MEETING OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE

JUNE 18, 2021

(FRIDAY SESSION)

Taken before Lorrie A. Schnoor, Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of Texas, Registered Diplomate Reporter and Certified Realtime Reporter, reported by machine shorthand method, on the 18th day of June 2021, between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m., via Zoom videoconference and YouTube livestream in accordance with the Supreme Court of Texas' Emergency Orders regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster.

1	INDEX OF VOTES
2	
3	Votes taken by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee during this session are reflected on the following
4	pages:
5	Vote on Page
6	Sexual Assault Survivor Privilege 32539
7	Ethical Guidelines for Mediators 32577
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, welcome to our hopefully final meeting by Zoom, and I say "hopefully" because we will meet in person on October 8th of 2021; but as everybody knows, we have a challenging agenda necessitated by a number of more than usual, as I recall, statutes by the legislature which require either rule amendments or at least being addressed in some fashion by the rules.

And I want to thank everybody on the committee for jumping on our latest referrals from the Court and just doing a terrific job, and I know we're going to see the results of that in a minute.

I also want to note two things. One, it probably doesn't need being noted, but this is an important day in our nation's history, and especially in Texas history. Long recognized in this state is Juneteenth but now recognized nationally, as is only appropriate.

Second thing, it has been the tradition when a new committee has been appointed to, on our first meeting -- on the Friday night of our first meeting, to have a reception for the committee and to have a team picture taken. And we're going to do that, although we're a little late this time, but on the Friday night

```
following our October 8th, 2021 meeting, there will be
1
 2
   such a reception. And Shiva will get the details of
   that out, but just hopefully plan to be -- stay in
 3
   Austin to do that, and we'll have a record -- photo
 4
   record of this committee, and we'll get a chance to talk
 5
   to each other casually and in a social setting.
6
                  So with that, I'll turn it over to the
7
   Chief for a report from Chief Justice Hecht.
8
                  HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT:
                                          Well, thanks,
9
   Chip. We have several things to mention to you today.
10
                  First of all, as you know, our colleague
11
12
   for the last 11 years, Justice Eva Guzman, has resigned
   this week and has announced her candidacy for the office
13
   of attorney general of Texas. And so we wish her well.
14
15
   Justice Guzman was started on the trial bench back in
16
   about '98, I think, or '99. She had been on the bench
   22 years and has contributed immensely to the work of
17
18
   the judiciary. She contributed enormously to the
   Children's Commission, the Mental Health Commission, to
19
   the Access to Justice Commission, and she is a
2.0
   nationally-known advocate for improving the operations
21
   of the justice system in all those areas. So we wish
22
   Eva well, and we look forward to continuing to see her.
23
24
                  We have also had another resignation this
25
   week.
           David Slayton has resigned as administrative
```

director of the Office of Court Administration to take 1 2 the position as vice president of the National Center For State Courts in charge of court consulting services, 3 both nationally and internationally. This is really 4 David's dream job, and I was hoping and praying that it 5 would come along in a couple years, but here it is. 6 so we wish him well. He will be starting that position 7 in -- on September 1st and leaving us at the end of 8 9 August.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.0

21

22

23

24

25

We began a search for a new OCA director. This is going to be very difficult because the job that David has made the position into involves policy and innovation, both setting policy and trying to imagine what policy should be. It involves an enormous amount of IT work because the appellate courts are all operating almost online all the time, and trial courts are coming along in that regard as well. And it involves work with the legislature. And there's just nobody who knows the Texas judiciary inside and out, both from positions to people and the staffing who knows the legislature, and the people over there who regularly help the judiciary with legislation that we request or And then, of course, with the IT. I think the IT department is pretty strong. We still need a manager there. So we're looking for somebody to fill David's

1 position here starting in September.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

2 The Court is beginning to gather in person again. We had our last two conferences this past 3 Tuesday and the week before or maybe -- yeah, the week 4 before -- in person. And meeting in the conference 5 room, just to put it in perspective, it was Justice 6 Huddle's first time to meet with the Court in person, 7 even only she's been there for months. And Justice 8 Bland had not joined us in person very many times, so it 9 10 was very good to get back together again, and we're looking forward to working in person in the fall both in 11 oral arguments and in conference. We're trying to 12 decide, like law firms are, what our in-person policies 13 should be for all personnel going forward, and that's 14 15 kind of a work in progress.

And we're -- it's been a very productive term, and we're on track to clear the docket of argued cases by the end of June. Our goal is to beat the Supreme Court.

The Court has issued 38 Emergency Orders.

Two are still in effect, the one covering eviction diversion, which just sets out a procedure for the program in the justice courts, and the general omnibus order, which expires August 1st.

And I think going forward, the -- our hope

is that the order will be fully as -- give trial judges 1 full flexibility in continuing to handle backlogs, any changes in risk from COVID, and any other aspects of 3 their procedure, which they have been learning to handle 4 in -- with the challenges of the pandemic. 5

2

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.0

21

22

23

24

25

So we'll continue -- some people have asked if the State -- if the governor's disaster order expires and the Supreme Court's power expires -emergency power also expires will we continue remote proceedings, and the answer is yes. And we will try to give by order -- we don't expect the disaster to -- the governor's order to expire. We expect him to continue I think actually Hurricane Harvey disaster order is still in effect. So we don't expect a change, but we're preparing for one and trying to move a lot of what we've learned over into rules of procedure. We'll be continuing to do that.

For example, there's a paragraph in the omnibus order that allows for remote proceedings and bar disciplinary matters. And we're preparing to move that over into the rules of disciplinary procedure so that it would not need the support of any Emergency Order going forward, so we'll be looking at those.

This, in my view, is not something that I think we need to draw on the can be done top-down.

very good work of our trial judges, Judge Miskel, Judge
Ferguson, Judge Schaffer in Houston, all of his judges,
lots of judges who have been trying to navigate the
shoals of the pandemic and learn from their experiences
and try to put those into practice going forward, so
that's kind of our strategy in that regard.

We're trying to expand jury trials. The trial judges are trying as hard as they can. We've had about 60 virtual jury trials since the pandemic started in traffic cases, child protection cases, a few insurance cases, a few small claims, and they work reasonably well in those kinds of settings. We have not had much success with using them in bigger cases, but we are trying to do all we can to conduct jury trials in person. Just to give you a perspective, from March 2020 through March 2021, 13 months, we tried 239 cases to verdict. In 2019, we tried 186 a week. So we're way behind.

And our -- one of our strategies for getting through the backlog is to utilize visiting judges. And you may have seen some press about the legislature giving us only a portion of the funding that we asked for for visiting judges, but that is not going to hamper the program. We expect to get federal funding through the governor's office, and the legislature knew

that, and so we're -- this is not a repudiation of the plan, but it's just a working together to try to get it done, but we are way behind. And it's not for want of trying. And so we will have to utilize some innovative procedures to try to get back on track.

It's the same way throughout the United States. I see, from my national perspective, that everybody is struggling with this. Nobody has a better plan than Texas. And we're all trying to learn together, but that's kind of the way that we are looking for it to develop.

Remote proceedings do work well outside jury trials, and we've had a lot of them, over one and a half million, through the pandemic involving almost 5 million participants. And so we'll continue to try to refine those procedures and encourage them among our judges.

Chief Justice Christopher has chaired a Remote Proceedings Task Force identifying statutes that may impact proceedings. Judge Miskel vice-chaired that task force. We're going through that report. It's very voluminous. And we're going through the report, and we expect that over the summer, we'll make a lot of progress in trying to come up with more comprehensive rules to help with those proceedings.

We're working on final changes in Civil
Rule 145. We've gotten a lot of comments on the
proposed rule that was put out for comment, a number of
them from court reporters. And we're looking through
those carefully, and we thank David Jackson for helping
us with that, but we expect to have those changes
approved before very long.

2.0

We have also been working on Appellate Rule 49 involving motions for rehearing, and are also working with the Court of Criminal Appeals, because it affects them too, and we hope to have the comments in by the end of August and new rules in effect by October the 1st.

You-all know that the changes in the disciplinary rules that were approved in a referendum of the Bar had been also approved by the Supreme Court and are taking effect as well. Of course, they have to do with advertising and -- predominantly, but also some other issues. I think there are eight rules changes.

And I'm sure you've heard much about them.

We did make a change, per the recommendation of this committee, to change the Code of Judicial Conduct to clarify that specialty court judges are not engaging in improper ex parte communications in the way they handle matters in their courts, which, of

course, place those judges in a different role than most judges. And I think that clarification will give them a lot of comfort knowing that -- in going about their jobs.

As Chip mentioned, the session has left us with some work to do. And some of it we'll be tackling today, and some of it we'll be continuing to look at.

There have been changes in the rules concerning court reporters, guardians, military spouse licensing, and several other things, and so we'll be trying to address all of those new issues soon.

One very good thing from the legislative session is that the Legislative Branch, as well as the Executive, continue to recognize the important work of Legal Aid and legal services, pro bono work, and access to justice and were very generous in continuing the funding of all of those projects in this past session.

The Supreme Court -- the basic funding for the Access to Justice Foundation, which comes from appropriations, is in the Supreme Court's budget. And when we were asked to cut 5 percent going into the session, we declined to cut any of the BCLS funding because we just think in the times that we're in, we have to emphasize how important this is to both the bar and to Legal Aid providers, to their clients, and to

justice in Texas. So we're very grateful for the legislature's recognition of that.

2.0

The Texas legislature is one of the most generous legislatures in the country when it comes to funding Access to Justice. The only two I know that are comparable are -- other two are New York and California. So we can be very proud of that good relationship we have with the legislature.

And finally, we're talking about setting up a rules Listserv. So it's been called to our attention that sometimes it's hard to get notice of meetings or proposed rules of things that have to do with our rules operations, so we're going to try to set that up over the summer and get you-all signed up so that we can pop in your inbox with updates from time to time. And, of course, we'll email everybody when that's ready to go.

I think that's all, Chip. We are grateful to our staff, as always, to Jackie and Pauline and Martha and all of our staff at the Court, for their help with our rules.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thank you very much, Chief.

And Justice Bland reminded me just a moment ago that I have already messed up this morning.

1	Our next meeting is not in October. Our next meeting is
2	September 3rd, live and in person, in Austin, and that's
3	when the reception is going to be that night, that
4	Friday night. So I apologize for that, but for those
5	people who have joined after we started, you won't be
6	confused, and now hopefully the confusion will be
7	corrected for the rest of the committee; but our next
8	meeting, Friday, September 3rd, in Austin, in person,
9	reception to follow, with a team picture taken that
10	night at the reception.
11	So with that, Justice Bland
12	MS. HOBBS: Chip?
13	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
14	MS. HOBBS: I'm sorry. Isn't that the
15	night of the Historical Society dinner?
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It probably is, but
17	we're going to work we're going to work that out.
18	MS. HOBBS: Okay.
19	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: We'll work that out,
20	Lisa. Thanks.
21	MS. HOBBS: Okay, uh-huh.
22	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Bland.
23	HONORABLE JANE BLAND: Good morning. I
24	don't have anything to add to Chief Justice Hecht's
25	remarks. And I know we have an ambitious agenda. It's

```
good to see everybody, and let's get to work.
1
 2
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Well, I'm sure
   everybody would want to know -- and if not everyone, I
 3
   want to know -- who are the baseball players over your
 4
   virtual right shoulder?
 5
                  HONORABLE JANE BLAND:
6
                                         They're all my son,
   Daniel, various -- you know, the year -- every year he
7
   played baseball, I got one of those cutouts, so it's the
8
   same baseball player.
9
10
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. And so he looks
   like he's --
11
12
                  HONORABLE JANE BLAND: He's now 26, so not
   playing so much baseball anymore.
13
14
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I thought he would have
15
   been in at least AA, maybe AAA, by now, but...
16
                  HONORABLE JANE BLAND: No, just a proud
17
   mom.
18
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. So I think,
19
   speaking of baseball, the most valuable player on our
   committee is going to be Bill Boyce, who has not only
2.0
   chaired a committee that has had a bunch of projects
21
   given to them as a result of the legislative session,
22
23
   but he is currently in trial and trying to juggle that
24
   with his work on this committee. And so it's -- and
25
   they got a day off from trial today, so it's great that
```

Bill could be with us and help us. And on the agenda, I 1 2 have the three items that his committee, Judicial Administration, have been assigned. And, Bill, if 3 you're here, maybe you could give us a roadmap of how 4 you plan to attack all this. 5 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Thanks very much, 6 Chip. I appreciate it. 7 8 We've got three urgent topics. And so my proposal is to take them one at a time, but they're all 9 10 specific applications of the same general issue, which is that different statutes have established different 11 12 limitations for time requirements on certain types of And so the general question is: Should either 13 the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure or the Judicial 14 15 Administration rules be amended to reflect these new 16 statutorily created limitations on particular types of 17 cases. So that's the big picture. 18 We've got three of them, in particular, and so I think it would probably be easier and less 19 confusing if I introduce each of the three, we talk 2.0 about that one, and then move on to the next one as 21 opposed to mixing them all up. 22 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okav. 24 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: The first is an

amendment that House Bill 2950 accomplished to

25

- 1 Government Code, Section 74.1625 to prohibit an MDL
- 2 | panel from transferring a Texas Medicaid Fraud
- 3 Prevention Act action brought by the AG's Consumer
- 4 | Protection Division.
- The question on the table is: Should Rule of Judicial Administration 13.1 be amended to reflect this statute change? The subcommittee met and -- I'm grabbing my notes here while we're talking. The
- 9 subcommittee met and discussed each of these.
- With respect to Rule 13.1 -- and I'm
- 11 | flipping to it right now -- Rule 13 of the Rule of
- 12 | Judicial Administration sets out different procedures
- 13 | related to multidistrict litigation, Rule 13.1 discusses
- 14 applicability to certain types of civil actions. The
- 15 current references to applicability are mostly time
- 16 related in terms of when the statute became effective,
- 17 but the bottom line is that as currently drafted, Rule
- 18 | 13.1 really doesn't try to capture every statutory or
- 19 other limitation on what can be sent and how it can be
- 20 | sent to MDL proceedings. And so the subcommittee's
- 21 | thought was that there's really not a reason to carve
- 22 out this particular new limitation and include it as
- 23 | well.
- There was also the thought that this is a
- 25 | highly specialized area. If the specialized attorneys

from the AG's office, Consumer Protection Division, are involved in it, they're going to be well aware of the statute and can apprize the Court of that. And so the bottom line for this particular subpart was to recommend leaving Rule 13.1 alone for this particular purpose.

And I should pause at this moment to say

2.0

that as we go through each of these subparts, if there are additional comments that any of the subcommittee members have, I certainly would ask them to chime in. Because of the nature of the legislative schedule, this meeting was done in an expedited fashion. The write-up you have is not the usual fulsome report that you would have with all the appendices. So if there's something I leave out or a point that anybody on the subcommittee wants to amplify, I would certainly ask them to do that; but that's an overview of the first of these items.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thanks, Bill.

Does anybody on the subcommittee have any additions to Bill's excellent summary of this portion of the referral?

HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: This is Judge
Peeples, and I have just a brief suggestion about all
three of these. All three of them deal with statutes
that have an impact on rules of procedure or
administrative rules. And the real question for me is:

Would it be helpful to either mention in the rules or comments that there are statutes that modify them? And so, you know, "Would it be helpful," to me, is the question. And when I ask that question, I get different answers on all three of these, so I think we need to talk about them individually, but for me, that's the focus. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Anything 

specifically, Judge, on this particular MDL with respect to -- you know, Bill points out that this is a very specialized area where the practitioners are likely to know about it, but what are your thoughts on that?

three things. It involves Medicaid fraud cases brought by the attorney general, and they can bring those in all across the state. And the MDL panel will know -- they probably already know about this -- know that they could not grant such a motion.

The assistant AGs who will be prosecuting these cases will know about it, too. And if they are in litigation with people and those people start threatening, "Hey, we're going to file an MDL motion," the assistant AGs will tell them very quickly, "You can't do that." It's a nonstarter, and it just won't happen. And so it's just not needed. It's just utterly

```
not needed, and so I think that we ought to just
1
 2
   recommend that to the Court.
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great.
 3
                                             Thank you,
 4
   Judge.
                  Anybody else from the subcommittee with
 5
   comments about this MDL rule that Bill went through.
6
                  HONORABLE DAVID EVANS:
                                          Chip, David Evans.
7
                                     Yes, sir.
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
8
                  HONORABLE DAVID EVANS:
                                          I chair the panel,
9
10
   MDL panel, and there are other acts in legislation that
   restrict the authority of the panel. Windstorm
11
   Association venue is fixed in the Windstorm Association
12
           And I agree with Judge Peeples, it's not
13
   necessary for the panel. The matter will be brought to
14
15
   their attention in the responsive briefing, and it'll
16
   take care of it at that point. So would be my thought.
17
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you, Judge.
18
   Anybody else from the subcommittee, then we'll go to our
19
   full committee. But anybody else from the subcommittee
2.0
   have any comments about this aspect of it?
                               This is Kennon, and I will
                  MS. WOOTEN:
21
   echo agreement with Judge Peeples and also point out
22
23
    that if we were to identify one area in which statutes
24
   amend processes, it would suggest that statutes are not
25
   amending processes in other areas.
                                        So it could, on the
```

1	grand scheme of things, be more confusing than helpful
2	to practitioners.
3	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thanks, Kennon.
4	Anybody else from the subcommittee?
5	(No response)
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. How about
7	the full committee? Anybody else have any comments on
8	the MDL aspect of it?
9	(No response)
10	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. I don't
11	hear anybody or see any hands, any mechanical hands,
12	popping up. So Bill, let's go to the next subpart of
13	this.
14	HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: So the subcommittee
15	discussion on the next subpart, number two, and the
16	third one, number three, was a bit more involved. We
17	reached consensus on this first one that we just
18	discussed pretty quickly, but there's probably more room
19	for discussion on both number two and number three.
20	And, again, I'm going to try to keep them separate, but
21	I also want to flag that Judge Peeples and I had visited
22	last night, and I think he may have some additional
23	thoughts that he will want to share after I sort of
24	introduce this topic.
25	Number two involves cases with a family

violence protective order under Section 85.006 in the Family Code.

2.0

House Bill 39 shortened the time, potentially, within which a default judgment can be obtained that is different from what's referenced in Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 107(h). So the question on the table was: Should the text or a comment be added -- should the text be amended or comment be added to Rule 107(h) to reflect that for this very specific kind of case, the default rules are going to be different?

The thinking or at least the discussion of the subcommittee -- I'm not going to presume to say what people were thinking, but the discussion in the subcommittee was that at a minimum, the Rule 15 through 165a subcommittee should be consulted on this since this also overlaps potentially with their jurisdiction. And we certainly would invite anybody from that subcommittee who has thoughts to chime in at the appropriate time.

I think the consensus was that this is -even though this is a specialized area of type of case,
it probably does behoove the courts and the litigants to
alert, either through rule amendment or through a
comment, that the rules for this very specific kind of
case are different with respect to the availability of a

default judgment. Again, the courts that are dealing with this are likely to be specialized courts.

2.0

We had a thought that the attorneys who may be in one of these situations may or may not be as specialized, and we thought for that reason that this is a significant departure from what is otherwise a pretty bright-line rule in Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 107. Folks should receive a head's-up about it, so the question is: How do you do that?

When we had the discussion within the subcommittee, I think the initial consensus was to look at a rule amendment to talk about that, but it wasn't 100 percent clear. There was some recognition that a comment may be an appropriate way to do that, but one way or the other, there should be some kind of head's-up of notice of this, particularly in light of the potentially urgent circumstances in which this type of request for a family violence protective order might come up. So that's kind of the overview, but Judge Peeples may have additional thoughts that he wants to share.

