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CAUSE NO. 1301318

THE STATE OF TEXAS § IN THE 228TH DISTRICT COURT
 VS. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
 JOSE ADOLPHO CASTILLO § JULY TERM, A. D., 2015

Members of the Jury:

The defendant, Jose Adolpho Castillo, stands charged by indictment with the offense of capital murder, alleged to have been committed on or about the 31st day of December, 2010, in Harris County, Texas. The defendant has pleaded not guilty.

A person commits the offense of murder if he:

- (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; or
- (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and intentionally or knowingly commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.

A person commits the offense of capital murder if he intentionally commits murder, as hereinbefore defined in paragraph (1), and the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of robbery. Robbery is a felony.

A person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing theft, and with intent to obtain or maintain control of property of another he intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another.

RECORDER'S MEMORANDUM
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A person commits the offense of aggravated robbery if he commits robbery, as hereinbefore defined, and he:

- (1) causes serious bodily injury to another; or
- (2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon.

"In the course of committing theft" means conduct that occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of theft.

"Attempt" to commit an offense occurs if, with specific intent to commit an offense, a person does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends, but fails, to effect the commission of the offense intended.

"Theft" is the unlawful appropriation of property with intent to deprive the owner of property.

"Appropriation" and "appropriate", as those terms are used herein, means to acquire or otherwise exercise control over property other than real property. Appropriation of property is unlawful if it is without the owner's effective consent.

"Property" as used herein means tangible or intangible personal property or documents, including money, that represents or embodies anything of value.

"Deprive" means to withhold property from the owner permanently or for so extended a period of time that a major portion of the value or enjoyment of the property is lost to the owner.

"Effective consent" means assent in fact, whether express or apparent, and includes consent by a person legally authorized to

act for the owner. Consent is not effective if induced by deception or coercion.

"Owner" means a person who has title to the property, possession of property, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.

"Possession" means actual care, custody, control, or management of the property.

"Deadly weapon" means a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.

"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

The definition of intentionally relative to the offense of capital murder is as follows:

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result.

The definitions of intentionally or knowingly relative to the offense of murder are as follow:

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result.

A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

The definitions of intentionally and knowingly relative to the offenses of robbery and aggravated robbery are as follow:

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

All persons are parties to an offense who are guilty of acting together in the commission of the offense. A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.

A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the

offense. Mere presence alone will not constitute one a party to an offense.

If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.

By the term "conspiracy" as used in these instructions, is meant an agreement between two or more persons with intent, that they, or one or more of them, engage in conduct that would constitute the offense. An agreement constituting a conspiracy may be inferred from acts of the parties.

Before you would be warranted in finding the defendant guilty of capital murder, you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt not only that on the occasion in question the defendant was in the course of committing or attempting to commit the felony offense of robbery of Sarfraj Maknoja, as alleged in this charge, but also that the defendant specifically intended to cause the death of Saturnino Argueta, by shooting Saturnino Argueta, with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm; or you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Jose Adolpho Castillo, with the intent to promote or assist in the commission of the offense of robbery, if any, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid Mark DeLeon and/or Edgar Padron and/or Ariel Donnataria in shooting

Saturnino Argueta, if he did, with the intention of thereby killing Saturnino Argueta; or you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on the occasion in question the defendant, Jose Adolpho Castillo, entered into an agreement with Mark DeLeon and/or Edgar Padron and/or Ariel Donnataria to commit the felony offense of robbery of Sarfraj Maknojia, as alleged in this charge, and pursuant to that agreement they did carry out their conspiracy, and while in the course of committing said conspiracy, Mark DeLeon and/or Edgar Padron and/or Ariel Donnataria intentionally caused the death of Saturnino Argueta by shooting Saturnino Argueta with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm, and the murder of Saturnino Argueta was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and was an offense that should have been anticipated by the defendant as a result of carrying out the conspiracy, and unless you so find, then you cannot convict the defendant of the offense of capital murder.

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 31st day of December, 2010, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Jose Adolpho Castillo, did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the robbery of Sarfraj Maknojia, intentionally cause the death of Saturnino Argueta by shooting Saturnino Argueta with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm; or

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 31st day of December, 2010, in Harris County, Texas, Mark DeLeon and/or Edgar Padron and/or Ariel Donnataria, did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing

or attempting to commit the robbery of Sarfraj Maknojia, intentionally cause the death of Saturnino Argueta by shooting Saturnino Argueta with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm, and that the defendant, Jose Adolpho Castillo, with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, if any, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided or attempted to aid Mark DeLeon and/or Edgar Padron and/or Ariel Donnataria to commit the offense, if he did; or

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Jose Adolpho Castillo, and Mark DeLeon and/or Edgar Padron and/or Ariel Donnataria entered into an agreement to commit the felony offense of robbery of Sarfraj Maknojia, and pursuant to that agreement, if any, they did carry out their conspiracy and that in Harris County, Texas, on or about the 31st day of December, 2010, while in the course of committing such robbery of Sarfraj Maknojia, Mark DeLeon and/or Edgar Padron and/or Ariel Donnataria intentionally caused the death of Saturnino Argueta by shooting Saturnino Argueta with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm, and the murder of Saturnino Argueta was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and was an offense that should have been anticipated by the defendant as a result of carrying out the conspiracy, then you will find the defendant guilty of capital murder, as charged in the indictment.

Unless you so find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, or if you are unable to agree, you will next consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense of aggravated robbery.

