you call and there's been no service, I know where to find my constable or my, you know, whoever. I do not know where to find whoever, Anne Gardner, where she is, whoever else is picking it up. And it doesn't matter to me. I just wanted to point this out.

HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Can't the clerk make a record of who the process is delivered to?

MS. LANGE: No.

MS. SWEENEY: Why no?

MS. SWEE

MS. LANGE: Because we know what all of our citations go to the constable; we know what papers go to the sheriff and which go to the constable, and we keep a copy. I keep a copy. Not all clerks do, but I keep a copy of what I send out until the original comes back. But you know, if you have someone else, or you have the attorney asking for something, if he asks, "Have they served it?" I have no record of who is serving it.

Page 945. All right. Does anybody understand what this is? Let's see, the subcommittee didn't give us an explanation of what they think this is about, so we'll have to look at it.

The amount of the bond for sequestration set by the court, and the plaintiff replevies, bond for sequestration is not fairly nominal. What should be the amount of the penalty if combined with the replevy bond? Are we in the trespass to try title rules here, 696?

PROFESSOR CARLSON: No.

HON. C. A. GUITTARD: This is

1 sequestration.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: What does . that have to do with sequestration?

HON. C. A. GUITTARD: You can sequester real estate on a claim within the jurisdiction of the justice court.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Well, all of these rules provide for a bond amount -- in the amount fixed by the court's order. That's a sequestration bond.

HON. C. A. GUITTARD: Yeah.

got to reduce or increase the bond, and then you can replevy by giving a bond payable to the plaintiff in an amount fixed by the court's order. So that's not any fixed sum either. I think he's right. I think he's missing something, and that is that the trial judge can decide how much protection the bond needs to give. And that really runs through all of these extraordinary writs. We worked hard to get that done in the very beginning.

I agree with the committee. I don't think any change is necessary here.

Does anybody object? No change to 696.

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3	the same. No change.
4	708. Page 947.
5	MS. GARDNER: Those are all
6	duplications.
7	CHAIRMAN SOULES: 708 is
8	probably a different extraordinary writ. No,
9	it's the same. It's still sequestration.
10	They're all the same thing. No change. No
11	change on 696, 698 or 708.
12	And then we get to 523, which is small
13	claims court. Well, let's look and see what
14	he's saying, Jeffrey Mahl. The subcommittee
15	says that small claims court is governed by
16	Chapter 28 of the Government Code and the
17	Texas Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply.
18	This looks like something we ought to postpone
19	consistent with what we said earlier about the
20	justice rules. I'm not sure.
21	Holly, would you bring me the supplement,
22	Page 428, please.
23	MR. PARSLEY: I think he wants
24	to add small claims court to Rule 523.
25	CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay.

698 is probably the same issue, I think.

I agree with the subcommittee. I think that's

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Jeffrey Mahl. It is my impression from this judge, he says, he doesn't say which one, that in a small claims court no rules apply. Judge Prather writes him and says, "Concerning your letter requesting a hearing, I refer you to Rule 2, which lists the courts that are controlled by the rules. You will note that small claims court is not listed. It is a separate and distinct court from justice court which hears all other civil cases. Your case was filed in small claims court and is not bound by the rules. Therefore, your motion for attorneys' fees and your request for a hearing are denied."

Okay. Should small claims court be governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure or can they even be under the Government Code?

Let's see --

MR. YELENOSKY: We addressed that in our subcommittee as well and recommended against that. We recommended against any change on the theory that small claims court is precisely for people who aren't represented by counsel and it shouldn't go under the rules. That's what justice court

is for.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Let me see, I'm just wondering if the Government Code provision is in here. We may not even be able to get there. Chapter 28 is not in my book, so I can't --

PROFESSOR CARLSON: I have it here, Luke. And it's largely jurisdictional and provides that the justice court sits or presides over small claims court. I'm not sure that's the right cross-reference or not.

I know I've read statutes other than this that do provide that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are basically relaxed, gone. And I think that is appropriate. There's a limited number of cases that can be filed in small claims. They would be overly burdensome and expensive, those proceedings, to tie them back into the state rules.

MR. YELENOSKY: They're typically small consumer claims. If you're evicting somebody, it has to be in the justice court, so those rules apply.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. No change. So be it. That gets us to 571

through 73, which are justice rules, right? Postponed.