22 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Yes, I do.

All across the state, in the big cities and also out in the country, most of these cases are bought by dedicated prosecutors, I mean, prosecutors who

this is what they do, and they're heard most of the time 1 by judges who this is one of the main things they do. 2 And so the people out there are going to know this by 3 and large, but I don't think that's true everywhere. 4 And I do think it would be very -- there's an easy fix 5 that would be helpful to people who might not know about 6 this. 7 And so I agree with the subcommittee's 8 recommendation that maybe the text and/or a comment 9 10 would be -- should mention this. And I've got a ten-word sentence that could be inserted in Rule 107(h) 11 that would cover it. Quote, This section does not apply 12 to family law protective orders, period. 13 And then I 14

think that could be footnoted and there could be -- a comment could be drafted that would just basically quote

16 the statute, and depending upon how it's formatted, it

might take up four or five lines. 17

15

18

19

2.0

21

22

23

24

25

The statute is very clear and refers explicitly to Rule 107. And so I think there's an easy fix that would be helpful for some people, although the specialists in this area I think would know about it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, Judge. anybody else on the subcommittee have any thoughts about Emily, there's a hand. Somebody who's this? technologically savvy. Yeah, Emily.

HONORABLE EMILY MISKEL: 1 And I'm sorry, 2 I'm in a hotel room, so I'm trying to like look this up on my phone while we're having the discussion. 3 But I think a lot of family violence protective orders are 4 filed by pro se litigants, and they're filed in general 5 jurisdiction courts. So I do think it helps to have a 6 comment. I don't know that it needs a rule change. 7 I'm sorry, I'm not on the subcommittee, so I apologize 8 9 if I'm overstepping. 10 But one thing I wanted to look up that I couldn't access quickly enough is, there are also 11 stalking protective orders under Chapter 7A of the Code 12 of Criminal Procedure. And a lot of times, they're 13 14 mixed together and we treat them similarly or we try them together. We use the same forms for both. 15 And T 16 just don't know if the change on the Family Code also affects the other types of protective orders under the 17 18 Code of Criminal Procedure. So I don't know the answer, 19 but I just wanted to mention that. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you very much, 20 Judge. And you're certainly not overstepping your 21 boundary. 22 23 But here's another technologically savvy 24 Kennon, what do you have to say? person. 25 Thank you, Chip. I just want MS. WOOTEN:

to echo, again, Judge Peeples' good suggestion. I think
that's a clean way of addressing this particular matter
in the rule.

And in regard to the fact that there are pro se litigants out there confronting these situations, I will say, for what it's worth, that this might be a good thing to address on TexasLawHelp as well, the website that has recently been addressed via amendments to the citation rule. It's a great resource for pro se litigants, self-represented litigants, and frankly people like me who do pro bono work in the family law realm and don't really know the ins and out of how it works. So I would also say that collaboration and working with the Texas Legal Services Center to get something up on TexasLawHelp.org in regard to this matter would be a good thing to do.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Anybody else?

Yes, Judge. Judge Salas?

HONORABLE MARIA SALAS MENDOZA: So I understand what Judge Peeples is saying, but sort of the other part of the conversation on the subcommittee is that if you -- the question was whether the Rule 6 should be amended. And if you look at that particular rule, it's talking about suggestions for disposition of cases. And it has -- in the first part, you know, it

refers to criminal cases and it refers back to the 1 2 statute, then talks about civil cases. I don't have it in front of me, so I apologize to y'all not having the 3 particular cite. But at least A, B, and C refer to 4 these, as we discussed them in the subcommittee, 5 aspirational rules for disposition of cases. And then 6 you get to D, and I think there's an E also, that do set 7 out some deadlines. 8 And so I was of the opinion there were 9 10 some of us on the committee that thought this isn't the place for anything having to do with a deadline. 11 Tt. should be referred to the actual Family Code, and that's 12 where people would go. 13 14 And to the extent that people are thinking 15 that a pro se litigant might need the additional help, I 16 don't think they're going to the Rules of Judicial Administration. I think that still would be more 17 18 helpful in the actual Family Code. So I think Rule 6 is an interesting rule 19 because it mixes a couple of things, but I guess I 20 wasn't in the group that thought adding to the mix-up or 21 the hodgepodge would be helpful. So I just think this 22 is not the place to add it. 23 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thank you, 25 Judge.

1	Is Richard Orsinger with us? He's the
2	chair of the Rule 15 through what is it 137
3	subcommittee, or Judges Estevez or anybody else on that
4	subcommittee, any comments that you-all might have about
5	this? Either raise your electronic hand or just pop in.
6	(No response)
7	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, the only thing I
8	can
9	HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: I like what Judge
10	Peeples said. And I will just say from my experience
11	with pro se litigants, they're not going to be looking
12	at the code of you know, the injunction code.
13	They're going to be looking in the Family Code. They're
14	going to go to a family violence coordinator, and
15	they're going to get the need they the help they
16	need. I would be more concerned with our attorneys that
17	are doing pro bono work, so that sentence would help.
18	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thanks, Judge.
19	Anybody else on the committee whether or
20	not they're on the subcommittee?
21	HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Chip
22	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes, sir.
23	HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: the issue
24	that Judge Salas Mendoza brought up, I want to save that
25	for the next issue we have, which is the 90-day deadline

```
to rule after you've had a trial. But this one right
1
 2
   here deals with the default judgment issue and must --
   notice and so forth, citation, be on file for ten days,
 3
   and the legislature said not in a protective order case.
 4
                  And the more I think about -- I hadn't
 5
   thought about the pro se issue. It is true that
6
   sometimes pro se people bring these. I think it adds a
7
   little bit if 107(h) would have that sentence, and then
8
   a comment would quote the statute and they would see it.
9
10
   It certainly doesn't hurt. Probably helps a little.
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.
                                             That makes some
11
12
   sense to me, but anybody else have any comments?
                  HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
13
                                                 Oh, I have
14
   my hand raised, Chip. I don't know if you can't see me,
15
   but --
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, no, I can see it
16
17
   now, yes.
               Sorry.
18
                  HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                                 Okav.
19
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Christopher.
20
                  HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER:
                                                 So, you
   know, I've been on the Pattern Jury Charge Committee for
21
   a long time. And we put a lot of stuff in the comments,
22
23
   and I have found that people don't read the comments.
   So I actually think it would be better to, you know,
24
25
   add, you know, in a family violence protective order
```

case to the text of the rule rather than putting it in a 1 2 comment just because people don't read the comments. I do see this note that Tom Gray has put 3 up that says, "If we amend 107, the statute negates 4 anything in 107." Yes, yes, it would, but, you know, I 5 think everyone would find it clearer if you actually put 6 it in the text. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, Judge. 8 Great. Richard Munzinger. 9 10 MR. MUNZINGER: I agree with putting it in the text of the rule. The ten-word sentence that Judge 11 Peeples suggests is fine, but I do think that 12 practitioners need to be alerted in the text of the rule 13 14 to a place that they can go to learn that there is a 15 shortened time frame because those rights are being 16 affected, and most people think you have 20 days, et 17 cetera, et cetera. So I think that the practitioners 18 should be warned in the text of the rule itself. 19 you. Thanks, Richard. 20 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. I'm scanning for mechanical hands, 21 and I don't think I've missed any, but I may have. 22 23 Anybody else have any comments about this? 24 (No response) 25 Well, Bill, back CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.

1 to you.

2.0

HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: So the third item is the one that I think Judge Salas Mendoza and Judge Peeples have flagged for us, and this was also a topic of considerable discussion within the subcommittee and not a clear consensus on what to do about it. And I think Judge Salas Mendoza really crystallized the source of potential confusion.

567 has added a new Family Code section that sets a 90-day deadline for rendering a final order in a child protection case after the date on which trial commences. So the question was: Should Rule of Judicial

So the issue on the table is, House Bill

14 Administration 6 be amended or flagged with a comment to reflect this new time limit?

And the thing about Rule 6 is at its core, as Chief Justice Gray pointed out in our subcommittee discussion, Rule 6.1 setting out different timetables is not mandatory. It is aspirational. It is permissive. District and county -- district and statutory county court judges should, so far as reasonably possible, ensure that all cases are brought to trial or final disposition in conformity with the following time standards, and then you've got different time standards for different types of cases.

Same thing with 6.2. You've got this "so far as reasonably possible" language, which is more aspirational, obviously entitled to attention in an effort to comply with it, but not really framed in mandatory terms.

2.0

In contrast, the statutory amendment is framed in mandatory terms. You decide this matter within X number of days, absent a showing of good cause, which good cause is statutorily defined. So it's mandatory rather than permissive.

So the overall concern was, if we start mixing up mandatory and permissive in Rule 6.1, is that a source of potential confusion, because as we read the statute, the statute is not telling judges to do this insofar as is reasonably practical or possible. It's telling judges to do this. So that's an overarching consideration.

A related consideration is that, you know, there still may be some source of potential confusion. Even under -- even if we leave Rule 6.1 alone, it references some statutory provisions. The subcommittee did not have a particular grasp on whether there are other mandatory timeframes for dispositions either in the Family Code or in other context. The suspicion is there probably are, but we didn't run that to ground.

And so there's still a potential source of confusion because, for example, 6.1 references timeframes for family law cases. That's kind of a broad term, and you capture within that there may well be types of family law cases, quote, unquote, that have specific time frames within them.

So there was not a consensus on whether to amend Rule 6.1 to have some kind of a notion that says these standards don't apply in this specific kind of case under this provision of the Family Code.

I think the options that were settled on to bring to the full committee is, number one, possibly just leave Rule 6 unchanged with the concern that highlighting this one particular mandatory statutory timeframe may, by omission, mislead people into thinking that this is the only one and there are others out there.

Another option that was discussed is kind of a general preamble perhaps to the entirety of Rule 6 that says nothing in these guidelines, or however you want to characterize them, nothing in the time standards set out in Rule 6, displays any mandatory deadlines that any statute anywhere may establish. Not perhaps, you know, the most precisely informative preamble, but at least it gives folks an idea that they should

consider -- they should investigate whether there's
something specific to the very particular kind of case
that they're working on.

So the two options for further discussion that the subcommittee came up with are reflected at the end of the short memo in Subsection B. There may well be other options that folks want to flag.

And, again, Judge Peeples and I talked about this some last night, and he may have some additional thoughts in addition to any other subcommittee members who may want to chime in at this point.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thank you,
14 Bill.

15 Judge Peeples.

2.0

three things. I think it bears stressing, this deals with judges who have tried the case. They've had a trial. I mean, they have tried the case and it's over, and they've got 90 days from the start of the case to sign a judgment that's final. And so this is going to be on their radar. They will know about it.

And the lawyers, you know, again, many -- maybe most of these cases are brought by people that this is what they do. They'll be reminding the Judge,

and there's so many easy ways to do it. "Your Honor, we 1 2 just would like to get it on your calendar because the legislature, you know, was mad about this. 3 They said mandamus lies -- urged people to bring mandamus if you 4 don't get this done in 90 days." And the legislature 5 does care about this because they said in the statute, 6 once you've started the trial, that 90-day period is not 7 tolled if you recess the trial. And they did that 8 because judges were doing that, some of them. 9 10 And so I just think this is going to be -the Judges are going to be aware of this and the people 11 involved in the case will remind them. And that, plus 12 the fact it's just a bad fit in Administrative Rule 6, 13 14 which is preparatory and aspirational, and it could be 15 done. We tried the drafting it. It's just hard because

it's such a bad fit. So -- and my view is because it's not helpful to put it in Administrative Rule 6, we shouldn't try. The Court shouldn't try, but it can be done if the Court wants to do it.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you, Judge.

Yes, Judge Miskel, you've got your electronic hand up. Thank you.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

HONORABLE EMILY MISKEL: I was just realizing that, you know, child welfare cases have a ton of very specific and strict deadlines that have never

been mentioned in Rule 6. So I'm on board with either 1 2 leaving it the same, because everyone that does child welfare cases knows that that's its own specific set of 3 deadlines, or to just modify 6.1 where it says "family 4 law cases to just say "family law cases except child 5 welfare cases." 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, Judge. 7 Justice Gray has a comment. I don't know 8 if everybody's seeing it. "They start the case to avoid 9 10 the mandatory dismissal and tell them to come back for some more of the trial on a date in the future, so the 11 trial is not over." 12 Judge Peeples, did you address that issue? 13 14 It seems like maybe you did, but --15 HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: The statute 16 itself addresses it and says -- if you -- once you've started the trial, the 90 days is not tolled by 17 18 recessing the trial. I mean, they explicitly said that 19 in the statute. 2.0 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Got it. Judge Salas Mendoza. 21 All right. HONORABLE MARIA SALAS MENDOZA: 22 So Judge Miskel, I don't do family law, so I would defer to you, 23 24 but my recollection is that there are a ton of deadlines 25 in all the cases. And so if it's just child welfare,

1	then I agree that's helpful, but that was the
2	conversation we had, too, that we wouldn't want to
3	suggest in any way that those are the only deadlines.
4	And so, you know, that's why I thought it's just not a
5	good place to put it in.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you, Judge.
7	Any other any other comments? Yes,
8	Kennon.
9	HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: You're muted.
10	MS. WOOTEN: Can you hear me now?
11	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes. Yes, thank you.
12	MS. WOOTEN: Sorry about that. I was
13	hoping nobody would ever tell me I'm muted again on Zoom
14	but hopes get dashed all the time.
15	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It happens.
16	MS. WOOTEN: It does.
17	With Rule 6 of the Rules of Judicial
18	Administration this is beyond the scope of the
19	immediate task; however, I'm wondering whether it might
20	be worthwhile to say something general in that rule
21	along the lines of "unless provided otherwise by
22	statute," comma, and then go into the text of the rule,
23	because it strikes me based on the feedback received
24	today that there are instances in which the statutes
25	require disposition by a certain date. And then we have

this rule that's aspirational as opposed to mandatory 1 2 that could be somewhat confusing if an individual were to go to it and think that it is universally applicable. 3 So, again, I know this is a suggestion 4 beyond the immediate scope of the issue at hand, but I 5 throw it out there for consideration in light of the 6 fact that we have a rule that may be a little misleading 7 to people who don't have a grasp on the broader context. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, Kennon. 9 10 Any other -- any other comments? Justice Gray has amended his -- or supplemented his comment to 11 everybody indicating, "So we will be arguing in the 12 mandamus proceeding if it was tolled but amending RJA 13 does not need to be done, and it would be tolled versus 14 15 recessed to determine if the trial is over." 16 Anybody -- Bill, do you have any thoughts 17 about Justice Gray's comment? 18 HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: My main thought is 19 I don't think tweaking or changing Rule 6 is the place to address these issues. Some of them may get litigated 2.0 and so on and so forth. 21 You know, speaking for myself, not 22 purporting to speak on behalf of the entire 23 24 subcommittee, I think some kind of a flag to 25 litigants -- either we try to identify the entire

```
universe of statutory exceptions or we have some
1
 2
   catch-all language in Rule 6.
                  And trying to capture the entire universe
 3
   of every specific timeline that's statutorily mandated
 4
   somewhere would be fraught with opportunities for
 5
   omission. And because of that, you know, I think
6
   alerting folks that nothing in the rule overrides a
7
   specific statutory mandate for a time frame is probably
8
   the best we can do for purposes of Rule 6.
9
10
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Rich Phillips?
                  MR. PHILLIPS: Yeah. Again, I think just
11
   looking at Rule 6.1 and 6.2, like Kennon said, why not
12
    just put a thing in the beginning that says, "Except as
13
14
   otherwise required by statute, " comma, right at the
   beginning of 6.1, and put the same thing at the
15
16
   beginning of 6.2. Problem solved.
17
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                     There you go.
18
                  Anybody else?
19
                  (No response)
20
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                     Okay.
                                            I don't see
   anymore hands. Bill, any closing remarks before we move
21
22
   on to our next topic?
                  HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: I think we should
23
24
   move on to the next urgent topic.
25
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
                                             Thank you.
```

1	HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Thanks.
2	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So we'll do that. And
3	terrific job by you and your subcommittee on such short
4	notice. Really, really fine work. Thank you.
5	HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Chip, I have one
6	parting comment, which is that Bill Boyce ought to chair
7	more subcommittees.
8	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think we ought to
9	make him chair of all the subcommittees.
10	HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: He's good. Very
11	good.
12	HONORABLE BILL BOYCE: Thanks, I think.
13	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And Roger Hughes, I
14	don't know if he's shared a screen with the rest of you,
15	but he must be proud of some mandamus ruling because he
16	keeps putting it up on the screen, but if you won it,
17	Roger, congratulations.
18	Okay. We're going to move on to and
19	where I went to college, we used to play URI in
20	football, but University of Rhode Island, but I'm not
21	sure what U-r-i, Uri-related appeals, particularly
22	refers to, but Pam's going to tell us. I hope you're
23	here, Pam Baron.
24	MS. BARON: Here I am. This is going to
25	be a very similar discussion to the one we just had

because the primary question is whether new legislation 1 should be referenced either in the text or comment of a 2 rule governing direct appeals. 3 Chip, the winter storm that you just went 4 through had a name, and its name was Uri. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Oh, that's right. 6 Yeah, well, I was in Florida, so I didn't get to benefit 7 from that storm. 8 MS. BARON: Well, there you go. 9 Okay. Ιf 10 you had been there, you might remember and be on a first-name basis with it; but there were extraordinary 11 12 costs, as you might expect, in the power industry at all And if all of those costs are immediately 13 incorporated into rates, it will have a really 14 15 devastating impact on ratepayers throughout the state. 16 And so the legislature has come up with a 17 way of securitizing extraordinary costs related to the 18 winter storm, which basically, you know -- this is not 19 my area, but I think it basically means that they can issue bonds and recover their costs over a period of 2.0 time instead of passing them directly to ratepayers. 21 And so there are three different statutes. 22 They all look somewhat similar. They're a little bit 23 24 different, because gas utilities are regulated by the Railroad Commission and other market participants either 25

fall under ERCOT or the PUC, but basically authorizes gas utilities, ERCOT, market participants, and electric co-ops to use securitization as a method of recovering extraordinary costs from the winter storm.

2.0

They all provide that they move on a pretty expedited basis from the issuance of whatever agency's order authorizing the securitization to the District Court, and District Court is required to consider it expeditiously. And then it skips the Court of Appeals and it goes directly to the Texas Supreme Court and can go only to the Texas Supreme Court from there.

Review is limited to the record before the agency, and the issues are very limited to whether or not the securitization order was authorized by the constitution and the laws of the state and was within the jurisdiction or power of the agency that issued it, so it's a pretty limited appeal.

There is a rule governing direct appeals to the Texas Supreme Court. It's Rule 57.

There are other direct appeals. The most common one is, in the course, jurisdictional statute, and it involves issuance of injunctions based or denial of an injunction based on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a state statute. So that's --

like the school finance cases are a good example of
direct appeals to the Texas Supreme Court from a
District Court. They go -- they proceed just like any
other kind of appeal.

2.0

There are also other statutes that are particular to utilities and securitization. There are two in the utilities code where the PUC issuance of securitization orders proceeds by direct appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, and it's heard at least two of these on direct appeal some years ago.

There is another one or two here and there, like House Bill 4, tort reform, had a provision in there saying that if you're challenging the damages cap provision, that has to go up by direct appeal. So we see these periodically. I would say there are not a lot of them.

I think going back to Judge Peeples' question, our overriding concern is would changing the rule or statute be helpful to reflect this very rare and unique type of statute where you're going to have very sophisticated participants in the proceedings before the agency. It has not traditionally been our approach in the appellate rules to cite to particular statutes either in the rule or comment.