Therefore, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 31st day of December, 2010, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Jose Adolpho Castillo, did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing theft of property owned by Sarfraj Maknojia, and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, intentionally or knowingly cause serious bodily injury to Saturnino Argueta by shooting Saturnino Argueta with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm; or

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 31st day of December, 2010, in Harris County, Texas, Mark DeLeon and/or Edgar Padron and/or Ariel Donnataria, did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing theft of property owned by Sarfraj Maknojia, and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, intentionally or knowingly cause serious bodily injury to Saturnino Argueta by shooting Saturnino Argueta with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm, and that the defendant, Jose Adolpho Castillo, with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, if any, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided or attempted to aid Mark DeLeon and/or Edgar Padron and/or Ariel Donnataria to commit the offense, if he did; or

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Jose Adolpho Castillo, and Mark DeLeon and/or Edgar Padron and/or Ariel Donnataria entered into an agreement to commit the felony offense of robbery of Sarfraj Maknojia, and pursuant to that agreement, if any, they did carry out their conspiracy and that in Harris County, Texas, on or about the 31st

day of December, 2010, while in the course of committing such robbery of Sarfrac Maknojia, Mark DeLeon and/or Edgar Padron and/or Ariel Donnataria caused serious bodily injury to Saturnino Argueta by shooting Saturnino Argueta with a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm, and said offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and was an offense that should have been anticipated by the defendant as a result of carrying out the conspiracy, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery.





If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of either capital murder on the one hand or aggravated robbery on the other hand, but you have a reasonable doubt as to which of said offenses he is guilty, then you must resolve that doubt in the defendant's favor and find him guilty of the lesser offense of aggravated robbery.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is guilty of any offense defined in this charge you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict "Not Guilty."

An accomplice, as the term is here used, means anyone connected with the crime charged, as a party thereto, and includes all persons who are connected with the crime by unlawful act or omission on their part transpiring either before or during the time of the commission of the offense, and whether or not they were present and participated in the commission of the crime. A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible or by both. Mere presence alone, however, will not constitute one a party to an offense.

A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. The term "conduct" means any act or omission and its accompanying mental state.

You are instructed that a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless the accomplice's testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense charged, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, but it must tend to connect the defendant with its commission.

The witness , Mark DeLeon 
 accomplice, if an offense was committed, and you cannot convict the defendant upon  testimony unless you further believe that there is other evidence in the case, outside

of the testimony of Mark DeLeon ~~_____~~
~~_____~~ tending to connect the defendant with the
offense committed, if you find that an offense was committed, and
the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the
commission of the offense, but it must tend to connect the
defendant with its commission, and then from all of the evidence
you must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty of the offense charged against him.

Our law provides that a defendant may testify in his own behalf if he elects to do so. This, however, is a right accorded a defendant, and in the event he elects not to testify, that fact cannot be taken as a circumstance against him.

In this case, the defendant has elected not to testify and you are instructed that you cannot and must not refer to or allude to that fact throughout your deliberations or take it into consideration for any purpose whatsoever as a circumstance against him.

A Grand Jury indictment is the means whereby a defendant is brought to trial in a felony prosecution. It is not evidence of guilt nor can it be considered by you in passing upon the question of guilt of the defendant. The burden of proof in all criminal cases rests upon the State throughout the trial and never shifts to the defendant.

All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that he has been arrested, confined, or indicted for, or otherwise charged with the offense gives rise to no inference of guilt at his trial. The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all. The presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit the defendant, unless the jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.

The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty and it must do so by proving each and every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant.

It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution's proof excludes all reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's guilt.

In the event you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt after considering all the evidence before you,

and these instructions, you will acquit him and say by your verdict "Not Guilty."

You are the exclusive judges of the facts proved, of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, but the law you shall receive in these written instructions, and you must be governed thereby.


After you retire to the jury room, you should select one of your members as your Foreman. It is his or her duty to preside at your deliberations, vote with you, and when you have unanimously agreed upon a verdict, to certify to your verdict by using the appropriate form attached hereto and signing the same as Foreman.

During your deliberations in this case, you must not consider, discuss, nor relate any matters not in evidence before you. You should not consider nor mention any personal knowledge or information you may have about any fact or person connected with this case which is not shown by the evidence.

No one has any authority to communicate with you except the officer who has you in charge. After you have retired, you may communicate with this Court in writing through this officer. Any communication relative to the cause must be written, prepared and signed by the Foreman and shall be submitted to the court through this officer. Do not attempt to talk to the officer who has you in charge, or the attorneys, or the Court, or anyone else concerning any questions you may have.

Your sole duty at this time is to determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty under the indictment in this cause and restrict your deliberations solely to that issue.

Following the arguments of counsel, you will retire to consider your verdict.



J. Michael Wilkinson, Judge Presiding
228th District Court
Harris County, TEXAS

FILED
Chris Daniel
District Clerk

AUG 28 2015

Time: 10:48 Am
Harris County, Texas
By: dc
Deputy

CAUSE NO. 1301318

THE STATE OF TEXAS § IN THE 228TH DISTRICT COURT
VS. § OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
JOSE ADOLPHO CASTILLO § JULY TERM, A. D., 2015

VERDICT

"We, the Jury, find the defendant, Jose Adolpho Castillo, guilty of capital murder, as charged in the indictment."

FILED
Chris Daniel
District Clerk

AUG 28 2015

Time: 3:06 pm
Harris County, Texas
By: [Signature] Deputy

[Signature]
Foreman of the Jury
Frank T. Calderone Jr.
(Please Print) Foreman

"We, the Jury, find the defendant, Jose Adolpho Castillo, guilty of aggravated robbery."

Foreman of the Jury

(Please Print) Foreman

"We, the Jury, find the defendant, Jose Adolpho Castillo, not guilty."

Foreman of the Jury

(Please Print) Foreman

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