

# Case Summaries April 5, 2024

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#### **DECIDED CASES**

#### ARBITRATION

# **Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement**

Lennar Homes of Tex. Inc. v. Rafiei, \_\_\_ S.W.3d \_\_\_, 2024 WL \_\_\_ (Tex. Apr. 5, 2024) (per curiam) [22-0830]

The issue is whether the plaintiff established that the arbitration agreement in his home-purchase contract is unconscionable because the cost to arbitrate the issue of "arbitrability" would be excessive.

Rafiei bought a house from Lennar Homes. Several years later, Rafiei sued Lennar for personal injuries that he attributed to improper installation of a garbage disposal. Lennar moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in the home-purchase contract. Rafiei opposed the motion on the ground that the costs of arbitration are so excessive that the agreement is unconscionable and unenforceable. The trial court denied Lennar's motion and the court of appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court reversed. First, it observed that because the arbitration agreement had a clause delegating the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator, Rafiei had to show that the costs to arbitrate the delegation clause are unconscionable, not the costs to arbitrate the entire case. If an arbitrator decides that the costs to arbitrate the entire case are unconscionable, the case is returned to the courts. The Court then concluded that Rafiei presented legally insufficient evidence to demonstrate unconscionability for that proceeding, which requires an evaluation of: (1) the cost for an arbitrator to decide arbitrability, (2) the cost for a court to decide arbitrability, and (3) Rafiei's ability to afford one but not the other. While Rafiei presented evidence of the fees he might incur in arbitration, he presented no evidence that he sought an agreement to proceed with a single arbitrator, as permitted by the agreement's terms, or a fee reduction under the AAA rules. Additionally, he presented limited evidence regarding the costs of litigating in court, preventing a comparison to the cost of arbitration. Finally, Rafiei failed to establish his ability to pay for litigation but not arbitration. He averred that he had \$6,000 in surplus income a month and did not explain why he could not afford to pay for fees associated with arbitration of the unconscionability issue.

### **NEGLIGENCE**

## **Premises Liability**

Albertsons, LLC v. Mohammadi, \_\_\_ S.W.3d \_\_\_, 2024 WL \_\_\_ (Tex. Apr. 5, 2024) (per curiam) [23-0041].

At issue in this slip-and-fall case is whether the premises owner's knowledge of a leaking bag placed in a wire shopping cart is evidence of the owner's actual knowledge of the dangerous condition that caused the fall.

Maryam Mohammadi slipped and fell at a Randalls grocery store next to a shopping cart used by Randalls to store returned or damaged goods. She alleged that a leaking bag placed in the cart caused her to slip. Randalls disputed that the floor was wet. The jury charge contained separate questions about Randalls' constructive knowledge of the danger and its actual knowledge of the danger, and the jury was instructed to answer the actual-knowledge question only if it answered "yes" to the constructive-knowledge question. The jury answered "no" to the constructive-knowledge question and therefore did not answer the actual-knowledge question. The trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment for Randalls.

The court of appeals reversed, holding that the jury should have been given the opportunity to answer the question on Randalls' actual knowledge. Though there is no evidence that Randalls knew of the wet floor before the fall, the court reasoned that Randalls had knowledge of the dangerous condition because there is some evidence that an employee knowingly placed a leaking grocery bag in the shopping cart.

The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding that any charge error is harmless because there is legally insufficient evidence of Randalls' actual knowledge. The Court reiterated that the relevant dangerous condition is the condition at the time and place injury occurs, not the antecedent situation that created the condition. Here, the dangerous condition for which Randalls could be liable was the wet floor, not the leaking bag placed into the shopping cart.