As you know, I guess we have now six or

seven different kinds of direct appeals. If we were to 1 2 do this, for example, in the interlocutory appeal statute, you can -- rule, you can imagine, it would be 3 pages of comments at this point because there are so 4 many different kinds of interlocutory appeals. 5 So generally we would think it's not 6 helpful -- the first phrase of Rule 57 does require that 7 there be an authorizing statute to bring a direct appeal 8 to the Texas Supreme Court. I did a quick look, and 9 10 over the last ten and a half years, there have been 26 direct appeals brought to the Texas Supreme Court. 11 Ιt has noted jurisdiction in only two. That's because I 12 think many of these come from pro se people who don't 13 14 know that they have to have a particular statute, even 15 though the rule tells them they have to. So that's kind of where we are. And the 16 committee by -- all agreed -- I can't say the word 17 18 unanimous for some reason -- we all agreed that we would 19 not recommend change to the rule or comment. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 20 Thanks, Pam. Anybody on either the subcommittee or the 21 full committee have any thoughts or comments about this? 22 23 (No response) 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Boy, you bulldozed 25 them, Pam.

Well, I try. 1 MS. BARON: 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Well, if there are no -- if there are no other comments on Storm 3 Uri, we will flip back to our next agenda item, which is 4 protection of sensitive data. And I got a report I 5 think today from somebody on this, but is Jim Perdue 6 here? 7 Jim is not here, but I think MR. LEVY: 8 I'm going to be covering this topic. 9 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. Great, Robert. Thank you. 11 12 MR. LEVY: Okay. And I will apologize. The memo that was sent out did not have the full vetting 13 of our subcommittee, so it's a work in progress, and I 14 15 encourage the input of the full committee. This topic 16 relates to passage of two bills, House Bill 1540 and House Bill 2669. 17 The issue of most focus is House Bill 18 19 1540, which is a bill that was passed and was sponsored by representative Senfronia Thompson, and it addresses a 2.0 variety of issues pertaining to child trafficking. 21 there were a number of different features in the bill, 22 but the one that I think requires this committee's focus 23 24 is a provision in the bill that amends Chapter 98 of the 25 Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code that deals with

the ability of a victim of child trafficking or
trafficking to bring a cause of action against
individuals or entities that participated in the events.
And that chapter has been in place for over ten years.

The provision of House Bill 1540 adds language that allows a claimant under this chapter to bring those claims under a pseudonym and otherwise avoid the disclosure of any information that might be identifying to that claimant.

And the bill also includes provisions that make clear that the only people that can be aware of the identity of the individual is the Court, the parties, the attorneys representing a party to the action, and anyone that the Court specifically authorizes. When a Court authorizes that further disclosure, the Court is obligated to inform those additional individuals of the responsibility to keep the information confidential and the power to enforce that through contempt.

The other element of this is that the right to bring the -- or to bring the action under a pseudonym and in confidence is voluntary. So the claimant could bring the claims in her or his name, or they, of course, can bring it under a pseudonym.

The issue for the committee, I think, is advising the Court on potential rulemaking, and similar

to the prior discussions, the question is: Do we need to propose specific rulemaking, or do the procedures that are currently in place enable courts to apply their administrative practices to address this issue?

2.0

Another element of the law that is important is that a Court has an obligation to inform a claimant of her or his right to proceed confidentially, and that ostensibly would suggest that after the lawsuit is originally filed, that notification would go to a claimant, and then the claimant would effectively -- should be enabled to withdraw the original petition and replead using a pseudonym.

It creates a number of very challenging questions in terms of the way cases are tried both in pretrial as well as trial practices. And it starts with issues about pro se proceedings and how a party would be named and how discovery would proceed, issues about disclosures in discovery. And one of the significant questions or issues is that this obligation not only, of course, falls on the party bringing the claim, but it also would fall on other parties to the action and not taking any steps that would violate the statute by disclosing the identity of the claimant. And that would involve issues about depositions, production of documents, how to deal with medical records, if there

are medical records involved, the selection of experts, and what information the expert would be told, and all of those issues should be considered.

2.0

The other interesting question is, in terms of the way the statute is written, it actually raises a question of: Is the reference to the attorneys representing the parties mean that the rest of an attorney's staff are not permitted to know the identity of the claimant? And that would include, of course, the parties representing defendants in the action.

The other questions involve transcripts.

Rule 76a potentially is involved. There are a few Texas

Rules of Appellate Procedure that would come in play.

And then also, and not listed in the memo, is the Rule

of Judicial Administration, Rule 12.5(i) that covers

confidentiality.

The other point that is worth noting in terms of the statute is, the statute specifically prohibits rulemaking that is contrary to the language of the statute. And I'm not sure if that is precedented or not, but it is notable and something that I think this committee should keep in mind.

So I think that the question for the committee is: Would a specifically drafted rule that covers Chapter 98 proceedings be appropriate, or should

specific rules that cover the names of the parties or other references that might involve disclosure of a claimant be specifically amended, or is rulemaking generally not needed because of the ability of the courts to manage this issue just under current practices?

2.0

In the memo, I included a proposal to create a new rule, and the rule would provide for the reference to the right of a party to bring the claim under a pseudonym that also issues about not having to disclose their address, email information or using a pseudonym for an email or any other identifying information. It would also note that any information that is filed in the case, whether in motions or other proceedings, including potentially a trial, those would be filed under seal.

A party that needs to present an affidavit or verification can use a pseudonym, and the court clerk also would be instructed not to disclose any information about the individual in bills of cost or anything else, because obviously if a claimant brings a claim under that chapter and a bill of cost is adjudicated against that claimant, you know, normally that would list the name of the party, and so that would need to be addressed.

There's an additional issue of -- well, 1 2 let me just go through the rest of the proposed rule. It would also obligate that the parties --3 no party to the action may disclose identifying 4 information in any form. So, for example, if a 5 defendant is listing all of the individuals with 6 knowledge of relevant facts, they should not include the 7 name of a claimant. And no other individual should be 8 advised of the identity of the claimant absent express 9 10 written approval of the Court. And, of course, the Court must include admonishment that the disclosure of 11 the identity of the claimant is punishable by contempt. 12 Some other questions that are also 13 14 triggered by this relate to how trials themselves could be conducted if you have a claimant who has chosen to 15 16 maintain confidentiality. If a claimant is sitting there at trial, do steps need to be taken to protect 17 18 that individual's identity through a screen or other types of ways to keep their identity from being 19 disclosed, how that issue applies to our open courts, 20 and, you know, the right of the press to attend and 21 participate, the way the transcripts, of course, would 22 be dealt with. 23 24 What I did in the memo -- and I don't need

to go through it in detail -- is talk about all the

25

rules that I could find where the identity of a party or
witness is called for and therefore could be impacted as
a result of the passage of this statute.

2.0

I will note specifically one area that is not necessarily for rulemaking but something that -- a suggestion to the Court is that in there under Rule 18c, Court is authorized to permit the broadcasting of proceedings. And I think consideration might be appropriate to include in the rules for broadcasting that steps might need to be taken to protect the identity of Chapter 98 claimants, if that claimant makes that election.

There are other specific references to rules that provide for protection of privacy, which is in Rule 21c. That rule could be amended to include reference to Chapter 98 cases, and the memo includes a proposal to add that language.

And the rest of the memo talks about the additional rules that might be involved. I'll leave that for your review, but I will stop there and see if -- thoughts or suggestions about how to address this issue.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thanks, Robert.

Very thorough memo for sure.

Yes, Stephen Yelenosky with a mechanical

hand. I see that --1 2 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: There's a real one, too. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I see a second one. 4 You got three hands. 5 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: This is --6 goes a little beyond this, but I think it's directly 7 I think 90 percent of my comments on this 8 related. committee have involved Rule 76a. So somebody who 9 10 survives me, please make sure that my epitaph says, "Rule 76a. See below." 11 12 I put in a chat about this. And some time ago, I brought this up regarding 76a. And the reason I 13 14 brought this up about name changes is that it's not just 15 in sex trafficking. It's also true in name changes, and 16 perhaps other contexts, that a person wants an order 17 precisely because they want to protect their identity. 18 Most often you have a domestic violence situation. Somebody has gone into hiding, let's say, or at least 19 2.0 moved, and they don't want another person to find them, with good reason. 21 And under 76a, you cannot seal, quote, any 22 The exception for Family Code does not include 23 24 That includes other things. 76a does not apply orders. 25 to the Family Code except for the first part of 76a. So

name changes under the Family Code, which are under the Family Code, don't allow you to steal an order which changes a person's name from this to that. So arguably, I don't know how difficult it would be, but somebody knowing the name of the person they're trying to find would then know, if they can figure out how to get the order, what that person's new name is.

2.0

And I'll admit to violating that part of 76a for some time as a judge because I decided the harm to a person trying to avoid a harmful person was more important than keeping their name open in an order. I would like to be able to do that consistent with the law rather than in violation of it.

And so I would propose, if we're going to do anything with respect to sex trafficking, that preserves the identity of a person, as it should, that at the same time, we add a sentence after no court order that does not exclude those kind of orders from 76a but says that instead -- essentially instead of under these statutes or an order under Chapter 45 entered to protect a person from harm shall not include the identifying intervention -- or information but also adds "and instead shall make reference to a sealed document containing that information," because that information -- for example, law enforcement needs to be

able to get name change information and I imagine sex trafficking information. So an order that simply leaves that stuff out, without some reference elsewhere to the identifying information, is an unenforceable order, as far as I can tell.

So that is my suggestion. And if that's of interest either now or by email or whatever, I can propose some language.

2.0

MR. LEVY: I think that it's a very important point, something that I didn't emphasize earlier, is that the language of 76a, as you know, it includes the language that says "no court order or opinion issued in the adjudication of a case may be sealed." The problem with that is that an order reflecting the confidentiality of a claimant or, as you point out, a name change, would be such an order and therefore the -- if an order lists the name of the original claimant, that would obviously be public. So a court would have to be very careful how it would describe that information.

One other point that I failed to mention earlier that I wanted to suggest as well, that one of the issues that the statute could be addressed is in the area of electronic filing. And obviously we have a number of different services that are available for

parties, including pro se parties, to bring their 1 2 And the -- I think it should be included in the forms that claimants or petitioners would use to file 3 their proceedings, that if they have a Chapter 98 case, 4 that they have the right to bring the case under a 5 pseudonym and use nonidentifying information, because 6 obviously the format of what used to be the case 7 information sheet would include their full name and 8 address both as a pro se or as a -- you know, the 9 10 attorney preparing it. And so that is one place to advise parties of their rights and would avoid the 11 challenge of trying to strike that data from the 12 electronic records if they originally filed it with 13 their full name and then they decide to later proceed 14 15 confidentially. 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thanks, Robert. 17 There is a chat from Judge Miskel that 18 says that there's a similar -- similar to the current procedure under federal law to obtain disclosure of drug 19 and alcohol treatment records requires filing under a 2.0 pseudonym, closing the courtroom, et cetera, and cites 21 to a Law Review article at 22 law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/42/2.62. And Judge Yelenosky 23 has talked about Rule 76a on the record and also in a 24 25 chat.

The reason why I'm reading that into the record is because although we're technically not subject to the Open Meetings Act, although we are subject to Open Records Act, we ought to try to create a complete record for the public for anybody who's watching and for the court reporter who is taking this down, which the Court will review in trying to decide whether to adopt our recommendations or to reject them or modify them.

And so the Court will have a full record, unless you're like Justice Gray who is having trouble phoning in, and with respect to that, I'll read his comments into the record; but other than that, you know, these comments are all terrific and should be made, but if we could make them on the record, that would be great. And I'm trying to keep up with the chats as well, but I think I've got everything into the record that people have said.

So with that, Justice Christopher and then Roger Hughes and then Judge Miskel.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yes, I would suggest that rather than trying to amend certain rules that we consider putting a section into Part 7 of our rules, rules relating to special proceedings, and just make an omnibus rule there.

And I think a lot of the things that

Robert brought up, some of them are more best practices 1 2 versus rule changes. So I think that also needs to be considered, too. Do we really want to micromanage 3 everything that the trial court does in connection with 4 these type of cases? 5 It seems to me that, you know, we identify 6 the specific thing is the original pleading, right, that 7 starts the whole process. And the district clerks are 8 going to need to know that someone is filing a lawsuit 9 10 pursuant to this statute and that the rules -- you know, that they're allowed to use this pseudonym and no 11 identifying information, because otherwise, they might 12 reject the pleading. 13 14 So I think when we're looking at the 15 rules, we've got to figure out which ones absolutely 16 have to be rules versus which ones are just best practices for the trial court. And I would suggest 17 18 rather than trying to tinker with every rule of civil 19 procedure, that it be in a separate rule. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 2.0 Great. Thanks, Judge. 21 Roger? Yeah. I want to echo the 22 MR. HUGHES: earlier remarks of Yelenosky about Rule 76a. 23 And T 24 think we need to consider a way to somehow seal this off

so that there are no, so to speak, chinks in the armor

25

that would allow a person to invoke Rule 76a to get at 1 what would otherwise be unavailable information.

And part of the reason I say this -- and maybe it's just because I'm at an age where I've gotten a little cynical -- the defendants in these cases are not going to be nice people. And I can imagine the possibility they would be more than willing to, so to speak, blackmail or threaten the possibility or findings raising some 76a issue to unseal or make public this stuff. And I want to be able to take that off the table as a bargaining chip, so to speak.

Now, how to do that? I leave it up to somebody else. I'm just saying I think we need to be very cautious and be very thorough to make sure that Rule 76a is not going to undo what this statute has done. Thank you.

> CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, Roger.

Judge Miskel.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

HONORABLE EMILY MISKEL: I was going to agree with what Chief Justice Christopher said, which is have rules for special proceedings because there are several places that require pseudonyms and confidentiality and all of that, and so it might be helpful to just have one general rule that guides courts in that. Because, for example, on the drug and alcohol

treatment records, the link I included was a link to the text of the federal law that requires filing under a pseudonym, keeping it all confidential. And I do those about like once every 18 months, and it's just long enough for me to totally forget how to do it in between.

So I agree with that.

I also think the interplay between 76a and 21c, I am a passionate hater of TRCP 21c, but one of the problems with it is it causes a huge burden on the trial court. So, for example, that's the one that says you can't use a child's name in any pleadings. And so what will happen is, the parties will go throughout the whole case filing a bunch of stuff with the child's name in it, and then at the end of the day, they're like, "Oh, wait. That all has to be redacted," and then turn to trial court like it's now my job to somehow go and redact all the pleadings that you filed that you now don't want that information in.

So just a plea on behalf of trial courts is I believe -- I'm quickly reading the statute, but I believe it says the claimant may keep their name confidential, but I think we need to have something that says if they themselves file a bunch of things with their own name in it, the burden is on them to provide substitute redacted copies or something like that just

to -- so that it's not the trial court's job to go clean 1 2 up and seal and fix all the pleadings that get filed incorrectly. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great Thanks John Warren I think was next, and then 5 Kennon and then Stephen. 6 7 MR. WARREN: Okay. My question was as it relates to seal versus a pseudonym. What impact would a 8 pseudonym have on a prosecutor's ability to enhance 9 10 charges on a defendant? So like if you have a defendant that may have been charged with one incidence, and you 11 12 see that he has a pattern -- a history pattern of multiple or bad behavior, how would the use of a 13 14 pseudonym hinder the prosecutor from enhancing his 15 charges on a defendant? 16 MR. LEVY: I don't think that would have 17 an issue in terms of these proceedings. These are civil 18 So any criminal record involving a defendant and 19 their victims would be in the criminal records, which is 20 separate. 21 MR. WARREN: Okay. 22 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Kennon. 23 MS. WOOTEN: Make a comment now just to put on the record something I'm remembering about Texas 24 25 Rules of Civil Procedure 21c that may be helpful when

deciding how to proceed with the matters at hand.

2.0

My recollection, which Chief Justice Hecht may correct to a degree or in full, is that there was extensive discussion about rule -- what ultimately became Rule 21c. A lot of differences of opinion about what should be in the record, what should be kept out of the record. There were discussions with legislators about the impact of excluding certain information from court records.

For example, if you exclude certain information from the court records, do you make it difficult for people to try to enforce judgments. In relation to what Judge Yelenosky said, if you exclude certain information from the record, do you impact law enforcement efforts negatively to a degree?

All of these discussions were happening.

There were a lot of strong opinions. I recall, when I was the rules attorney many years ago, going back to look at discussions of this esteemed committee and seeing a lot of debate about what to do, how to proceed, et cetera.

For a period of time there was discussion about having something called a sensitive data sheet or something along those lines. And that sensitive data sheet would include the information perceived to be

sensitive or defined as sensitive from the actual filing, but the sensitive data sheet would be maintained by the Court separately from the filing such that to the extent there was a need to actual use this sensitive data that was a legitimate need, you would have the information stored in the court system.

My recollection is that there was concern about the burden a sensitive data sheet process would impose on clerks, on courts, et cetera. I'm hearing now that there is a burden imposed on courts, clerks, et cetera, because of noncompliance with 21c.

I do note for the record that there was supposed to be a rule that tended to that potential burden, and that was put out in Rule 21c(e), as in elephant, the intent of that rule being to put the burden on the parties to comply with the rules opposed to putting the burden on the courts to deal with noncompliance with the rule in terms of actually handling materials that did not comply with the rule.

So this isn't really a comment to offer a particular suggestion in regard to rule revisions but more a comment to put on the record that there is a robust discussion of this committee from years ago about how to handle sensitive data and how to deal with the fact that any time we take things out of court filings,

we, of course, encounter need to consider openness of courts. There are many competing considerations at play, obviously.

2.0

The final thing I'll say, just for what it's worth, is that I agree with Judge Yelenosky's comments regarding Rule 76a. I think it goes a bit too far, if you will, in that it requires a very cumbersome process and sometimes precludes sealing from court records -- or sealing court records when those court records do contain information that could be used to harm individuals. And at the end of the day, I would hope that we put the safety of people who come before the courts before strict adherence to these rules, but in an ideal world, we would modify the rule to be more protective of individuals to the extent needed.

MR. LEVY: Just one follow-up on that.

Kennon's comment does emphasize the point that there should be, or I would think there would need to be, a way for the Court to become aware of the true identity of a claimant for a variety of reasons, particularly if there was later a dispute that the -- an individual trying to enforce a judgment or otherwise, was that claimant and/or if the claimant did not prevail and brought another case under a different pseudonym that res judicata would apply, and so a process would need to

be addressed on how to keep track of who that -- who the
true identity was without being inconsistent with the
statute.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Chip, let me just add, if I might.

6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yes, sir.

considerable discussion. Kennon's exactly right. And just to color in a little bit the background, it was precipitated by the federal statute requiring the federal courts to adopt the rules they did, which is 5.2. And so we decided to look at our rules at the same time, but we got about -- we had several meetings internally about it. And we got about halfway through what we thought the issues were, and it was so unsettled and so difficult, we finally decided we're just going to have to let the situation mature more before we could do anything.

