Second Court of Appeals

Summaries of Civil Opinions and Published Criminal Opinions Issued - Week of December 29, 2014

NOTE: Summaries are prepared by the court's staff attorneys and law clerks for public information only and reflect his or her interpretation alone of the facts and legal issues. The summaries are not part of the court's opinion in the case and should not be cited to, quoted, or relied upon as the opinion of the court.

Links to full text of opinions (PDF version) can be accessed by clicking the cause number.

 JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Prof'l Pharmacy II, No. 02-11-00373-CV (Dec. 31, 2014) (Gardner, J., joined by McCoy and Meier, JJ.).

Held: Partnership had standing to sue the bank for negligence in opening a bank account and in paying funds out of the account in response to a writ of garnishment directed at one of the partners individually because the funds in the account were partnership property. The bank owed the partnership a duty of care when opening the account and responding to the writ of garnishment. Evidence that the bank opened the account as a joint sole proprietorship account instead of a partnership account contrary to partnership's instructions and documents provided to the bank and that the bank paid funds out of the account in response to the writ of garnishment when it recognized that the funds in the account were partnership funds was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's negligence finding against the bank. While it was undisputed that $116,683 was withdrawn from the account in response to the writ of garnishment, the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the partnership's claim that it suffered additional damages for business disruption due to the wrongful withdrawal of the funds from the account by the bank.

In re C.R.A. & S.A.A., No. 02-12-00498-CV (Dec. 31, 2014) (Gardner, J., joined by Livingston, C.J., and Gabriel, J.)

Held: The Georgia divorce decree giving Mother "primary physical custody" of the children and imposing a geographic restriction that expired at the end of the children's school year did not comply with section 153.134(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. Mother's "primary physical custody" did not include the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the children as contemplated by section 153.134(b)(1). Regarding the geographic restriction, section 153.134(b)(1)(A) contemplates geographic restrictions being modified only by order and does not contemplate geographic restrictions simply expiring with time. Section 153.134(b)(1)(B) requires the absence of a geographic restriction be specified; the Georgia divorce decree failed to specify either parent could determine the children's primary residence without regard to geographic location but was, instead, silent as to the parents' respective rights after the expiration of its geographic restriction. Father's suit was, therefore, not a suit seeking to modify the designation of the person having the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the children and was not a suit seeking a modification of a geographic restriction as contemplated by section 153.134(b)(1)(A) and (B).

Bizios v. Town of Lakewood Vill., Tex., No. 02-14-00143-CV (Dec. 31, 2014) (McCoy, J., joined by Meier and Gabriel, JJ.).

Held: The local government code does not grant a Type-A general law municipality the authority to extend its building code to its extraterritorial jurisdiction.