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professor CARLSON: Luke, can I just raise one question before we go on?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Of course.

understand that what we just said, that there could be service by an independent process server for the writ of garnishment and the writ of injunction, is the intent to just track the language in Rule 103, a person authorized by written court order? Is that how it ought to be stated?

CHAIRMAN SOULES: I think so, yes. Okay. Bonnie.

MS. WOLBRUECK: I'm sorry, I
just realized that you had one more to go
through, but since you're in this writ
section, I have a concern that comes to clerks
in regards to executions that I am wondering
if the rules should clarify, and that is if
more than one writ of execution can be issued
at the same time.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: What's your concern? It's not clear at this time?

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MS. WOLBRUECK: It's not clear 1 at this time in the rule. And I have had some 2 attorneys tell me, in fact, in some sessions 3 to clerk, that only one writ of execution can 4 be issued at one time. And it's not clear in 5 the rule, so I'm wondering if it should be 6 clarified so that clerks know that more than 7 one writ of execution can be issued. 8 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Would you 9 prepare a change that says that? 10 MS. WOLBRUECK: I will do 11 12 that.

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CHAIRMAN SOULES: We're through at trial, we're to a judgment that is mature, not superseded, and they say you can't get but one execution at a time so I can go get my property hid. That leaps the lines at that point, I think, to enforce the judgment, right? Okay.

MS. WOLBRUECK: That's the way some clerks read it. And like I said, we have had an attorney give a presentation to us before on executions who said only one could be issued, so I feel like it needs to be clarified.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: If you will 1 prepare something for us, we will certainly 2 3 work that through. 571 to 73 is back in the justice Okav. 4 5 rules, right? MS. DUDERSTADT: Correct. 6 CHAIRMAN SOULES: So we'll 7 postpone that without reference to the merits. 8 That's Supplemental Page 435. 609(d). 9 In Kleberg County, proposed change to 609(d). 10 Juvenile adjudications. 11 MR. PARSLEY: Okay. That's a 12 rule of evidence. 13 CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. Refer 14 this to Buddy Low's committee. Holly, will 15 you take care of that and tell him to address 16 That will come back then, and we'll put this? 17 it on our agenda as a specific item so we'll 18 know where it is. 19 This is Dick Brown again. We've 20 handled that. Refer to 14c. 21 Miscellaneous justice court rules. We'll 22 postpone that without reference to the 23

merits. The same with 525, 534 and 546, 554

556, 568 and 574(a). Those are all postponed

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without reference to the merits pending our consideration of the task force when we get it.

Now we're to 680. This is in the second supplement, Page 496 to 499.

PROFESSOR CARLSON: That's the same thing we looked at before.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: Okay. This is James Holmes, the thing we just talked about, notice and the Creed. No change.

And that's it, isn't it? Anne, does that wrap it up? You're on the committee.

MS. GARDNER: That's it.

CHAIRMAN SOULES: So we've done all the rules in that area except the mistaken assignment of a rule of evidence and the justice court postponements.

Is there anything else left here? Does anybody see anything else here that we haven't covered? I want to be sure that if we have parked something that I've got it on the agenda to get back to. Nothing?

Well, thanks for your endurance and your help and your contribution. I think we made a lot of good headway here at this meeting. And

I believe I can see light at the end of the tunnel, and it doesn't seem to be the train.

Thank you all. We will see you in January. Merry Christmas, happy holidays, and I hope you find time to enjoy them.

(HEARING ADJOURNED 12:00 NOON.)

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1 CERTIFICATION OF THE HEARING OF 2 SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 3 4 I, WILLIAM F. WOLFE, Certified Court 5 Reporter, State of Texas, hereby certify that 6 I reported the above hearing of the Supreme 7 Court Advisory Committee on November 23, 1996, 8 and the same was thereafter reduced to 9 computer transcription by me. 10 11 12 Charges for preparation of original transcript: \$ 1,025.50 13 Soules & Wallace P.C. Charged to: 14 15 Given under my hand and seal of office on 16 this the Tday of December, 1996. 17 18 ANNA RENKEN & ASSOCIATES 19 925-B Capital of Texas Highway Suite 110 20 Austin, Texas 78746 (512) 306-1003 21 22 WILLIAM F. WOLFE, CSR Certification No. 4696 23 Certificate Expires 12/31/96 24 #003,122WW