But there are some -- there are a lot of interests that you would never think of that have views about this. For example, the title insurers are in favor of more disclosure and pleadings so that they can track down issues that might have to do with title. I never would have imagined that, but the legislature has since, I think, enacted legislation at their behest

providing more information in pleadings. 1 2 We even got a letter at some point, I think, from the Boy Scouts saying they wanted to go 3 through -- I think maybe churches wanted to be able to 4 go through records and look for people that might be 5 dangerous for them to employ. So it's just a whole raft 6 of issues, and this is just the latest piece of 7 legislation. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, Judge. 9 Great. 10 I think it's -- the order is Stephen Yelenosky, then Sharena, and then Richard Munzinger. 11 And I thought Judge Miskel had her hand up, but maybe 12 she took it down. Anyway, Stephen. 13 14 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: There she is. 16 HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Couple of 17 things. One, I agree with pretty much everything that's 18 been said. I'd just point out a few things. 19 One, with regard to the cumbersome process of 76a, the process does not apply to anything under the 20 Family Code. It's only the sentence on the order that 21 applies in the Family Code. So to the extent you have a 22 name change, which is in the Family Code, the only issue 23 is sealing the identity in an order. 24 25 Now, sex trafficking, I don't know if it

falls under the Family Code, but those things that don't already fall under the Family Code that are akin to sex trafficking and name change to protect someone should only be -- should only be affected by the order language of 76a and not the process. So that's one point.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Secondly, the mechanics obviously are complicated and need to be worked out. I would disagree, though, with the prior statement about putting the burden of removing sensitive information on the parties because you're going to have pro se litigants, you're going to have -- typically a woman, sometimes a man -- come in and want to do a name change who doesn't know anything about protecting identity. I don't want that person to be stuck with dealing with this when we already have the clerk deal -- at least Travis County deals with this sensitive data. And most often in family cases, you know, they're required to eliminate sensitive data, but they're not really particularly concerned about it, the parties; but in a name change case to protect somebody, it is important.

And I guess the last point is that I generally agree with the point by Justice Christopher that best practices is a better way to deal with a lot of things, but I don't think you can deal with this issue under best practices because 76a is a prohibition.

And I don't think a comment or a best practice
instruction can affect the 76a prohibition.

And even if there's another rule that were
written that made an exception under 76a, it would have

2.0

Finally, if you're going to make exceptions, I really, really, really believe they need to be in one place so that there is a clear instruction of the openness of records as it is under 76a, and you don't get to go and look elsewhere or have to look elsewhere for an exception. If there is an exception, it follows that sentence. That's what I have to say.

to refer to 76a and say, "except in the case of 76a."

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, Stephen.

Sharena.

MS. GILLILAND: With respect to talking about sealing versus pseudonyms, just from a practical matter, pseudonyms are going to keep the case unsealed, a little bit more transparency in what's happening and what's being filed with the Court. It also allows you to continue to use E-filing.

If a clerk flags the case as sealed, nothing can be E-filed, and the actual pleadings themselves shouldn't be E-filed. So just from a practical matter to still be able to utilize E-filing, pseudonyms might be an easier approach.

about who should be redacting, the clerks are very adamant about not wanting to take on that challenge because what happens when you miss something? What happens if we redact something that you really wanted in there? And kind of sets up a fight between clerks and parties what should be redacted, when should it not, is there an exception; well, we know we could have redacted, but we really wanted it in here, and you kind of end up in a circle and a lot of finger pointing if you put that on the clerks. And that's all.

MR. LEVY: Wait. One -- Chip, if I could comment on that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah.

2.0

MR. LEVY: And that was something that Justice Gray pointed out about the desire to proceed with pseudonyms versus sealing. And I do agree that it's -- in terms of the use of the pseudonym, that's the way that the statute contemplates, but the question is how to address other aspects of the trial practice like discovery where you're providing documents -- medical records, I would think, would be a very likely situation or other just documents that would include identifying information. And do the rules need to address ways to modify, redact those documents, as -- before they're

used, and then what happens if a witness at trial refers
to the correct name of the claimant versus a pseudonym,
which I would think would be likely, those types of
situations where it's -- the pseudonym alone is not
going to protect identity.

2.0

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Thanks, Robert. Richard Munzinger.

MR. MUNZINGER: I'm going to show my ignorance and inexperience in this area, but it does occur to me that there is a problem regarding res judicata and claims preclusion. I don't know if the statutes or rules or codes address that problem, but suppose, for example, that somebody accuses me of doing something that's a violation of the law that's in this area and I win the case, and the judgment has now been entered under a false name.

There are certain occasions, as I recall, where if you're attempting to set aside a judgment, you can't go beyond the judgment. You can't go outside the judgment. And so whose name is used in the judgment, and how does the person who has been exonerated in a trial protect himself or herself from false claims by one of these claimants or claims that have been precluded even if they were successful?

There is a problem here, unless -- again,

```
I may be showing my ignorance -- I'll keep guiet -- but
1
 2
   I do think that res judicata and claims preclusion are
             Perhaps they're addressed by the statute or
 3
   issues.
   others, and I'll be guiet and listen.
 4
                  MR. LEVY:
                             Statute does not address that
 5
   issue, and I think that is a legitimate point.
6
                                                     The way
   the statute seems to be drafted is the claimant's
7
   identity remains confidential whether they prevail in
8
   the civil action or not.
9
10
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                     Once again, Munzinger
   has shown his wisdom and the opposite of ignorance,
11
12
   which he so frequently self-deprecatingly states.
                  Judge Miskel had your hand up, but maybe
13
14
   you lowered it.
15
                  So we'll go to John Warren.
16
                  (Reporter dropped from Zoom.
                                                 The
17
                  following proceedings were transcribed
18
                  from audio.)
19
                  MR. WARREN: I would just like to comment
   that while we talk about whether it's a pseudonym or --
2.0
   and how those documents are received electronically, it
21
   would require an amendment to the E-filing rules, but
22
   also as it relates to -- and Sharena, I share your
23
24
   concern about pro se litigants.
25
                  One of the things that my office does, we
```

have a personal information redaction form that we will have people fill out, and you have to identify the specific page and that the information contains -- that the information is contained on so that we are able to capture all of the information. And it is -- it is on the -- while you may be a pro se litigant, you're still required to know it and exercise the laws related to the litigation that you're pursuing. So I just wanted to make that comment. 

10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great, thank you.

11 Stephen.

2.0

HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Couple of things. I do agree, obviously, pro se litigants are required to follow the law. We have, as judges -- I still sit as a visiting judge, so I guess I can say us judges -- are allowed to make certain accommodations to pro se litigants, and that's a dicey area, but I would not want to impose a strict requirement of understanding a rule about -- that's necessary to protect potentially your life. That seems to me to put the priorities wrong.

The other thing, though, is there's been a discussion of pseudonym versus sealing. And my suggestion is, you use both. And you can use a pseudonym. You can use a blank space in the order.

Ultimately, there is a document that's sealed that, if unsealed by law enforcement or by the Judge for any purpose -- for res judicata, whatever -- that a Court can unseal it, and it can unseal it to allow it to particular people or to, you know, it's been 20 years and now unseal it to the public.

2.0

So there's not a problem as long as whatever is public refers to an unsealed document that can be readily obtained and, by a judge's order, unsealed for particular people and places. So that's the sealing part.

The pseudonym part is not a big deal. You can have the order with a pseudonym. You can have the order with a blacked-out name. You can have the order with a blank. You can have an order that says, "See sealed order." It doesn't matter.

So I think pseudonym versus sealing is a false choice. You have to have both. You have to have protected information in the order and sensitive information in a sealed document, and one refers to the other.

MR. LEVY: May I ask a follow-up question, then, on that? Would it be appropriate to include in a rule a reference that the use of a pseudonym be noted in the pleading itself so that it's -- and this would

hopefully go to Richard's point, that a claimant's name that is a pseudonym is a pseudonym, not just a made-up name, and therefore the record would reflect that that's not the true name and that the name of the claimant would be kept in a sealed document.

And I think it is kind of ironic that I'm looking at -- Justice Gray is using John Doe in this -- in our chat. So, you know, that could be an example of a pseudonym.

HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY: Yeah, he was just trying to be sneaky, I think. Right, Justice Gray?

I don't know if that question was directed generally, but if you're concerned about people being confused by a pseudonym, then the option among those I referenced from the order would instead be a blank or, you know, a blacked-out part or merely the reference to the name of this individual is in this sealed document. You don't have to use a pseudonym. I mean, if not --

MR. LEVY: I think the statute -- yeah, the statute does allow the use of a pseudonym, so I think that that would need to be the approach, but -- and there would be, I think, numerous situations where you have to have a name or identity to reference either "Claimant" or "John Doe," "Jane Doe," something like that, so that the opposing party would have somebody to

talk about and, you know -- and similarly, you know, the

talk about and, you know -- and similarly, you know, the

talk about and, you know -- and similarly, you know, the

addresses or email address, that would include

addresses or email address, things like that.

2.0

know, for years with 76a when we're not talking about an order but a pleading, which obviously isn't affected by the no court order language, but it's affected by everything else if it's not in the Family Code. And rather than always sealing the entire document, my practice was to say, "Well, what part of this document is problematic?" Like somebody wants to seal the whole motion for summary judgment because within that motion for summary judgment, there's a dollar figure that's a -- you know, I don't know -- it's a proprietary matter.

So in those instances -- and this could be done -- it's the same thing with an order, if permitted with an order, is the instruction to attorneys that I give is, "Take the order with all the information in it, bring that to me, and I'll seal that. File publicly the same document that's -- you know, the same pleading in the case now with everything taken out that's sensitive." So you have identical documents, one redacted, one sealed.

Now if the statute says it has to be a

pseudonym or you want a pseudonym, that's fine as
poposed to just blanking it out.

2.0

But the idea, I think, applies, which is there's a public document, there's a sealed document, and the difference between the two is that we have to unseal one document for many reasons.

7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you. Thanks for 8 that.

Kennon points out a few minutes ago that linking the federal rule referenced by Chief Justice Hecht, so just for the completeness of the record, the cite is law.cornell.edu/rule/frcp/rule5.2. So we'll have that in the record.

And now Sharena, I think you're next and then Scott Stolley.

MS. GILLILAND: Just real quick to Judge Yelenosky's point of a hybrid pseudonym sealing-type situation. We kind of already have that in the lawsuits where people want to undo their structured settlements. They essentially file their petition, any follow-up pleadings with initials, or it could be pseudonyms. At the time of the final judgment, we typically get two versions, and so there's one with the name redacted, and then there's one that is sealed that includes all of the information that's not public until it meets statutory

timelines. But that is a possibility to essentially 1 2 have two versions, one that's public and one that is sealed. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thank you. Scott. 5 MR. STOLLEY: Thanks, Chip. 6 I want to compliment the subcommittee for doing such a thorough 7 memo on such short notice. And that list of rules that 8 could be potentially affected is a pretty awesome list. 9 10 I agree with the subcommittee's sentiment that we really can't modify all those rules. 11 It seems to make more sense to do one catch-all rule. 12 And then the one comment I have on the 13 catch-all rule as it's drafted now, and I realize this 14 15 is an initial cut at doing that, but it needs to be 16 drafted with gender neutral language. Thanks. 17 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. I had a 18 comment, Scott, about the -- excuse me. 19 I had a comment, Robert, about the -about the proposed new rule. And I'll join Scott in 20 saying this is a remarkable memo and the time you put it 21 22 together. I wondered if you-all considered -- I 23 think it's Section 132.001 of the Civil Practice and 24 25 Remedies Code, which talks about declarations. There is a requirement in there for certain identifying information that would be in conflict with this statute that we're trying to address in the new rule.

2.0

I believe that the reason for the identifying information in declarations is to guarantee or to assure some credibility or some ability to check to see whether the declarant who is doing it not in front of a Notary but just saying "Under penalty of perjury, I say all these things are true," how that fits if the plaintiff, who is operating under a pseudonym, wants to submit a declaration.

I know you talked about affidavits elsewhere, but I wonder about declarations. So that's one question I have. And maybe you've thought of it, and like Richard Munzinger, I'm just a dumbass and didn't realize it.

MR. LEVY: I think that's a very good point. The focus was on affidavits or other items under oath that would be filed in the court case itself, but I do agree that Section 132 is also implicated particularly to the extent that a Chapter 98 proceeding would involve a declaration. And it does trigger that question if you make an affidavit or declaration under oath, but you don't use your full name or your true name, is that is the penalty of perjury applicable that,

you know, could a claimant get out of a perjury claim 1 2 because they said, "Well, I didn't use my name; therefore, it shouldn't apply," and would a rule need to 3 potentially even address that, that declarations or 4 affidavits, verifications using that pseudonym, are 5 punishable as if they use their real name. 6 (Portion transcribed from recording 7 concluded.) 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. And unlike, you 9 10 know, all the rules that you've laid out here, obviously a statute, if it conflicts with a rule, is going to 11 trump the rule; but with Section 132, you're dealing 12 with two competing statutes, I think, so that raises 13 14 some issues. 15 Before I get to Judge Miskel, there is 16 some language in this proposed rule where you say pleadings, motions, discovery responses, or other 17 18 submissions, and that seemed broad to me. And I wonder, for example, if there is some dispute that requires an 19 in-camera submission where only the Judge and the 2.0 parties and the attorneys representing the parties would 21 be -- would have access to that in-camera submission. 22 Would that be -- would that be excluded or would it be 23 24 included in your other submissions language? So --25 Yeah, that's a good point. MR. LEVY: We

should add that, because that's a way to address the confidentiality issue, submitting it in-camera, which is, you know -- how that overlays with the sealing element, but that would be a way to protect the identity.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay, great.

Judge Miskel.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.0

21

22

23

24

25

HONORABLE EMILY MISKEL: I just wanted to add on the unsworn declaration issue, this comes up already right now. I think in connection with family violence protective orders, a lot of times the applicant does not want to provide their birthday. I can't remember what all information is required by 132. Ιt might be like name, birthdate, address -- I can't remember, but we already have people that don't want to provide that information and request to be excused from it. And what our answer has been so far is, "If you don't want to provide that information, then you'll need to do a Notary instead of an unsworn declaration because the ability to do unsworn declaration requires providing that information." But then that may not answer the question for this particular case because I'm not sure -- can a Notary notarize something with a pseudonym? So I just don't know the answer to that. But as far as currently people who don't

want to provide that unsworn declaration information, we
just say, "Do a Notary instead if you don't want to
provide that."

MR. LEVY: And it does require the
birthdate under the unsworn declaration. And it raises
that question of if you have to provide a notarization,

you're then obligated to show the Notary your identification, so is that inconsistent with the statute if there is a requirement either for verification or

otherwise to -- for a claimant to take an oath, and do we need to address that as well.

12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks. Kennon.

2.0

MS. WOOTEN: Just point out a couple things for the record. In regard to the requirements pertaining to unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury as set forth in Chapter 132 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, there are some opinions out there I believe at the intermediate appellate court level that essentially come down and say, the most essential part of the jurat from the statute is to say that you're swearing under penalty of perjury to the veracity of the statements in the particular declaration. However, I believe there is also a statement from the Texas Supreme Court in an opinion suggesting that strict compliance with 132 is required.

So in matters with my clients, I have come down on strict compliance being required, in light of that statement from the Texas Supreme Court opinion, and it does lead to clients not wanting to use that statutory mechanism, which does simplify procedures in many ways because of the sensitive data requirement.

2.0

But to close the loop on it, I'll also point out that the sensitive data that gives people a lot of concern is the birthdate and home address, and both of those things are in the definition of sensitive data in Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 21c. So to the extent that I have filed those declarations in the court record, I have followed 21c and not actually included in the court record that sensitive data.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thanks, Kennon.

Justice Gray, acting under the pseudonym John Doe, for the record says, "The cool thing about having a rule authorizing using only the pseudonym and no other identifying information is that when the petition is filed, it already has the pseudonym and avoids many problems. The res judicata matrix does not change. The defendant has to prove the parties are the same. I cannot imagine that is going to be a serious issue." And then there's what could be a smiley face or a frown. I'm not sure. "We had a case working its way

through the Tenth Court of Appeals now that uses only a 1 2 pseudonym, and I have no doubt that if a subsequent suit was filed, the defendant would know exactly who it is 3 based on the alleged facts." So there you have Justice 4 Gray's thoughts. 5 Are there any other comments about the 6 proposed rule that Robert has in his memo found at 7 Page 2 of the memo. 8 9 (No response) 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. You've had your So we'll, I think, Robert --11 chance. 12 MR. LEVY: Let me just raise one --CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sure. 13 MR. LEVY: -- on the referral, it also 14 15 includes reference to House Bill 2669, and I reference that in the memo. 16 17 In my review of that, it's a -- just 18 trying to make two different statutes aligned on the question of the disclosure of criminal records relating 19 to misdemeanors. There was -- two statutes in the Code 2.0 of Criminal Procedure had some inconsistency. 21 I did not see any rulemaking issue that 22 would be triggered by that statute, so I just wanted to 23 24 mention that as well in case anyone has a different

25

point of view.

```
CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great.
1
                                              Well, Lamont
 2
   has raised his hands, so maybe he does.
                  Lamont.
 3
                  MR. JEFFERSON: No, not on that point.
 4
                                                           Т
 5
   was going to just raise a real quick reaction to Chief
   Justice -- well --
6
7
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Gray, Hecht, or
   Christopher. Those are the chief --
8
                  MR. JEFFERSON: Chief Justice -- give me a
9
10
   chief --
                  (Laughter)
11
12
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: A, B or C.
                  MR. JEFFERSON: Yeah, no -- sorry.
13
   having a little moment here, so let me check through
14
15
   the -- Chief Justice Christopher's comments -- thank
16
   you -- from early on about whether a rule is necessary
17
   at all here or where it should be if there's going to be
18
   a rule.
19
                  So the statute says -- or the statute from
20
   Senfronia Thompson, the recently passed statute,
   provides that these -- under this circumstance, you
21
22
   could have anonymity or use a pseudonym or whatever.
2.3
                  Should we have a rule that just addresses
   the situation of Chapter 98? And I would say no.
24
                                                        And
25
   if we're going to have -- and the reason why I'd say no
```

is because this -- it's such a specialized area. 1 It's 2 not, I don't think, a special proceeding, and I don't think that I would change a rule in the special 3 proceedings rule because if this is just a -- it's another tort, but there's a whole list of torts, and 5 they're mostly in the Civil Practice and Remedies Code 6 for medical malpractice, for wrongful death, for, you 7 know, all kinds of different torts that have these very 8 particularized rules that just apply to that tort, to 9 10 that particular thing. And that's what this is. This is a rule 11 12 that applies -- a special rule that apply to a very narrow, rarely used cause of action. And so to change 13 the Rules of Civil Procedure to address this one narrow 14 15 issue I think is unwise, and I think we've just not done that, generally speaking. There are a lot of 16 particularized procedure rules that are contained in 17 18 statutes for these rarely used torts, and so I would 19 advocate that we not pass a rule particular to that one. 2.0 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thanks, Lamont. MR. LEVY: Can I ask Lamont just a quick 21 question on that? 22 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sure. MR. LEVY: Two areas that might be 24 25 inconsistent are -- what we talked about was 76a and

also the question of whether we should include in 21c 1 2 reference to the right of the party to include their identity as confidential information. 3 Is that inconsistent with your comment? 4 I mean, I do -- you know, MR. JEFFERSON: 5 I think 21c also has its issues. I don't know -- I'm 6 not sure that I quite understand the question, Robert, 7 but the entire point that I'm making is that there are a 8 lot of rules that by statute govern specific causes of 9 10 action that are not in the Rules of Civil Procedure because they're so specialized -- they're so specialized 11 causes of action. 12 MR. LEVY: The question is on 76a, 13 Yes. 14 whether that should be addressed because there is the 15 potential inconsistency of the way 76a applies that could be inconsistent with the new statute that would 16 require the disclosure of the claimant's name if it's 17 18 included in an order, and then the issue of whether we should include it in 21c just to help cover situations 19 where litigants might think that the rules are 2.0 inconsistent that -- with the statute and not knowing 21 how to proceed with that. 22 And I will also point out that Rule of 23 Judicial Administration 12.5(i) does list specific 24 25 examples, or at least a couple of examples, of

situations where confidential information needs to be maintained, the confidentiality of information. And it might make sense to include Chapter 98 proceedings just to have that reference point.

2.0

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thanks, Robert.

Are there any more comments that anyone wishes to make about this proposed rule and the subcommittee's excellent work addressing this statute?

(No response)

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, if not, then thank you very much, Robert, and your colleagues.

Here's the schedule that I think we'll try to follow for the rest of the day. We have — the next item, sexual assault survivor privilege. Let's take our morning break right now for 15 minutes, and we'll come back at 11:30 and we'll deal with that topic, and then we'll break for lunch because Bobby Meadows, who is the chair of the subcommittee addressing the next two topics, is not available until after lunch.

So we'll take a 15-minute break now and then we'll come back and we'll do sexual assault survivor privilege until we conclude, and then we'll take our lunch break, and then we'll come back after that and do the final two items on the agenda, if that works for everybody. So we'll be in recess for 15

1 minutes. Back at 11:30.

2.0

2 (Recess: 11:15 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And now we are recording and back on the record. Hopefully our court reporter is somewhere taking all this down, and we're streaming live on YouTube. And we have the great Buddy Low, who is the chair of our evidence subcommittee, and we'll take up the next item on our agenda, sexual assault survivor privilege.

Buddy.

MR. LOW: I may not hold myself out as an expert in sexual assault, but I've been asked to report on it.

This assignment was from the Chief Justice which asked us to consult with the State Bar of Texas Administration of Rules of Evidence Committee and consider whether we should write a rule following the new amendment or should we have a comment or just what we should do.

We have always in our evidence committee have submitted things to the State Bar AREC and then they would give a report, we would review that report and try to get together. Well, unfortunately here, their membership is changing. The chairman of that committee goes off Monday, but I have had a telephone

1 conference call with the incoming chairman and with him, 2 and I have been in communication with our committee.

2.0

And for background -- most of you might already know this -- Senate Bill 295 amended Chapter 420 of the Government Code to provide a privilege for victims of sexual assault for particular people associating and helping victims. There was already a privilege for victims of domestic violence. And so apparently, the legislature wanted to make them equal.

All right. Well, the first thing I did was call Professor Goode, who is a long stay on the AREC, and I sent him the material, and he responded back that we should do nothing because there are about 15 or 20 privileges that he knows of that are not in 500 section.

I sent all that to my committee. And I agreed with Professor Goode. Unfortunately, nobody on my committee agreed with me. Some wanted to draft a rule like 295. Most wanted a comment. And I responded back and I said, "If we have a comment, then what do we do with the comment? Where do we put it? At 501?"

We also state that there are many privileges -- legislative privileges that are in existence and not here. And then if we put that in a comment, then we overshadow the domestic violence --

violence privilege. I mean, what to do? 1 And we've not 2 gotten beyond that other than a majority of my committee does favor the comment. And with that, Roger can give 3 you some of the help. 4 Now I do point out that a -- that the only 5 reference in that amendment -- they do refer to the 6 Rules of Evidence, and they say -- let me find the term 7 here. Hold on just a minute. They say, 8 "Notwithstanding Subsection A and B, the Texas Rules of 9 10 Evidence govern the disclosure of, " and they talk about communication with regard to expert witnesses. And as 11 12 you know, expert witnesses under 703 can rely on privileged material. 13 14 And so the question was -- we want to do 15 what the legislature wanted us to do. Do they want us 16 to do anything? Do they want us to draw a rule or what? 17 But I do point out that they do mention that. And in 18 other times, they have asked us to draft a rule, a procedural rule, according to a legislative directive. 19 20 All right. Roger, do you have something to add? 21 Yeah. Let me explain a 22 MR. HUGHES: little bit about what this privilege is. And he is 23 24 right, but he's right that most of the committee favored 25 a comment; but there was one minority view that we do

1 nothing, and then there was a -- another minority view
2 that we try to write a rule.

Now, what it is, you have Government Code Chapter 420, which creates a -- or authorizes the creation of nonprofit corporations to provide sex assault advocates to victims of sexual assault and then later in the chapter creates a privilege. And what Senate Bill 259 did was, it expanded the privilege and codified some waivers.

Now to bring it to a point, nothing in Senate Bill 295 asks the Supreme Court to write any rules at all, rules of procedure or Rules of Evidence. That's nowhere in it. What it does is it expanded the privilege to cover not just communications between the advocate and the victim but also to cover the written records of the advocate. And then in the next -- it amended the section on the exceptions to the privilege, one is for exculpatory records that the Court has. Now, I'll come back to that in a moment.

The second of it is in the exception section, it says that the Texas Rules of Evidence will control disclosure of underlying facts if the expert gets on the stand.

We all know if you have a testifying expert, the expert doesn't have to disclose their

underlying facts that they're relying on, but if this
expert has reviewed confidential records or
communications, the Court has some leeway under Rule of
Evidence 706 first to allow the opposing counsel to
explore that on voir dire and second to perhaps have the
jury hear it.

The next one is that it created a new motion in criminal cases, and it set out exactly what has to be in the motion, how it has to be verified, and what the Judge has to do to allow access to exculpatory information in the records.

And what my opinion was after looking at all this, is that, number one, trying to write a rule to encapsulate this or paraphrase it would be impossible. It's a very -- the whole several sections about the privilege, the exceptions, waiver, are several sections. They're very detailed. I just don't think we can write a rule to encapsulate them all other than to quote the rule itself.

The second is, it seemed to me that this was a legislative compromise because the bill went through several versions, and it seemed to me that there was, shall we say, something going on in the back room between the advocates and the criminal defense bar. And any attempt to paraphrase this rule, trim it,

encapsulate it, whatever, is going to look like we're trying to upset the legislative apple cart.

2.0

And furthermore, we've got a situation where people who are involved in this probably know this statute already. The advocates are going to know it.

The criminal defense people are going to know it.

Now to give some credence to the minority view that we do nothing, not even a comment, Professor Goode did give a very lengthy list of statutory privileges, and he said that is not complete. And if we have a comment saved, for example, to Rule of Evidence 501, which is the general rule of privilege, everybody's going to say -- going to have a "What about me, too?" I have a -- there is this privilege and there is that privilege. And if you mention one, then they're all going to say "equal dignity, mention me all," and it could get lengthy.

On the other hand, the issues of family violence and sexual assault are very extensive. And I don't practice criminal law, but I suspect they occupy a considerable portion of the Court's docket. I'll defer to trial judges about whether that's a valid viewpoint. And so maybe mentioning it might be of some help. I don't know.

Anyway those are my comments. Thank you.

MR. LOW: Chip, you can understand why I said I feel comfortable when I have his backup. He's -- now, the committee -- Roger, one of the things that they are considering is whether they can do this through Rule 510, mental health. I don't know how they can. What do you think about that?

2.0

MR. HUGHES: Well, I don't think it's a neat pigeonhole to fit the -- or to try to incorporate it into Rule 510. Sexual assault advocacy in some senses is broader than physical and mental health, whereas Rule 510 is limited to communications with professionals who deal with mental health issues.

Sexual assault advocates may deal with a broad range of issues, and there may be information that they acquire about the victim that might not be pertinent to treating them for an illness or counseling them about mental health issue. I'm just not sure it's a very neat pigeonhole to try to say this is more like mental health.

My personal opinion is that sex assault advocates are more like social workers that deal with the whole person and all of their problems that arise from a particular situation and not just their physical -- treating them for their physical or mental condition.

MR. LOW: All right. Chip, you've heard our report. Now, the chairman of the AREC has told me that they will begin immediately working on that and try to get something out, you know, as quickly as they can; but under our procedure, unless we're asked to do differently, we always get an opinion from them and then try to get a joint opinion. That's gone on for a long time, and it's worked well.

2.0

And in the meanwhile, I've asked my committee to draw their own conclusions and be able to go forward. So we're staying abreast, and now we're waiting on the AREC. And if Chief Justice Hecht would like for us to start drawing a comment or doing something, I'd be glad to do so, but traditionally, we've waited to hear from the AREC.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, I'll defer to the Chief on that question, but I think the Court was interested in getting this committee's views. And unfortunately it had to be expedited because the rule goes -- the section goes into effect September 1, and the Court needs, of course, time to decide what to do, if they're going to do anything.

So we'll get to Lonny in a second, but Chief, do you have any response to Buddy's thoughts or comments?

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, I 1 Yeah. 2 think it would be a good idea, because of the timing, to go ahead and get the committee's views on the subject 3 and then begin AREC in the next few weeks after the bar 4 year changes and they get settled. 5 MR. LOW: Your Honor, I have already sent 6 my suggestion of where we should put it and my 7 suggestion of basically what the comment is or should 8 be, and I've heard nothing about that. My suggestion 9 10 was, again, nobody has -- in my committee has responded to this. My suggestion was, we show -- we put a 11 footnote for this an example of legislative privileges 12 or this -- although there are many other legislative 13 privileges, we don't list them all. That was -- I 14 15 didn't draft the comment, but that was my suggestion and 16 I've heard nothing. I will ask the committee, since the 17 18 majority of the committee want a comment, I will ask them to start to work on what the comment would be and 19 2.0 what it would say. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Professor Hoffman. 22 Thanks, Chip. 2.3 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: So I guess -- I serve on the subcommittee 24 25 here.

MR. LOW: Right. 1 2 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: We had an awful lot of email discussion about this, and I guess I -- it may 3 be -- you know, I guess one could read the email 4 discussions differently, but I mean, I guess I -- the 5 place I disagree with Buddy's characterization is, I 6 think we largely are unanimous in that I don't think 7 there's anyone who's supporting a rule change right now, 8 9 and so --10 (Simultaneous discussion) MR. LOW: -- one member was, and he's 11 backed off. 12 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: So I just wanted to 13 14 clarify for the whole committee, there was no one on the 15 subcommittee who is supporting a rule change. At one 16 point Levi was, but he isn't now. 17 MR. LOW: Right. 18 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: And so we're really 19 left with just the question of whether we should do nothing or whether we should add some reference in the 2.0 form of sort of a comment or something somewhere. 21 And, I mean, I thought Roger did a pretty 22 good job of summarizing some of the issues and, you 23 24 know, as Buddy says he raised one suggestion of one 25 possible alternative. And if the Court wants us to go

1 | in that direction, we certainly can.

I mean, I guess I'll just add, you know, I looked at all of the legislative history that I could find on this. And although there isn't a lot, as usual, that sheds a lot of light, at least in the House's — the House Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence Committee's report that came out, the first paragraph emphasizes that the state law currently doesn't provide survivors of sexual assault with the same confidentiality protections when they're seeking a crisis center's assistance as current state law does as to survivors of domestic violence, so — and let me just repeat. That's what the House Committee's report asserts.

And so apparently, the effort -- the legislative effort here was to make -- the goal of the new statute was to make Texas law consistent for victims of domestic violence and of sexual violence. And so that -- again, that may or may not be a correct characterization, but that's what I took away from the legislative history, which I think could be helpful in informing our thinking about what we should do here.

The only other thing I'll add that I don't -- well, I'll stop there. That's enough. Thanks.

MR. LOW: But one of the things, didn't you say that you got the impression they wanted to treat

those equally. And if we comment on one and not comment 1 on the other, would we be treating them equally?

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.0

21

22

23

24

25

PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: So that's a good point, but, again, there's no reason that we can't do In other words, we might say, for instance, that victims of domestic violence and of sexual violence have protections under statutory law that are not codified here in any part of the rules; go look them up.

> MR. LOW: I agree with that.

So, Chip, what -- as I understand what we're to do is start working on a comment because that would be approved by most of my committee, to add a comment, and now the details of the comment would be left up to us. And I will try to keep the State Bar committee informed of how we're going and what we're doing.

Well, I think we CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. ought to finish our discussion today, to the extent anybody has any further comments. And then if your subcommittee is going to do additional work after today and propose a comment that y'all agree on, then I would think that that needs to be done pretty quickly because the effective date of this statute is September 1. The Court right now is very occupied with trying to get all their opinions out by the end of June, as has been their

```
custom for the past several years. So, you know, I
1
 2
   would think that they would need something from us, if
   we're going to provide it in writing, by the -- you
 3
   know, in a couple of weeks, so...
 4
                  MR. LOW:
                            I understand. What had held me
 5
   up was the traditional way -- now, this is due
6
   September 1, as I read the bill. Isn't that right?
7
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's when it becomes
8
   effective.
9
10
                  MR. LOW: That's when it's effective.
                                                          Ι
   understand. We can't wait till then. All right.
11
                                                       Т
12
   will have the committee start working on a comment and
   we'll go from there.
13
                                     That would be great,
14
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
15
   Buddy. And then give it -- you know, obviously send it
16
   to me and to Shiva. We'll distribute it to the full
17
   committee. And we're not going to have another meeting
18
   before September 1, so we'll provide any comments the
   full committee has, but that's the timeline.
19
                  And we'll continue our discussion today,
2.0
   if there are any more comments. Does anybody else have
21
   anything to say other than what Professor Hoffman and
22
23
   Roger have added?
24
                  HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN:
                                           This is Harvey.
25
   I have a comment. One, on the September 1st deadline,
```

because the legislature is not requiring a rule, it does mean that we could decide to have a comment, have that after the fact, since right now at least we're getting indications that the committee from the State Bar thinks there should be no rule at all, which means if we don't do anything, we'll be doing exactly what the State Bar committee is inclined to do and that we could do it after the fact. 

Secondly, I think one of the bigger problems with this is where to put a comment. And I haven't found a place that I really feel like it goes very well. And to that extent, it occurred to me, after our email exchanges, that we could have a new rule, Rule 514, that would be entitled "Statute Privileges" that would basically just say, "These rules are not exclusive. There are also statutory privileges," and just keep it that short to remind people to check to see if there is one. That puts it in a place that's easy to find and alerts practitioners to the issue.

We were a little sensitive, or at least I was sensitive, to the fact that maybe we want to highlight new privileges because practitioners may not know them. On the other hand, any time we -- if we were to start listing them, not only do we have the problem of a long list and maybe inadvertently missing some --

even Professor Goode said he didn't have an exhaustive 1 2 list -- but of changes that occur in those privileges, so that would be a problem in listing them. So I think 3 we were pretty set on we should have no list. 4 comment would be fairly general, if we have one. 5 I throw those out just for committee 6 reaction, if they have any ideas on -- if we have a 7 comment were to go -- or would it be simpler to have a 8 rule that says there's other privileges. And I'm seeing 9 10 Rich Phillips' comment here, and I just have to double-check, frankly, 501. I have it somewhere on my 11 12 computer right in front of me, but I don't see it right now. 13

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: So the record's complete, Rich Phillips' message, it says, "Doesn't TRE 501 already do what the proposed comment would do?" So that's his question, and --

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.0

21

22

23

24

25

MR. PHILLIPS: I'll just read it: Unless the constitution, a statute, or these or other rules prescribed under statutory authority provide otherwise, no person has a privilege to.

Doesn't that already flag people that there could be a privilege in a statute somewhere? What. would a comment do that that sentence in 501 doesn't already do?

MR. LOW: And that's a good point. 1 2 Professor Goode pointed out that one of our most important privileges is the 5th Amendment. We don't 3 mention that, but the rule does mention what you said, 4 statute or constitution. 5 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: 6 Judge Estevez. HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: So this is my 7 ignorant question time, since other people got to say 8 9 that. 10 When I -- looking at the statute that they passed, it's a privilege for sexual assault survivors. 11 And my question is: Is a sexual assault survivor 12 someone who is claiming they've been sexually assaulted 13 14 or someone who has been adjudicated as a sexual assault 15 Because I've had so many cases in which the survivor? 16 counseling records have come in to determine whether or not a sexual assault ever even occurred. 17 And if a 18 sexual assault survivor does not include an alleged sexual assault survivor, then the most important thing 19 we need to do is to let people know that it doesn't 2.0 21 include that. So I would suggest that we need to find 22 out if the -- what this privilege really is would be --23

that would be more helpful than determining where we put

it, because it's going to change our litigation,

24

25

especially when we're talking about children. 1 2 So we have so many counselors that come in to talk about the advising and the counseling when we 3 have children as victims. And right now, we've just 4 privileged a huge amount of information before we 5 determine what a survivor is. And maybe there's 6 litigation already there that determines that. I just 7 don't -- I don't know. That's why I'm ignorant, but we 8 do need to do something with this if a sexual assault 9 10 survivor does not include an alleged sexual --PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: It does, Judge. 11 The statute defines survivor, individual victim of assault, 12 regardless of whether a report or conviction is made in 13 the incident. So -- and then the second point I'd make 14 15 is, I think the issue you're raising is really more of a 16 statutory construction question rather than one for us. 17 HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: I would agree, but 18 I would also -- I mean, it's going to be so important. 19 MR. LOW: I mean, you're going to have people -- volunteers helping somebody that has been 20 sexually assaulted, maybe the person hadn't been 21 convicted or they have. I don't see how you can draw a 22 distinction. And this legislation did and it didn't. 23 24 HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: Well, I think you draw a distinction if we're talking about a case in 25

which you're trying to determine whether or not there's 1 2 a survivor. I understand that there's not a conviction, but let's say that you're in a civil case, and whether 3 or not that person was ever sexually assaulted, I mean, 4 it'll be privileged, because when you're getting -- I 5 mean right now, they usually don't disclose it anyway or 6 it's ex parte, and they give it to us to review 7 in-camera; but I just don't -- I don't know where this 8 is -- it's been the most helpful probably for juries to 9 10 determine -- what the facts are or what they believe them to be have been these records. And I don't -- I 11 don't know if you just -- and I understand it's 12 legislative. That's why I said it was -- you know, that 13 14 was my ignorant part. I understand that that's the 15 statute that they passed. 16 And when I was reading the rule in the Government Code, I didn't necessarily see that that --17 18 that the words, regardless of whether they've been convicted, would make a difference in a lot of 19 scenarios. So it could -- you could still use it to 2.0 determine whether or not it's a sexual assault survivor. 21 And I just think that if we know that in some other area 22 of law that it's already been established, then we 23 24 should point that out in some sort of notation when 25 we're doing this other part. It would be helpful.

MR. LOW: I mean, we can't change the 1 2 legislation. Under this legislation, what would you suggest we do? Should we draw a distinction, or what 3 should we do? Should we try to define sexual survivor? 4 The legislature didn't do it. 5 HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: But they did. 6 They just didn't make it very clear. 7 Okav. What should we do as a 8 MR. LOW: committee within our limits? 9 10 HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: I think we should be consistent. If we're not going to put a lot of 11 12 comments on every specific place we change or we add privileges, then we should probably not do that; but I 13 14 think this is such an important change for family law 15 cases and potentially criminal law cases because of 16 impeachment issues that everybody needs to know this, 17 but I quess I'm --18 MR. LOW: I know, but how are you going to 19 do it without changing the legislation? I mean, we're limited. We can only -- we can't change. 2.0 So I'm 21 limited to what our committee can legally do. somebody has a suggestion, I'm open to suggestions 22 because I have no answer to that. 23 24 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, let's hear from 25 Justice Christopher, but then we need to get back to

Judge Estevez's point and specifically with respect to
the definition of survivor and the statute that Lonny
points out, because I think, as the Judge says, it's -at least my reading, it's not all that clear, although
I'll be the first to admit, I don't practice in this
area. So Justice Christopher.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Yes. I was looking at the comment to Rule 510, and apparently the mental health information privilege was enacted in Texas in 1979. And it appears that we then wrote a rule of evidence to cover it.

And so my question, because I haven't really studied the rule that well versus our privilege rules, is: Is there a difference between what is in that rule and what the normal procedure would be in terms of a privilege? And I agree with Judges Estevez. This could be a huge number of cases, especially on the criminal side.

And I don't agree with someone's comment that a criminal defense lawyer, for example, might know what kind of motion he has to file to get this information, so -- I don't think that they would. So putting it in the Rules of Evidence I think would be useful for them. And obviously we have rules in our Rules of Evidence that specifically apply to criminal

cases versus civil cases. So I think we need to look at 1 it a little bit more and consider those problems. 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you, Judge. 3 Getting back to the point that Lonny made about the 4 definition of survivor -- and, Lonny, make sure I'm 5 reading the right section here -- survivor means an 6 individual who is a victim of a sexual assault or other 7 sex offense. That's how it starts. Right? 8 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: Yes. So, I mean, this 9 10 is 420.003 Definitions, and it's the eighth item down, so survivor. Yeah. 11 12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And then it says in making that -- in meeting that definition, you can 13 disregard two things: One, whether a report or a 14 15 conviction -- whether a report was made or a conviction 16 is made -- I think they mean conviction of a perpetrator 17 occurs. But to Judge Estevez's point, in the 18 definition, survivor means an individual who is a victim of a sexual assault or other sex offense. 19 Is it sufficient for somebody to come in 20 and say, "Hey, I was a victim of a sexual assault, and 21 now I have this privilege, " or does there have to be 22 some determination by a fact finder when that person 23 meets the definition of survivor and therefore gets the 24

Is that what you were raising, Judge

25

privilege.

Estevez? 1 2 HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: Yes, exactly, because sometimes that's what's being litigated. 3 4 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah. HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: They need those to 5 determine it whether or not they -- there was a sexual 6 assault because the fact finder is going to determine 7 8 that. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Right. 9 10 PROFESSOR HOFFMAN: Okay. I quess my reaction to this is really -- I guess it's the same as 11 12 what I had before -- maybe I just need to elaborate a bit -- is -- and I think Buddy already said it pretty 13 14 well, which is whether we think this was a good or a bad 15 statutory change, whether we think it was ambiguous or 16 not -- by the way, I could make an argument that it's 17 totally not ambiguous, that the legislature is being 18 clear that it's not only the people who are safe or 19 victims and can prove it, but just simply people who say they're victims. But, again, whether I'm right about 2.0 that or not, this is what we've got to deal with. 21 And so it's not clear at all to me how we're going to 22 23 resolve any of this with some sort of line drawing in a 24 rule.

And then the other thing I'll just add,

25

and this was the place I hesitated before, but it made
me take a look at this, is under federal law, under the
Victims Against Women's Act, from my early research that
I did for part of this, it looks like federal law under
VAWA already provides confidential protection privilege
for both victims of domestic violence and of sexual
assault.

2.0

And there are several Texas attorney general opinions that recognize VAWA's confidentiality protections are enforceable under state law. Now, again, I haven't dug into what that means and how they're enforceable and whatnot, but I mean there's sort of additional layers here, again, none of which I think a rule would address -- we wouldn't address it in any other rule.

And then the only thing I guess I'll just add is back to Tracy's point. You know, Tracy, I hear you, but I also -- it may be of some value to some practitioners to have it in the rule; but, again, as Professor Goode has said, there's all sorts of evidentiary privileges that aren't recognized explicitly in the rules. And so why we would add this one and not another is not as obvious to me. And many of those are also statutory, not all, but many of them are.

HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: Can I just respond

to Professor Hoffman? So I'm sorry I'm not as 1 articulate as all the people that talk for a living, but what I wanted to say was that my question -- I started 3 off with a question, and the question was: If they have 4 defined what a survivor is under any of these other 5 statutes, then I think the most important thing we can do for a practitioner is to let them know that that's 7 been defined and that this privilege wouldn't apply if it's an alleged victim and you're actually litigating that issue. 10

2

6

8

9

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.0

21

22

23

24

25

So it is -- if it's there, since the legislature didn't put it specifically in this statute, if they had done it in the family violence statute and there's already case law and we can point that out, that would be more important than letting them know that this privilege exists. It's to let them know that this privilege does not apply to that specific type of scenario. So that's why it was important, not because I was trying to change what the legislature did or I disagreed with them but because if there's been an interpretation already on that survivor issue, it would be imperative for the Judges to know when they go through these cases that if we looked at a rule of evidence and it says they have a privilege, we don't just say, "No, you're not getting that in." We need to

know that there's that exception.

2.0

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Fair enough. I don't know who had their hands up first, but I think the order was Richard Munzinger, Robert Levy, and Justice Christopher, so we'll go in that order.

Richard.

MR. MUNZINGER: Judge Estevez raises a very, very, very important issue in my opinion. Does the Texas Supreme Court interpret statutes by making a comment to a rule of civil procedure when the statute itself needs to be interpreted? Because the legislature wrote it the way it wrote it.

I don't see how the Court can write a comment even on this rule without addressing the problem of definition. And if it is doing that, then it is resolving an issue that I believe should be resolved in litigation.

I think Justice Estevez hit a home run here. You've got a real problem if you come in here and say, "He sexually assaulted me," you haven't -- he hasn't been convicted. The other two provisions in the rule that have been read don't apply, but they don't apply to the situation that we're talking about. So how can the Supreme Court write a rule or a comment without interpreting the statute or at least admitting that the

statute is ambiguous? And I don't know that that's the Supreme Court's job, to tell the legislature that they blew it.

2.0

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Robert.

MR. LEVY: Well, I look at this issue, the specific one that we're discussing, in a similar lens that I looked at the issues on the Chapter 98 questions about claimant's confidentiality.

I think -- at least my view is that the Court should draw this more broadly in terms of what I believe is the intent of this statute and the others on a similar vein, is that we want to encourage victims, alleged victims, to bring claims, to be able to testify, to have confidence in their protection and the application of the privilege and that we would not want to place any preconditions or suggestion that they have to prove that they are a victim before they're able to benefit from the statute, similar to the fact that they can bring a claim whether -- notwithstanding whether there's been an adjudication that there was trafficking, for example, so that we should suggest a broader application and not a threshold.

And the way that Professor Hoffman read the statute, it seemed that there is no requirement that you prove that you are a victim or there's any

adjudication. In fact, it would seem to me that there
wouldn't necessarily be an adjudication for the
privilege to apply. So I think that a trial court would
have to assume that the person was a victim and apply
the privilege accordingly.

2.0

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Christopher.

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, looking at 420.074, talks about disclosure of privileged communications in criminal proceedings. So to me, that would seem to imply that we were talking about a victim where there has not yet been an adjudication, that they are a victim of sexual assault, because, you know, at that point, there's just a contention that they're a victim of sexual assault. You know, I would assume that.

And, you know, I mean, this is a very different procedure that puts the burden on the lawyer for the criminal defendant to file this motion. And I just think that this needs to be flagged for criminal practitioners, at the very least. So that's why I think it should be in a rule.

And in terms of, you know, Buddy saying, "Well, where should we put it," well, we're kind of -it's difficult because of the numbering. We haven't,
you know, left us any room to add a new number, but

frankly, I'd make it a new number. 1 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Harvey? HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: The issue is to 3 whether it would cover somebody who is an alleged victim 4 as opposed to an actual victim. 5 I think that it's possible the legislature 6 wrote this very carefully, and it is delegating that 7 issue to the trial court. Now let me tell you what I 8 mean by that. 9 10 Rule 104(a) of the Rules of Evidence says trial judges, you make the preliminary determination as 11 12 to whether the privilege applies or as to whether something meets a rule. So, for example, when somebody 13 claims attorney-client privilege, and the other side 14 15 objects and says "No, no, you were getting business 16 advice, not legal advice, well, that's a fact determination. And the Judge makes a preliminary ruling 17

18 on that, and based on that preliminary ruling, the

19 privilege applies or it does not apply. Whether

something is an excited utterance, the Judge makes a 20

preliminary ruling. 21

22

23

24

25

So lots of these rules have these preliminary rulings by a Court, and so it might be that the legislature was saying, "We're not going to say that everybody who alleges that they're a victim gets this."

It might be they're saying, "We want some type of 1 2 safeguard, but we also want the Judge to look at it first." 3 So I'm not sure that it's as vaque as we 4 think it is. It might take education for people to 5 understand how that procedure works under Rule 104(a), 6 but the rule does provide a procedure within it. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Gray asks: 8 Why would the determination of whether the person was a 9 10 victim be any different than the application of an attorney-client, religious advisory, patient-doctor? 11 The decision of the application definition is decided. 12 Judge Brown is now making my point. If the Judge says, 13 14 "No yes privilege," then potential mandamus. 15 And what I took to be a smiley face is, in 16 fact, explained to me to be -- by Justice Gray just something that he has to hit in order to get his message 17 18 sent to us. So now the record is complete on that. 19 And I think Richard Munzinger and then Judge Peeples. 20 I respectfully dissent 21 MR. MUNZINGER: The point at issue is whether 22 from Harvey's comments. 23 the person using the language of the statute, quote, is a victim, closed quote, not whether advice has a 24

particular nature as business or legal, but whether

25

the -- this is a suit where Jane has sued Bill claiming
Bill sexually assaulted her. That's the nub of the
case. And so the trial court, if Judge Brown is
correct, makes his preliminary decision in his own mind
that the plaintiff wins the case to apply the privilege.
How can that be? How can a judge make such a decision
without having heard all of the relevant evidence?

I'm a defendant. I've got a right for the Judge. Judge can't make a ruling on the merits of my case without having heard all the relevant evidence, and shouldn't be able to if due process means anything. And if, judge, justice means anything, when the legislature says a person is a victim, victim has a meaning. We deal with words and the Supreme Court all the time, "When we interpret a statute, we figure the legislature knows what they're saying, and so we're going to apply the English language as it's written and as they wrote it."

And all we're doing here is attempting to dodge that to create a privilege to an alleged victim as opposed to a victim. And so you've ruled on the status of the person claiming the privilege to apply the privilege when that's the nub of the lawsuit. That's Judge Estevez's problem in my -- that's the way I read it, at least, and I don't see how you can possibly write

a rule that let's -- the Supreme Court can write a rule 1 2 that avoids that discussion. We are bound by what the legislature --3 the Court is bound by what the legislature wrote. 4 The legislature did not state, "Create a rule or create a 5 comment." 6 My personal recommendation to the Court 7 is, let it work its way out in the court and don't say 8 9 anything. 10 I'm finished. Thank you. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: You bet. 11 12 Judge Peeples. HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: Two or three 13 14 things. Courts, and trial courts especially, interpret vague statutes all the time. All the time. And I think 15 16 that's what has to happen here. I doubt the Court --17 the Supreme Court would want to interpret this statute 18 by rule. 19 I would point out secondly that the only time this comes up is when the person who says "I'm the 2.0 victim" went to an advocate. We will at least know that 21 they -- I mean, that's what it's all about, but there 22 are discussions with the advocate. 23 24 And then the third thing I would say is,

as a trial judge, I don't need a list of privileges

25

because the only time I have to rule on it is when somebody makes an objection at trial or before trial.

2.0

So from my point of view, I don't need a list, but I would find a list of these privileges very helpful, and I wouldn't know the first place to go other than Professor Goode's treatise on it or his handbook on it. But I think to mention, as Harvey Brown said, or maybe 501 is good enough, but just to have a tentative list -- maybe it's incomplete, maybe something will be left out, but if that happens, you just add it later. But I think for practitioners, just a summary of what's out there would be helpful. And we got to muddle our way through on the rulings, but sometimes you take a baby step.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Judge Estevez.

HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: I just want to make the point that the place I see this the most has been a parent charging the other parent -- they're charging the other parent of having sexually abused one of their children, one of their -- you know. And it's been their greatest defense has been those counselors that have come in.

And so, you know, when I -- if it's privileged, it's privileged. And if they're an alleged victim, the child -- you know, the child's not running

around thinking about, "How am I going to make my case 1 better, " or "Who's going to be looking at my files 2 later," like an adult. 3 And so I think that this is such an 4 important issue that -- and I appreciate everybody that 5 supported that -- that they don't -- it's going to make 6 a huge difference. And if we already know the answer to 7 that, I just want to say we need to let them know. 8 And I'm going to agree with Chief Justice 9 10 Christopher. The reality is that our defense attorneys will not know what to do. Most of them won't unless 11 12 they happen to go to the CLE that specifically told them what to do. I mean, they're not going to get that 13 14 information. They're going to miss it. We're going to 15 have -- even our appellate lawyers may not know about 16 it. So we're not going to have a way to make them learn 17 what to do in these type of cases. So we probably do 18 need a rule for them any time we're dealing with the 19 criminal defense part just because that's just our 20 reality. Thank you, Judge. 21 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Levi. 22 HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: 23 Judge Estevez's 24 example there of parent versus parent, you know, I don't 25 practice in family or criminal, but, you know, any

privilege can be waived. And it seems to me in the
example she cites, it wouldn't be one parent or the
other who would have the right to assert the privilege.
I don't know if an ad litem is appointed in such cases,
then it's the ad litem's decision.

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.0

21

22

23

24

25

But I've gone in the context of a week from being a proponent of a rule to a proponent of a comment, to now I'm persuaded by Richard Munzinger and in part by Harvey Brown that we should do nothing at least for a period of time, because if we do nothing, we are still giving the sexual assault victims the same treatment that domestic violence victims are afforded. And that gives us some time to let the cases percolate and to get some opinions from the intermediate courts, at a minimum. And it also gives the Buddy Low subcommittee, which I'm a member of, the opportunity to debate with the State Bar committee. And whether it's September 3rd we come back with something or someday later, we just -- the Court need not rush because we'd be complying with a statute by taking our time to think and debate. That's all I've got. Thanks.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, Levi.

On the timing of our work, I went back and reread the reference letter. And on the topics that we're talking about today, the Court said we should

conclude our work at this meeting. I doubt that the Court would have much trouble with us taking an extra week or so to suggest a comment, if that's what the subcommittee and the full committee thinks is right, but running it out until our next meeting I don't think was contemplated by the Court. But if the Court wants us to keep studying this, that's fine, but the reference letter said we were to conclude our work today. So I offer that as a point of information.

HONORABLE LEVI BENTON: Well, maybe our subcommittee chair could make a motion for leave to extend.

MR. LOW: I would so do, but I've heard enough from my committee members to think right now, a majority are going to say do nothing. Now are we supposed to draw a comment anyway if we vote to do nothing?

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, we face -- this is not the first time we've faced that, Buddy. And sometimes the Court says, "Got it," you know, "We understand your recommendation but go ahead and draft something anyway," and we'll hear from Justice Christopher and then maybe ask the Chief if he has any direction to give us both on should we draft a comment, and number two, do we have any additional time, and if

so, how much to do so. 1 2 So Justice Christopher. Well. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: 3 unfortunately there will be waiver in the appellate 4 world. And so we will not see any criminal decision --5 any decisions on the criminal side very soon because if 6 the criminal defendant's attorney doesn't follow this 7 rule to try and get the information, then there will be 8 So that's why I consider that particularly 9 waiver. 10 important on the criminal side. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, Judge. 11 Kent Sullivan. 12 HONORABLE KENT SULLIVAN: I just wanted to 13 14 weigh in very briefly on what I perceived to be the 15 Tracy Christopher and David Peeples side here. 16 Certainty is good. Plain language is good. User friendliness is good. I think the idea of 17 18 doing absolutely nothing and just sort of letting some cases bring forward issues -- you know, it's one thing 19 when you're dealing with a case in which there's 2.0 uncertainty as to the outcome. That's every case. 21 It's another thing when there is uncertainty about core 22 issues of process, and the litigants become cannonfodder 23 24 in that sort of uncertainty. I think we need to look at this from the 25

1 user's point of view, and we need to at least provide
2 some reasonable amount of guidance here and weigh in.
3 That's it.

2.0

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, Kent.

Well, on the motion by the chair of the subcommittee, who's also vice chair of this committee, for an extension of time to draft and propose a comment, I will kick that to the Chief to see whether he would find that -- he and the Court would find that helpful or whether we are to, as the letter said, conclude our work today.

HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Well, I think it would be most helpful for me and, at this point -- and Jane -- and at this point, I think you've pretty well aired your ideas, just to have an understanding of what the considerations are.

And before I think we ask you to do more work on it, I think we probably should talk about it with the Court and kind of get their view on it and -- because I don't think we could comfortably speak on the Court's behalf given all the various considerations that we've heard without laying it out to them first.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I agree. That is good guidance, so we'll -- we will, at least for the moment, conclude our work on this matter.

1	And I'll ask Bobby Meadows, who I saw that
2	joined us but before I ask him anything, Harvey has
3	his hand up. So Harvey, do you have a comment?
4	HONORABLE HARVEY BROWN: I just had a
5	question for the Chief, and that is: Would it be
6	helpful to the Court to kind of do a preliminary survey
7	or vote, if you will, to see how many people fall in
8	each of three categories? We have the "do nothing," the
9	"write a comment," and then we have the "write a rule,"
LO	three different ideas out there? Would it help the
L1	Court to get a sense of the committee as to people's
L2	preliminary reactions?
L3	HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Sure.
L4	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Everybody who's
L5	in favor of do nothing, raise your electronic hand.
L6	Anybody else? Okay. Has everybody voted? All right.
L7	Everybody who's in favor of you can
L8	lower your hands.
L9	Everybody who is in favor of a comment,
20	raise your hand. Has everybody voted that wants to?
21	Okay. Lower your hands.
22	Everybody in favor of a rule, raise your
23	hands. Has everybody voted that wants to? Okay. You
24	can lower your hand.
25	Let the record reflect that the do nothing

party received 17 votes, the comment crowd received 11, 1 2 and the rules group garnered four votes. So -- and the chair didn't vote. So that's where that came out. 3 And anything else on this topic? 4 HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: 5 I just want to This is the highest litigated area in the whole 6 state of Texas. If you're going to have a lawsuit, 7 whether it's criminal or family law, it's going all the 8 way to the jury trial if it's a sexual assault case. 9 10 That's all. It's very important. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you, Judge. 11 12 Chip, I have one question about MR. LOW: my instructions, were wait to hear from the Chief, is 13 that correct, before we do --14 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: That's correct. 16 HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Yeah. 17 MR. LOW: Okay. Now with regard to the 18 supreme -- the State Bar committee, I have them go ahead and work or not? 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, my own view would 2.0 be that that's up to them; but if they're doing it for 21 our benefit, they're using their resources in a way 22 23 that's not helpful to us because our work is finished 24 for the moment. So if they want to do it for their own 25 benefit and get their own -- get that input to the

1	Court, then that's fine.
2	MR. LOW: Okay. I understand. All right.
3	I'm sorry that we all the other things went so
4	smoothly, and I happened to (indiscernible) this one,
5	but I had help. Thank you.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. And Robert
7	wants has a question about the protection of
8	sensitive data. I think whether there's whether
9	there should be more work done, and I think I'm going to
10	predict that we're done for now, Robert, unless the
11	Chief thinks we need more work; but I think for now,
12	we're done on that.
13	HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: I agree.
14	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Am I right about that,
15	Chief?
16	HONORABLE NATHAN HECHT: Yes.
17	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay.
18	MR. LOW: Thank you.
19	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. And so now
20	back to Bobby Meadows, who I saw enter the frame here a
21	little bit ago. And Bobby, your items are coming up
22	next, the last two items on our agenda. Do you have
23	scheduling problems, or would it be okay if we took a
24	half hour lunch right now?
25	MR. MEADOWS: Perfect. No, we're ready to

```
go, and a break's fine.
1
 2
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. You look like
   you're in a construction site.
 3
                  MR. MEADOWS: Well, I am actually.
 4
                                                      I'm in
   Montana, and we're wrapping up a little project here.
 5
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: All right. Good for
6
7
   you.
                  Well, it's 12:35, so why don't we
8
   reconvene at 1:05, unless that's not enough time for
9
10
   everybody to get lunch. Is that sufficient time for
   everybody? If anybody thinks it's not enough time,
11
12
   raise your hand. No hands have been raised, so we will
   reconvene at 1:05. That would be 30 minutes from now.
13
14
   Thanks everybody.
15
                  UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Recording stopped.
16
                  (Recess:
                            12:35 p.m. to 1:05 p.m.)
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: It looks like we are
17
18
   now recording, so welcome back after our lunch break.
19
   And somebody is trying to call me, but we'll get back to
2.0
   our meeting.
                  And I have, I think, taken care of some
21
   confusion I created this morning --
22
2.3
                  UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Recording in
24
   progress.
25
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- unintentionally, but
```

```
our next meeting is September 3rd, so that's for sure;
1
 2
   but the SCAC reception and picture taking is October 8th
   because if we did it on September 3rd, as Lisa Hobbs
 3
   pointed out, we would be conflicting with the Texas
 4
   Supreme Court Historical Society cocktail party and
 5
   dinner, which many, if not most of us, will be
6
   attending. So my apologies.
7
                  Next meeting September 3rd, followed by
8
   the Texas Supreme Court Historical Society event.
9
10
   the meeting after that will be October 8th, followed by
   an SCAC reception and picture-taking ceremony.
11
12
   hopefully we got that squared away, and we will now turn
   it over to --
13
14
                  MR. RODRIGUEZ:
                                  Chip --
15
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                      Yes.
16
                  MR. RODRIGUEZ: -- this is Eduardo
17
   Rodriguez.
                Is the meeting --
18
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                     Hello, Eduardo.
19
                  MR. RODRIGUEZ:
                                   Is the meeting on the 3rd
   going to be on the 4th also?
                                  It's the 3rd and the 4th
2.0
   or just the 3rd?
21
                                      I think just the 3rd,
22
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
   Eduardo.
2.3
24
                  MR. RODRIGUEZ:
                                   Okay.
25
                                      So why don't we turn
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
```

over to Bobby Meadows on oaths in depositions, the next agenda item today.

2.0

MR. MEADOWS: Okay. Thank you, Chip.

So the task we were assigned was to take a look at House Bill 3774 that includes language allowing court reporters to administer the oath to witnesses even if not in the same location as the witness, so that is the court reporter taking the deposition can administer the oath to someone who's in remote location. And the question put to our subcommittee and to this larger committee is: In light of that statutory language, does Rule 199.1(b) that addresses or deals with remote -- oral depositions in remote places, or remote depositions, does it need to be changed or include a comment in light of this statutory development?

And our committee met and concluded that Rule 199.1(b) does need to be changed. And Justice Christopher, as she often does, went right to the heart of things, prepared a proposal that, you know, is pretty quick work. It eliminates -- her proposal removes the last sentence of the current Rule 199.1(b) which allows an oral deposition of a remote witness if the witness is present with a person authorized to administer the oath in that jurisdiction. So that part of Rule 191 -- I mean, 199 would no longer apply.

1	And so that our committee proposal is
2	to strike that unanimous proposal was to strike that
3	sentence but add a comment that notes that Section 154
4	of the Government Code governs the administration of
5	oaths by a court reporter for a remote deposition.
6	So a pretty straightforward approach to
7	it, pretty much, I think, dictated by the language in
8	House Bill 3774.
9	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, Bobby. Anybody
10	have any comments on this?
11	(No response)
12	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Bobby, this may be a
13	first in our history.
14	MR. MEADOWS: It's not can't attribute
15	it to me.
16	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Christopher has
17	saved us at the bell here.
18	(Laughter)
19	HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Sorry.
20	MR. MEADOWS: Of course.
21	HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: This is the
22	fix to the legislation. I think the Court also put in
23	their letter: Is there anything else that we want to do
24	with respect to this rule? That would implicate the
25	broader question of Zoom depositions or WebEx or

whatever going forward.

2.0

And so I just wanted to say that we, in the committee, decided that we didn't need to address it. The rule already allows for it. And the question would be whether we should put something in there about grounds for objecting to a remote deposition versus the in-person depositions, and we decided not to at this time; but if the Court wants us to look at that, we can look at that.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Yeah, I think my own sense is that this was sort of a "Let's get done what we can do today," and if there are other issues that require more study, we'll do that in a more leisurely pace, but Robert.

MR. LEVY: I just had a question. How would this rule apply to situations where you have a deposition, a deponent in another state or even another country? Does it suggest that a Texas court has the power to compel that witness to participate, or does it only, I guess, assume that it's by the cooperation of the witness and the parties that the remote deposition take place?

MR. MEADOWS: It's my appreciation that it's the latter.

MR. LEVY: Got it.

MR. MEADOWS: And then the authorizing 1 2 statute goes into pretty significant detail into how the identity of the witness can be established. 3 HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: T don't 4 think it changes anything with respect to that in terms 5 of the authorization without agreement to produce 6 somebody and how you would subpoena for the remote 7 deposition or anything like that. 8 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, that would sure 9 10 be my take, but all right. Any other comments about this? You're still about to set the record, Bobby, even 11 12 with the help from two of your colleagues. MR. MEADOWS: By the co-chair, you might 13 14 note. 15 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: By the co-chair, that's 16 right. 17 All right. If there is no further 18 discussion about this topic, then we can move on to the 19 next one, ethical guidelines for mediators. And, again, Bobby is here to talk to us about it. 2.0 Okay. Well, if you think 21 MR. MEADOWS: that was easy wait till you hear this. 22 23 So the question here is around a request to have the Court amend the guidelines to ethical -- the 24 25 ethical guidelines for mediation. It's a request that

surfaces from I guess a period of confusion about the scope and extent of what a mediator can do in terms of reducing a settlement, the terms of a settlement, from mediation into a written document.

2.0

And I don't really need to go into the history, but apparently for some period of time, for eight years or so, there has been a good bit of confusion that surfaced out of a ethics opinion -- 584 to be precise -- about what a mediator could do in terms of moving from a mediation to the implementation of it.

And so the question is: Can mediators in a case where the parties are not represented by lawyers prepare a divorce decree and other necessary documents to effectuate the agreed divorce?

And so from that question, we now have a new Ethics Opinion 675 that was issued in 2016 that largely embraces or articulates what it is that the Supreme Court is being asked to accept in terms of an amendment to the ethical guidelines, and that is that a Texas lawyer acting as a mediator can prepare a written agreement that memorializes the terms of the parties' agreement and even suggests additional terms for inclusion in the draft agreement. So that's it.

So is it okay for a mediator to reduce the terms of settlement from a mediation into a written

document? And that's the question. 1 2 And, again, our subcommittee met on this and it was unanimous that this request should be 3 4 accepted. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I think just one 5 Okay. small clarification, Bobby. Was the Opinion 675, was 6 that 2016 or 2018? I thought it was 2018. 7 MR. MEADOWS: I have written March 2016 8 from the letter that I read, but I could have the date 9 10 I didn't do original research on this. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, that probably 11 12 doesn't matter. In fact, it doesn't matter. But we can get the precise date if we need to. 13 14 Any comment or discussion about the 15 subcommittee's recommendation? 16 MR. LEVY: Let me raise my hand, if I 17 could. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, Robert. 19 MR. LEVY: So one of the -- I quess the issues -- and I did not look over the opinion but having 2.0 the mediator involved in crafting a settlement agreement 21 potentially makes that mediator a witness in a 22 23 subsequent dispute about the settlement or the terms of 24 that agreement. 25 And we've tried, I think, historically to

be very clear to protect mediators from ever becoming a 1 2 witness to keep their role separate. And if we somewhat encourage them to draft the settlement agreements, then 3 are we subjecting them to exposure as witnesses and then 4 the conflict with the language that -- of the provision 5 that says that they are not witnesses? 6 Well, nothing about our 7 MR. MEADOWS: assignment included that question or implication. 8 Ιt was just simply a pretty straightforward examination of 9 10 whether or not a mediator who presided over, you know, a dispute and that was resolved in compromise could reduce 11 the terms of that to writing. 12 (Simultaneous discussion) 13 My thinking is, though, that by 14 MR. LEVY: 15 enabling that, we're actually putting the mediator in a 16 more likely position of having to be a witness. And is that -- do we want that to be the outcome or try to 17 18 avoid it by not adopting the proposed rule? 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: I'll say that typically, your agreement with the mediator is that 20 you -- no party will call him as a witness any time, 21 anyhow, anywhere. And if anybody tries to, he won't 22 23 show up and -- or she won't show up. 24 And the mediator's agreements that I've

seen, they'll have a kind of a form and it'll have a

25

bunch of stuff in it that, you know, is just kind of form information, and then the parties will either dictate or write in themselves the terms of the agreement.

- I've not had experience with mediators who say, "Okay, I sort of get the gist of what you guys are trying to do. I'll go back in my office and I'll draft an agreement." I don't see that happening, and I'm not sure that that's widespread, if it does; but I'm offering 2 cents here, and we've got people who probably know more than I do.
- So, Roger, you start off, and then we'll go to Judge Miskel and then Lisa.
  - MR. HUGHES: Well, my first point is, is my experience with mediators providing a form agreement is pretty much the same as yours. I've come to expect them to have a fill-in-the-blank form ready because they don't want to be bothered to have to craft a new interim agreement from the beginning. And it's important at least in nonfamily law cases to have something that's enforceable in case someone tries to back out. And unfortunately, I've had that happen once or twice.

As far as dragging the mediator into it, pretty much unless they're going to claim fraud or undue influence, I don't know what -- why they would be able

to call the mediator. And if they're going to claim
undue influence/coercion/fraud by the mediator, I don't
know what could protect the mediator from having to go
to court to say, "I never said those things. I didn't
twist his arm behind his back," et cetera.

2.0

My only observation is, pretty much every form mediation memo that I've signed usually has a paragraph to make work for the mediator in case you-all fall to arguing later on that "You can't go to court unless you re-mediate with me," or "If anyone tries to back out, you have to mediate with me before you can go to the court," that kind of thing. But generally speaking, I'm not offended by that.

So overall, I don't think this is going to do anything to change what's already going on out there. And I haven't heard people squawking about -- of course, we only use attorney mediators in my firm, but I haven't heard anyone squawking about the interim agreements. You just have to be very careful because frequently, you will remember something that you wanted to put in the agreement that you didn't, and then afterwards, they won't sign a more extensive release than is described in your mediation memo.

That's all I have to say.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay, great.

Judge Miskel. 1 2 MR. HUGHES: Quite favored by the way. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. 3 Thank you. Judge Miskel. 4 HONORABLE EMILY MISKEL: So the question 5 is specifically about pro se parties and attorney 6 mediators. Is that correct? 7 MR. MEADOWS: Right. 8 HONORABLE EMILY MISKEL: So I think 9 Okay. 10 that, for example, Kennon earlier mentioned TexasLawHelp.org, and that has very specific Supreme 11 12 Court approved forms for final judgments in many types And I have often wondered why mediators 13 of cases. 14 couldn't mediate a pro se case and check the boxes in 15 the form final judgment and then send the pro se parties 16 to court with their Supreme Court approved form, boxes checked, as their final agreement in the mediation. 17 Ιt 18 would be very efficient. 19 And so I think the recommendation that I'm hearing would not force any mediator to prepare a final 2.0 So if a mediator does not want the risk of 21 being called as a witness, they don't have to do any of 22 this; but if a mediator wanted to do a low-cost 23 24 mediation for some pro se parties in a family law case 25 and check the boxes on the Supreme Court approved forms,

I think that would be wonderful. 1 2 MR. MEADOWS: I don't think the mediator can prepare the actual divorce decree or any of the 3 Court documents. As I appreciate it, that was kind of 4 the point of uncertainty and controversy was around 5 these earlier ethics opinions about, you know, a lawyer 6 cannot, you know, obviously act as a mediator and then 7 act for one of the parties in terms of as a lawyer, so 8 it's just --9 10 HONORABLE EMILY MISKEL: But I'm saying the final form of the MSA could have all the same check 11 boxes. 12 That way you would know that you've ruled on -or that the parties have resolved all the issues by 13 In other words, the 14 agreement or what's been reserved. 15 question was about the mediator preparing the form of 16 the settlement agreement. 17 MR. MEADOWS: Right, the agreement. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Lisa. 19 MS. HOBBS: Yeah, I'm going to piggyback a little bit off what Judge Miskel is talking about 20 because I think we got off on sort of more sophisticated 21 mediation that most of us deal with more regularly than 22 what I think the ethics opinion is about. 23 24 And, Bobby, you can correct me, but

generally speaking, what was the background of that

25

ethics opinion? It was a family law and it was pro se? 1 2 MR. MEADOWS: Right, and that was -- yes. I mean, I don't know if that was the background for it. 3 I mean, that was -- the way the question was framed was 4 around that circumstance where you had, you know, two 5 parties not represented by a lawyer involved with a 6 mediation, you know, what was the scope of what the 7 mediator could do at the conclusion of the agreement. 8 MS. HOBBS: Yeah. And so, I mean, I 9 10 agree -- well, first of all, on my end, any case agree with what -- that a mediator could draft settlement 11 12 agreements. It's kind of interesting. I feel like 13 14 you're raising two separate issues, like it's one thing 15 to memorialize with some legal language what the parties 16 at the mediation agreed to, but then we all kind of know that sometimes in a mediated agreement, then you add 17 18 "and the party will indemnify them" or -- I don't know. There this sort of, like, stock language that you might 19 add to, like, the specific terms of this controversy. 2.0 I am in favor of letting mediators do 21 that, I think, but I'm sympathetic to the ethics opinion 22 because you can see, if you're a mediator and you're 23 24 adding these provisions that might never come up, and 25 probably in the vast majority of mediated agreements

don't come up, but once you start advising them about 1 2 what it means on some stock language, then you start --I don't know. Like it does get into a gray line, so I 3 don't know. I'm sorry, I'm just maybe being sympathetic 4 for the ethics opinion, even though my vote would be to 5 let mediators do this. I'm probably completely 6 unhelpful in my comments. 7 Well, I would say --MR. MEADOWS: 8 (Simultaneous discussion) 9 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Go ahead. MR. MEADOWS: -- I was just going to say 11 12 just one thing that might be useful, and perhaps I should have said it from the very beginning. 13 14 the important thing about this whole request, I believe, 15 is that the -- it's to recognize the difference between 16 simply, you know, memorializing the parties' agreement and then moving forward with some sort of legal 17 18 effectuation of that with a divorce decree, which ethics 19 opinion does not permit. But in terms of the questions around, you 20 know, protecting mediators and, you know, from being 21 witnesses and all of that, I should have said early on 22 that this request, this proposal, has the support of 23 every statewide organization in Texas representing 24 mediators, including the Council of Alternative Disputes 25

Resolution of the State Bar. 1 2 So I would just -- you know, I don't know that for a fact. It was just in the referral materials. 3 But if true, I would think that the mediators themselves 4 would know how to look out for themselves, and if they 5 were concerned about being called as witnesses or 6 something else, they would not be supporting this. 7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, speaking of a 8 gray line, Justice Gray says, "If we have nonlawyer 9 10 mediators reducing, quote, agreement, quote to a document, MSA, Rule 11, or regular mediation, I am sure 11 12 that the" -- (phone ringing) that may have been me. Sorry about that. 13 14 Let me start again. Justice Gray says, 15 "If we have a nonlawyer mediator reducing the, quote, 16 agreement, quote, to a document, MSA, Rule 11, or regular mediation, I am sure that the unauthorized 17 18 practice of law section of the SBA has a view on this. 19 If the lawyer mediator can do this because they are not practicing law for either party, could a nonlawyer do 2.0 this?" 21 So, Bobby, there you go. You got an 22 23 answer to Justice Gray? 24 I really don't. I think MR. MEADOWS: 25 that -- and perhaps others on the committee would want

to venture an answer. I understood our task to be examining this request built entirely around what a lawyer mediator could do.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Yeah, I think that's -I think that's right, but it's an interesting question
nevertheless.

Justice Christopher.

2.0

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: I guess I have to disagree with Bobby. I think that the requested change would include nonlawyer mediators.

And, you know, the mediation group rejected the idea that it would be the unauthorized practice of law. I mean, if they wanted to make it just for lawyer mediators, they could have put that in the comment, but it's not -- it doesn't distinguish between lawyer and nonlawyer mediators.

And Harvey couldn't make it this afternoon, and he said, you know, if the Court wanted to, of course, they could limit it to lawyer mediators; but I actually am in favor of the nonlawyer mediators being allowed to do this because in the vast majority of family law cases -- well, not the vast majority -- in a large number of family law cases, we have nonlawyer mediators, because they are a lot less money. And it's very simple for them to help the parties fill out a

settlement agreement. And, I mean, it's kind of funny because that ethics opinion says, "Well, you're not really acting like a lawyer when you're helping fill out the settlement agreement." And so if you're not acting like a lawyer when you help them fill out the settlement agreement, then it seems like a nonlawyer could do it, too. So, I mean, it is a concern, it is an issue, but I actually did not see the proposed comment as limiting it to lawyer mediators. 

MR. MEADOWS: Well, that's a good point, then. I mean, it may be that I was -- the ethics opinion that prompted all this was Opinion 675 that was turned on the question of "Can a Texas lawyer, acting as a mediator, prepare a written agreement that memorializes the terms of the parties' agreement and suggest additional terms for inclusion in the draft agreement?"

So perhaps I read our assignment too narrowly because I read it as focusing on what a lawyer could do in terms of memorializing the agreement but not taking the next step of preparing the divorce decree.

So it certainly would be impermissible, in my view, for a nonlawyer mediator to act beyond

memorializing the agreement; but what we know from this ethics opinion is that it's impermissible for a lawyer to do anything -- a lawyer mediator to do anything beyond memorializing the agreement.

2.0

So if I've read it too narrowly, I think you've made a good -- you know, you've raised a good point, Tracy, and maybe it's something that ought to be discussed. But that was how I was undertaking, you know, the response to that question was based on how I understood the question out of that Ethics Opinion 675.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. Judge Miskel had a hand doing something, but it may have been raised or it may have been a thumbs up. I'm not sure. But rather than try to interpret the hand, the mechanical hand, we'll just let her speak.

HONORABLE EMILY MISKEL: I was giving a thumbs up initially because I totally agree with Chief Justice Christopher. If it doesn't involve giving legal advice to a party, then it shouldn't matter if it's a lawyer mediator or a nonlawyer mediator.

And then I was also going to say there was the question about suggesting additional terms. And so specifically thinking about family law, that might be, "Okay, you've decided your weekday possession. Would you like to make agreements about the holidays?" or "You

haven't mentioned who's covering the child on health insurance," and so those would be things that would be additional terms that they might need to agree on but that wouldn't be like legal advice or tax advice or something along the lines that we wouldn't want mediators advising parties on.

So I approve -- I agree with what Robert

Meadows is saying. I agree that lawyer and nonlawyer mediators should be allowed to fill out a settlement agreement as well as make sure any additional terms, you know, like summer visitation or whatever it is, get covered in the agreement.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thank you,

14 Judge.

2.0

Richard Munzinger.

MR. MUNZINGER: When you start suggesting additional terms, it's not always as simple as a divorce case saying, "Oh, don't forget custody on vacation days." These cases aren't all divorce cases whether they're pro se or not.

And when I begin to suggest additional terms to somebody, am I not practicing law if I'm a lawyer? What happens if one of the parties decides that the agreement as written by the lawyer, which they signed, was interpreted by the lawyer to them and finds

out later that it had other features to it? 1 Do they 2 have a malpractice case? Can they file a lawsuit? What's the mediator's position in that situation? 3 There's some problems about saying that a 4 mediator may suggest terms to parties. 5 They do to me. We've all been in mediations where somebody has 6 forgotten something or something else, and the mediator, 7 if he's a good one, will say -- might ask a question, 8 but when they're pro se parties, I think you've got a 9 10 problem when you start saying that the mediator may suggest additional terms to the parties. "Well, he told 11 me I should do this. I didn't know that this had this 12 result to me, and now I'm going to file a lawsuit and 13 14 say I want out of the agreement. If I don't get out of 15 the agreement then, by God, I'm going to sue that dadgum 16 mediator. He gave me bad advice." 17 I mean, I don't know what -- how you handle this. 18 I mean, they're different issues. 19 certainly not what the committee was asked to concern, but including the language that you may suggest, 2.0 additional terms to the parties I think has some 21 ramifications that are not just necessarily scrivener 22 recommendations. They may have substantive effects that 23 24 affect the right of parties who are not represented by 25 counsel; and you got a guy representing both sides, and

that is problematic. Thank you.

2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, Richard.

Robert.

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.0

21

22

23

24

25

MR. LEVY: Following on Richard's comment, I do think there's a material difference in having the rule that would apply to lawyers as mediators versus nonlawyers, because as Richard points out, that there is a substantive context to a mediator suggesting weekend visitation. So let's say that they include that, but they don't include holiday visitation, something they should have talked about, or they don't include issues about a QDRO and retirement. And the party assumes that the mediator's guidance about what to include, including additional terms, will cover all the important issues that should be covered, and let's say they don't. And there is legal context and advice to a mediator suggesting terms to include or not to include or suggest, "No, you don't need to address that in the order," and it turns out, they should have addressed it, and the mediator had no qualification to give that advice.

And so, you know, there is the terms that you suggest, and then there are the terms that you indicate don't need to be included, and then there are the terms that the mediator neglects to address; and all

of those have consequences. 1 2 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, Robert. Lisa, Judge -- Justice Christopher, and 3 4 then Judge Miskel. MS. HOBBS: 5 Pass. No, I'm sorry. 6 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: missed Judge Estevez before Judge Miskel. 7 MS. HOBBS: I'll pass and let the Judges 8 talk. They probably have more experience. 9 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Justice Christopher. HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: Well, I 11 12 mean, I think you have to understand that in any pro se mediation, the mediator is going to be telling the 13 14 parties what they have to agree to if they want to get a 15 divorce. Right? 16 And this goes back to our very long discussion that we had about whether the clerks can help 17 18 people out and, you know, how much the Judge could do to 19 help people out. It's all part of that same philosophy. You know, the parties show up in front of the Judge, and 2.0 they've got this agreement, and the Judge says, "Well, 21 you've forgotten about this. You know, go back and get 22 23 the agreement on that." Some judges think they 24 shouldn't do that. Some judges think they should and 25 that's the best way to handle things to, you know, get

the pro se parties. So it's -- we had a long, long 1 2 discussion about this before, and this is just along those same lines. 3 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you. 5 Judge Estevez. HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: So I just want to 6 confess that when Judge Miskel was suggesting that they 7 pass out this final decree of divorce and everybody 8 checks the box while the mediator was there, I was 9 10 saying, "Yes, yes, yes." And then -- and then the ethics came up, and then I started thinking about the 11 ethics issue again. And we already approved that form. 12 And I bet you they probably -- and I'm talking about 13 14 PRPC or whatever these mediators are, because they go to 15 the \$50-a-side mediators so that they can get a 16 mediation done. I mean, they don't have money or they 17 would have gotten the lawyer, so they don't have a 18 lawyer mediator. They don't have a lawyer for 19 themselves, and they don't have a lawyer for their mediator. 2.0 And the -- we did the ethics issue. 21 talked about the ethics issue when we adopted those 22 forms. We kept going on and on about, "We're practicing 23

law and we're doing all this and telling them that this

is what they're supposed to do." And so I think we're

24

25

past that. I think that this applies to a lawyer and a
nonlawyer.

I think it's a good thing, and I also -- I want that whenever -- if the TexasLawHelp.org hasn't heard us before that they actually take our final decree of divorce and call it a mediation checklist because I think that would be very helpful to all of the parties and especially the Judges.

I mean, we spend -- I send them away after I don't give them legal advice so that they come back and do it right. And so if we can just give them that nonlegal advice right up front, they can get them done faster. We get them divorced, but all of you that think that they magically come here knowing what to do or how to do it right and that we don't have to cross that -- the Judges don't have to cross that line in order to get it done, you know, we live in a different world. It doesn't work.

So I just -- I want to echo what Chief

Justice Christopher said and Judge Miskel said. I think

it should apply to both. Even if that's what the ethics

opinion was talking about, it probably doesn't read so

narrowly that it's only talking about attorneys. It's

either legal advice or it's not legal advice; it either

crosses that line or it doesn't cross that line. If it

does it for an attorney, it does -- if it doesn't for an attorney, then it doesn't for a nonlawyer.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks. Lisa, I'm glad you didn't get in the middle of this judicial admiration society. The record will reflect that even though the court reporter couldn't hear it, the mechanical hands of Judge Miskel were clapping while Judge Estevez was talking. So --

(Simultaneous discussion)

HONORABLE TRACY CHRISTOPHER: And Judge
Christopher was nodding.

12 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: -- your turn.

2.0

Was my turn? I was just going to say that, for example, we trust clerks to know when to give information and when to say "I can't give you legal advice." And I think some types of additional terms are not legal advice, and I think some types of additional terms are legal advice. And I think we should trust mediators to know in the moment like "I can't give you tax advice. I can't suggest legal advice, but you haven't talked about where the kid's going to go to school," and I feel comfortable leaving that judgment call in the hands of the mediator.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great. Thank you.

Thank you, Judge. 1 2 Any other comments about what we're about to recommend? Bobby, anything --3 MS. HOBBS: I think I was smart to defer 4 to the Judges, but I would say, if I could sum up, their 5 experience is we can't let idealistic or perfection get 6 in the way of good enough. And sometimes in --7 sometimes we just need good enough to like get people 8 9 through the process. 10 And I don't mean to put words into our judges' mouths, but that's kind of what I'm hearing. 11 And that's a little bit why I backed off. I kind of 12 wanted to play some intellectual advocate or some, you 13 14 know, sitting in my ivory tower advocate. And really 15 sometimes you just need to get people through the 16 process and get a divorce, you know? It may not be 17 perfect. 18 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well, now we need some real world advice from John Kim. 19 Thanks. 2.0 MR. KIM: So does 675, as I read it in the letter 21 brief that was given, it doesn't seem to limit this to 22 divorce cases. Am I incorrect in that? 23 24 MR. MEADOWS: I don't think so. John, I 25 was just about to say, maybe -- I don't want to

implicate your thinking on this, but this entire issue 1 arose through these ethics opinions that were dealing with lawyer circumstances, and therefore I probably 3 approached this too narrowly. And Judge Christopher, as 4 is often the case, is correct, because what we're being 5 asked to do is to amend Guideline 4. Guideline 4 6 currently states, "agreements in writing" -- this is 7 ethical guidelines for mediators -- 14 currently states 8 a mediator should encourage the parties to reduce all 10 settlement agreements to writing.

2

9

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The proposed amendment, which has been -which I think we were asking this group to accept as the subcommittee's proposal, and I still do, says -- it would now have a comment, and the comment would read "A mediator may prepare a written settlement agreement that memorializes the terms agreed by the parties and may suggest additional terms in a draft that are consistent with the terms agreed by the parties."

So as I now understand this -- the way the issue is being presented, it does not apply singularly to lawyers who are mediators. It would, as Tracy observed, I would guess, be broader than that. then, as you point out, John, the entire discussion below that in terms of what prompted this request for an amendment turned on these lawyer circumstances: Divorce

situations, nonrepresented parties, and so forth. 1 2 So I just want to add that I think Tracy is right in that the issue for the committee is whether 3 4 or not we should accept this amendment or propose this amendment -- recommend to the Supreme Court that they 5 accept this amendment knowing that it's not -- I mean, 6 7 it applies to any mediator. CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks. 8 John, does that answer your question, or 9 10 do you still have questions? MR. KIM: Well, my concern is if it -- if 11 12 it is to be interpreted to apply to cases outside of just divorce cases, which I don't have a problem with 13 14 this rule in that aspect; but once you get outside to 15 complex type of business litigation, I sure as hell 16 don't want any mediator proposing terms to the other I mean, it is a business transaction that's going 17 side. 18 on, and there is strategic decisions that are being made, which I don't want a mediator who doesn't have a 19 full grasp of the entire case or the complexities 2.0 therein from a business aspect of it making any 21 22 suggestions. 2.3 HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: Can I respond to 24 that? 25 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Sure.

HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: The ethics -- the 1 2 ethics opinion is specifically for people with no lawyers. 3 MR. KTM: Fair enough. 4 HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ: So if you're a 5 lawyer, I don't think they're allowed to give another 6 suggestion, at least not to your party. Maybe they 7 can -- I -- but it is specific to unrepresented parties, 8 which is why we're going on and on about family law, 9 10 because that's probably 90 percent of the cases or 99 percent of these cases are going to be used in the 11 family law context. 12 And, John, to your 13 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: point, I just had a mediation in California. 14 15 California mediator did exactly what you're talking 16 about, and I was very critical of his doing that and told him so and said, you know, "It's not your place in 17 18 this very complex, you know, international implication 19 business transaction to go, you know, butting your head into it, " and he apologized and -- you know, but frankly 2.0 if I use him again, I'll take that into consideration. 21 So I think you can probably handle those 22 kind of things on a, hey, if a mediator steps out of 23 24 line that way, you can deal with it, but I think you're 25 exactly right in your comments. No question about that.

So Judge Peeples, I think, is next and 1 2 then Judge Stryker. HONORABLE DAVID PEEPLES: T want to 3 emphasize that these pro se family law cases are very 4 different from regular civil cases. In a regular civil 5 case, if a cause of action or element of damages, for 6 instance, is left out, issue preclusion will bar that 7 from being brought up later. That's not true in family 8 9 law. 10 If the details of something like visitation, possession, and so forth, if those are left 11 out, and if the mediator can't even mention those, that 12 will come back to court. That will come back and the 13 courts will have to deal with it, so there's a lot at 14 15 stake here in the family law pro se cases. 16 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you, Judge. 17 Judge Stryker. Along those 18 HONORABLE CATHLEEN STRYKER: 19 same lines, the biggest concern I have is the depth of suggesting additional terms in a family law case. So if 20 you tell the parties, "You have to figure out whether 21 you're going to sole managing conservators or joint 22 managing conservators, of course the next question is 23 going to be, "What does that mean?" 24

And the bulk of the cases that I see where

25

the pro se litigants are coming back because they're 1 2 unhappy with their settlement is they did not know what that meant, and it was something suggested either 3 through the attorney general's office, who was helping 4 them resolve their -- the amount of child support and 5 then they throw in possession and access in the back of 6 those orders, or they went, you know, and had a 7 nonattorney mediator and, you know, depending on that 8 person's leaning toward whether mom should always be 9 10 primary or dad should, you know, just be possessory conservators, they end up with something they totally 11 didn't understand. 12 So I'm a little concerned with saying 13 14 mediators can suggest additional terms without having 15 some kind of parameter in there because I see all the 16 time people unhappy with the agreements they came to because they didn't understand and were just filling in 17 18 the blank like they thought they were supposed to. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you, Judge. 20

Judge Miskel.

21

22

23

24

25

HONORABLE EMILY MISKEL: So first of all, what I would say is, in order to mediate family law cases, you have to complete a 40-hour training in mediation, and you have to additionally complete an additional 24 hours of training in mediating family law cases, so these are mediators who have gotten twice as much education on the topic.

But what I also will say is, we may not be thinking about online dispute resolution. So online dispute resolution is currently happening in Texas.

Counties are currently paying Tyler Technology for their asynchronous mediation product, which is the plaintiff and the defendant exchange offers through a software platform with the assistance of a mediator and reach a settled -- settlement agreement. And I have been trained in the platform that Tyler Technology is selling in Texas because they wanted me to test the family law one, and it literally walks the parties through the form in a checklist manner.

And so if we are currently, as counties, paying for software that does this on the county dime, I don't think that we should say that professionals who have had two training classes can't exercise their judgment in this area.

CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thank you, Judge.

Bobby, do you want to restate your -- the subcommittee's recommendation, and then we'll give everybody one more chance to say if they disagree with it?

MR. MEADOWS: No, I think our -- I mean,

Tracy and others for sure should speak up, but I think 1 2 our recommendation remains the same, and that is if the Court should accept the requested amendment to Rule 14 3 and let mediators reduce, memorialize, the terms of the 4 agreement. And it does -- the comment does go on to say 5 "and suggest additional terms," but it says "that are 6 consistent with terms agreed by the parties." So --7 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: And you -- I'm sorry, 8 Bobby. And you accept Justice Christopher's friendly 9 10 amendment that the term "mediators" applies to both lawyer and nonlawyer mediators? 11 12 MR. MEADOWS: The reason -- as I say, I haven't done any original research on this, but of 13 14 course I do. And the language of the rule that's being 15 amended says "a mediator should." And so if you qualify 16 as a mediator under this rule, I would think whether 17 you're a lawyer or not, this ethical guideline would 18 apply to you. 19 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Okay. We're going to 2.0 vote in a second on that. Anybody -- any further discussion? Because the vote is going to be are you in 21 favor of the proposal of the subcommittee as Bobby just 22 identified it with a friendly amendment from Justice 23 24 Christopher. 25 Richard Munzinger.

MR. MUNZINGER: The way it's written, it 1 2 says, "The mediator may suggest additional terms," which I interpret as meaning substantive material as distinct 3 4 from "the mediator may suggest areas requiring further agreement" or areas -- I like what I just said, 5 "requiring further agreement." If you're doing divorce 6 cases, you can say, "Well, what'd you do about 7 vacations?" If it's not a divorce case, the guy may 8 think of something else, but it's one thing to suggest 9 10 the terms as distinct from the issues and let the parties find their own way to it. 11 12 I think I've said what I want to say. MR. MEADOWS: But Richard, I was just 13 14 going to add, it says -- and, look, I don't really --15 I'm pretty agnostic about this. It says "suggest 16 additional terms in a draft that are consistent with the terms agreed by the parties." So I would take the draft 17 18 comment to mean that the parties themselves had to agree 19 to what's being suggested. MR. MUNZINGER: Well, dealing with a pro 20 se person, the lawyer suggests the substance of a term. 21 Is he intimidated intellectually? I don't mean he's 22 frightened, but is he -- he yields to the expertise of 23

somebody, and there's a lot of emotion, you're in a

hurry, and you want to get out of there and this and

24

25

```
that.
           I mean, my only concern is that the mediator is
1
 2
   suggesting terms to parties, and I see that as
   problematic; but I don't deal in these things every day
 3
   like some of the Judges do, and they know what they're
 4
   doing.
 5
6
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                     Great.
                                              Thank you,
7
   Richard.
                  All right. Everybody in favor of the
8
9
   subcommittee's proposal as amended by Justice
10
   Christopher, or at least the interpretation as amended
   by Justice Christopher, raise your hand.
11
12
                  Everybody -- you can lower your hands now.
                  Everybody opposed?
13
14
                  All right.
15
                  MR. LEVY: Richard can't do this without
16
   voting.
17
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: What's that?
18
                  MR. LEVY: Richard, you're not voting?
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Well --
19
20
                  MR. MUNZINGER: I don't have strong
   feelings either way. I'm not --
21
                  MR. LEVY: I'm sorry, I shouldn't push
22
2.3
   that on you.
24
                  MR. MUNZINGER: Oh, no, no, no. You're --
25
   I'm glad you noticed I didn't vote, but I just -- I
```

```
don't have strong feelings either way, and so I'm going
1
 2
   to abstain, unless Chip tells me I have to vote.
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK:
                                     No, you don't.
 3
                                                      You
 4
   don't have to vote.
                  And, Pauline, check me on this, but it
 5
   looked like there were 24 in favor and three against.
6
   Pauline, is that what you had?
7
                  MS. EASLEY:
                               Correct.
8
                  CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Great.
                                              So that will
9
10
   carry by a vote of 24-3, the chair not voting.
                                                     And that
   concludes our agenda; but before we go, one more time,
11
12
   Lisa, you may not have heard me -- my statement right
   after the lunch break because I think you came in later,
13
   but you've saved me once again.
14
15
                  The next meeting will be September 3rd,
16
   and after that will be the Texas Supreme Court
17
   Historical Society cocktail party and dinner, which many
18
   of us will go to; but it will be the October meeting
19
   where the SCAC will have its reception and photo
              So I was all confused at the beginning.
2.0
   session.
                                                        Ι
   apologize for that, but now we're on the right track, I
21
   think until I mess it up again, and that will happen any
22
23
   minute now.
                 So --
24
                              I'm glad for the correction.
                  MS. HOBBS:
25
   As an officer of the historical society, I will say to
```

everyone on this call: We are about to sell out because 1 2 we are at limited capacity due to Four Seasons' policy. So it's not -- it's going to be much less lawyers in 3 that room than normal, and I think we are about six 4 tickets away, which means one table way, from selling 5 So I'm sorry to put in a plug for the historical 6 society, but if you do not have your table or your 7 tickets, you need to get with Mary Sue immediately 8 because we're about to sell out. 9 10 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Thanks, Lisa. That's a good reminder for a worthy cause for sure. 11 And if there's no -- if there's no other 12 business, I'll repeat what Justice Bland has said, which 13 14 is great to see everyone. Thank you. And I add my 15 thanks, too. This was extraordinary work under a really 16 tight time deadline. And, you know, this committee 17 continues, after all these years as chair, to amaze me 18 in how great you are and how hard you work and how 19 insightful everybody is, so thank you. MR. MEADOWS: Oh, did Justice Bland say 20 that it was -- did Jane say it was her preference to see 21 everyone this way? 22 23 CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: Let's see what she 24 "Glad to see everyone. Thank you. Have a good says. 25 summer, and we look forward to seeing you in September."

1	No, I think she wants to see us
2	MR. MEADOWS: There you go.
3	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: in person, as we do
4	her, so
5	HONORABLE JANE BLAND: In person.
6	CHAIRMAN BABCOCK: In person, right. So
7	that's great work everyone and done in record time, and
8	we will now go off the record and be in recess. Thank
9	you. Thank you, Pauline.
10	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Recording stopped.
11	(Adjourned)
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
2	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION
3	MEETING OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
4	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
5	
6	
7	I, Lorrie A. Schnoor, Certified Shorthand
8	Reporter in and for the State of Texas, Registered
9	Diplomate Reporter and Certified Realtime Reporter, do
10	hereby certify that I reported the above meeting of the
11	Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the 18th day of
12	June, 2021, and the same was thereafter reduced to
13	computer transcription by me.
14	I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT the costs for my
15	services in the matter are \$ .
16	Charged to: The State Bar of Texas.
17	Given under my hand and seal on this 2nd day of
18	July, 2021.
19	Forrie a. sanoo
20	LORRIE A. SCHNOOR, RDR, CRR Certified Shorthand Reporter
21	CSR No. 4642 - Expires 1/31/22
22	Firm Registration No. 276 Kennedy Reporting Service, Inc.
23	555 Round Rock West Drive Suite E-202
24	Round Rock, Texas 78681 512.474.2233
25	